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Abstract
Catherine Anne Morse
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Sheffield 
Hallam University for the degree of Doctor of Education
Law Student Understandings of Critical Thinking: A Phenomenographic 
Study
This dissertation provides a phenomenographic analysis of perceptions of 
critical thinking in Law students. The ability to develop and demonstrate critical 
thinking is a key element in higher education, being an important criterion for 
success in terms of assessment. Critical thinking is particularly significant in the 
context of the study of Law, as Law embraces both problem-solving in the 
'technical' sense as well as the consideration and evaluation of argument, 
policy and jurisprudential questions. While definitions of critical thinking are 
problematic, they would include such notions of problem-solving and evaluation, 
so making legal education interestingly susceptible to such enquiry.
Phenomenography as a qualitative research method is well established, 
(although also contested) and has been used particularly in the field of 
educational research. It aims to give a 'second-order' account of perceptions of 
phenomena and so appeared to be an appropriate methodology in this instance, 
where the main investigation concerns students' own interpretation of what 
'critical thinking' might connote.
A group of first- year students was interviewed and a set of questions used to 
enable their perceptions and experience of critical thinking to emerge. An 
account of these perceptions, categorised under five headings, was then 
developed. The five categories are as follows: Critical thinking as negative; 
Instrumental critical thinking; A sense of argument; A general sense of analysis 
and Critical thinking as a way of being. The findings in relation to such 
perceptions, reviewed in the light of the literature on critical thinking and some 
of the current debates surrounding practices and directions in legal education, 
have clear implications for informing curriculum development, changing 
practice and developing pedagogic theory.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Problem
Background
The subject for my research, essentially students' perceptions of critical 
thinking, grew out of several initial sets of ideas and was refined over a period 
of months. I wanted to look at issues within legal education, particularly relating 
to the first year experience. To concentrate on the first year of undergraduate 
study seemed especially appropriate for both personal and external reasons. 
My own teaching in universities has tended, more particularly in recent years, 
to be predominantly at first year level. Many of my administrative and pastoral 
roles have been related to this level of study and experience. Furthermore, 
many of the more recent initiatives both at Sheffield Hallam University and in 
higher education generally, for example those referred to in the work of Smith 
and Hopkins (2005); Lowe and Cook (2003); Cook and Leckey (1999), have 
related to what has been broadly termed the 'transition' issue -  notably the 
transition of students from school or college to university at the age of eighteen 
or nineteen (still a majority of the student population, although this may be 
beginning to shift slightly due to demographic and other factors - see for 
example the BBC report on the findings of 'Universities UK' on demographic 
change and falling demand for places) (10th July 2008). There seemed, then, 
to be a sufficient academic and professional basis here (given the nature and
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requirements of the Doctorate in Education (Professional Practice)) for potential 
research which would have implications for curriculum development and 
student support on the Law Programme and the LLB in particular. (This is given 
a little further explanation below).
Broadly, there were three stages in the development of this research topic. My 
first thoughts centred around researching the problems and issues in teaching 
interdisciplinary subjects within the Law curriculum, a topic on which I had 
written two short conference papers (Morse, 2002 and 2005) and which was of 
particular interest given my activities at the time. Thinking about this enhanced 
my realisation that the aspect which especially concerned me was the student 
'experience', but 'experience' in a more subjective sense i.e. what their own 
expectations, assumptions, insecurities and existing skills and knowledge might 
be. Such thinking also threw up the interesting questions of what Law as a 
discipline is, and also the potential for a disjunction between staff and students' 
perspectives and perceptions as to the nature of legal education.
This first phase of thinking developed into a more student-focussed idea, 
relating more specifically to comparing students' perceptions of the academic 
skills they have as compared to staff perceptions. The question of the 
assumptions and expectations of students in regard to what a Law degree 
involves would also be explored (Pue, 2008). Academic skills and perceived 
'deficiencies' have been at the fore of some recent developments and debates
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within education, (Lizzio et al 2002, Hattie 1996) and indeed, the press and 
media in general, ('School leavers lack basic skills, say universities') (The 
Guardian, 9th February 2006) so again in respect of this topic there was an 
interesting and relevant meshing of personal experience and external 
significance.
However, continuing discussions with key academic staff then helped me to 
refine my ideas further. Considerations for example of scope, manageability, 
appropriateness of research methodologies and personal interest gave rise to a 
'final' set of ideas which have more than formed the basis for this research 
dissertation. In principle, a consideration of students' perceptions of critical 
thinking relates to three important requirements of doctoral educational and 
professional work; namely, it has implications for practice in terms of how to 
enhance the student experience; it raises academic questions as to the nature 
and purpose of law teaching, and it is a topic of immense personal interest. 
Discussions and consideration of research methods and methodology, 
approaches to interviewing, selection of students and so on then took place.
Reflections on Critical Thinking
It has for a long time seemed to me that critical thinking - whether we call it by 
this name, or criticality, or the ability to critique and analyse (using these terms 
more or less interchangeably for the present) is and should be a central tenet of
3
higher education, if not of all education. I could trace this personal conviction as 
having derived probably largely from my own educational background 
(grammar school, academic 'hothouse' sixth form college, English Degree and 
teacher training) and, to some extent, family influences. Much learning, from a 
relatively early age, appeared to stress the importance of not merely acquiring 
'knowledge' but of being able to question, analyse and develop argument- 
particularly so in subjects such as English, Religious Education, later at 'A' 
Level History and more recently in my legal studies. It was stressed to us 
during my teacher training that such an approach was particularly important at 
'A' Level, and it had been fostered during my English Degree studies. Coming 
into learning and teaching Law I became aware obviously of a different and 
more explicit set of requirements and possibly tensions -  put simply, what can 
be termed the 'black-letter' approach to legal education and training which puts 
a greater emphasis on the students' ability to 'learn the law' and not worry too 
much about theory, critique or wider contextual issues. In this version of legal 
education (and it would be easy, if possibly simplistic to call it “legal 
Gradgrindism") what matters is the acquisition of facts, cases, 'the Law' and the 
ability to apply these in certain scenarios. The variants and tensions within legal 
education are developed a little further in the concluding chapter but suffice to 
say that such different approaches to the teaching of Law, combined with 
several other more recent trends in higher education generally (broadly, the 
move towards vocationalism, skills and competencies and away from 'liberal 
arts' ideals have certainly challenged, but not necessarily shaken my initial
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convictions as set out above. Indeed, there is a significant counter-movement
which I would tend to endorse:
An academic called for a campaign for “critical higher education” 
this week, warning that the vision of universities as places that 
foster independent and critical thought is being replaced by a 
“wholly economistic” view ... “a view of education as a commodity 
rather than as a process, a set of 'inputs' to be delivered and 
consumed”...
(Brecher, B, quoted in Attwood, R, “Nurture 
sceptics, not industry fodder, critic says”) THE,
24th January 2008 p.5.
Other recent authors adopting this kind of thinking include Barnett (1990, 1994 
and 1997), and Rowland (2001).
Such personal reflections are relevant not just in relation to the genesis of this 
research, but to the question of positionality, or the potential for intrusion of 
personal 'position' into the research, in terms for example of interviewing 
approaches or interpretation of data. I think in this case, if this is an issue it 
would mainly be in relation to what in Chapter 5 is termed the fifth category - 
“Critical Thinking as a Way of Being”. This is where students were asked about 
their view of critical thinking as relating to the wider world and society as 
opposed to its academic significance. This view of critical thinking, as described 
below, for example by Brookfield (1987 and 2005) is one which has particular 
resonance for me and I was inevitably pleased when I “found” it, while being 
aware of:
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...the problem for the researcher of projection of his own 
conceptions into the interpretation of the interview material.
(Hedegaard and Hakkarainen in Ashworth et 
al, 1986 Ch. 6 p. 134).
While such findings would not vitiate any interpretation of data it is important to 
be aware of and reveal and comment on such personal predispositions or 
prejudices.
Clearly, a consideration of critical thinking brings in several wider issues which 
may be touched on in this dissertation but remain generally outside its scope -  
questions relating for example to the nature, purpose and politics of education 
including legal education; what (legal) education is and ought to be; whether 
the increasing emphasis on skills and competencies is tending to detract from 
the development of critical thinking; and how students themselves perceive the 
learning of Law. The latter points in particular may lend themselves to future 
research but this work will concentrate on the critical thinking dimension, 
particularly as seen through students' eyes, and as described further below.
The Research Rationale and Focus
For the immediate purposes of this research the two key questions appear to 
be, then, how can critical thinking be defined, and what might be the students' 
perceptions of critical thinking. It may become possible to relate their 
perceptions to the definitions expressed in the literature, or it may be that there
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appears to be little relationship between the two. If it should emerge that there 
is little consonance, this research may acquire additional significance in alerting 
us to such a discrepancy, with possible implications for our understanding of 
students and their interpretation of what we as academics expect them to 
demonstrate in terms of their approach to study and in the conceptual 
frameworks and terminologies we employ.
In any case, however, this research should help us better to comprehend how 
students have internalised the notions of critical thinking and analysis with 
which they may have been presented during their academic careers. It is clear 
that critical thinking is a highly important aspect of a student's general 
academic performance in Law, notwithstanding my comments above regarding 
'black-letterism1. There is a great emphasis placed upon this cognitive skill, in 
terms of, for example, the assessment criteria used locally and the QAA 
benchmarking skills for Law:
Critical analysis is recognised as a key feature of graduateness. It 
involves the ability to identify flaws in an argument.
(Section 2 Para.4.12 Law Benchmarking 
Statement 2007)
Such skills have come to signify 'graduateness', post-Dearing, with the 
apparent commitment to the principle that higher education should:
sustain a culture which demands disciplined thinking, encourages 
curiosity, challenges existing ideas and generates new ones.
(Para.1.4 National Committee of Enquiry into 
Higher Education 1997)
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Our students are exposed from the outset to a learning and assessment culture 
which prizes critical analysis; their basic assignment feedback sheet with which 
they become rapidly familiar, (and which is used as a reference point in the 
interviews for this research, see Appendix B) currently talks of, for example:
Consistent use of critical analysis well integrated into the text [and] 
critical and wide-ranging use of relevant cases and materials 
(two examples of 1st Class criteria);
Some evidence of critical thought/overly descriptive content
(examples of 2:2 and 3rd Class overall criteria).
In terms of essay-writing generally, and perhaps particularly within the more 
contextual or socio-legal subjects studies, there is a demand for critical thinking 
to be displayed in order for the higher levels of grading to be achieved. In short, 
then, strong emphasis is being placed, both in the wider and local contexts, on 
the demonstration of a faculty important for real success, where those most 
involved and affected may have an incomplete, or distorted, or otherwise 
unhelpful perspective which may be at odds with what academics are seeking 
and which they wish to reward.
This still, of course, begs the question of what critical thinking is, or might be. 
This will be explored in Chapter 2, primarily by means of a literature review. 
Moon (2008) more recently offers a map of the territory and identifies some of 
the complexities involved in definitions, showing an awareness of critical 
thinking as a 'way of being' (Ch.2 p.47) (which she ascribes to Brown and 
Rutter, 2006) and which I have used in Chapter 5 to describe my fifth
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phenomenographic category. However, in general terms what I have talked 
about so far relates to a broad academic notion -  the critical analysis of texts, 
materials and ideas. Within the Law curriculum, as suggested above, there is 
also a strong emphasis (partly driven by professional body requirements) on 
critical thinking in the sense of the logical application of facts and Law for 
problem-solving; a more clinical, or process-based set of critical skills, with an 
emphasis on the making of 'critical judgements[s] of the merits of particular 
arguments' (Section 1 Para 7.1 Law Benchmarking Statement 2007).
Such skills and approaches will also be considered in relation to the literature 
and in the context of the students' perceptions of what critical thinking might be, 
in relation to Law specifically.
Implications for Professional Practice
An enhanced understanding of students' perceptions may be used to 
inform professional practice within the teaching of Law, in the contexts 
specifically of curriculum development and delivery, and particularly in relation 
to what has been termed the 'transition' issue. Higher education institutions 
(and the teaching of Law is no exception) pay great attention to the 
management of what is being termed Induction and Orientation, and this 
emphasis seems likely to increase in the coming years. In principle, Induction 
and Orientation refers to aspects of life in higher education with which the
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students need to become familiar, and the term really embraces the pastoral, 
social and academic support available; management of student expectations; 
introduction to the notion of independent learning, and initial development of 
academic and other skills necessary for successful learning and future 
employability.
A demonstrable form of knowledge, then, about students' perceptions, together 
with a concomitant set of inferences (possibly) about the barriers to the 
development of critical thinking, would make a useful contribution to our 
approaches to the academic aspect of Induction and Orientation. Such work is 
already being undertaken at the time of writing; see for example the work of 
Lowe and Cook (2003) and Smith and Hopkins (2005). It is envisaged that the 
findings of this current research will contribute to this empirically - based and 
developing awareness of student experience and perception.
With reference to the methodology underpinning this work (Phenomenography 
- discussed particularly in Chapters 4 and 6), the following quotation provided 
at this stage reveals a general objective:
The purpose of this increased emphasis on the descriptive 
elements of research would be to make possible an improvement in 
the accuracy and analytical clarity with which we are able to 
discuss educational phenomena... there clearly is a need for 
complementing main-stream research with approaches that regard 
the educational field and the world of teachers and students as yet 
to be discovered and conceptualized.
(Saljo in Ashworth et al 1986, Ch.5 p.121)
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Greater understanding of students' views may lead to improved communication 
with students in the context of the articulation of critical thinking desiderata and 
in the ways in which we attempt to impart what is meant by critical thinking and 
analysis. Clearly this is a theme which will be developed further in the 
concluding sections, but in short it is anticipated that this work could underpin 
future changes and developments in the delivery of the Law curriculum here, 
particularly in relation to the first year of study. The work should both raise 
awareness of the student view and thus also prompt and inspire discussion and 
action on how best to enhance our pedagogic response, for example in relation 
to the explanation and teaching of skills and the giving of feedback -  the latter 
especially being designated, at least by students, as a problematic area.
A brief outline of the mechanisms by which such research may be locally 
disseminated and considered and principles implemented may be useful. 
Currently I am Learning, Teaching and Assessment (LTA) Co-ordinator for the 
Law Subject Group, but whether my role changes or not in the near future there 
would be opportunities to present and discuss findings with key staff through 
Law's LTA Group, and/or through the programmed series of research seminars 
held at regular intervals, as well as at staff meetings and other Divisional and 
Faculty LTA events. While tending to be concentrated around key events such 
as validations, there is ongoing planning, discussion and consultation amongst 
colleagues in relation to a range of curricular and associated issues, and 
responses to this work would be integrated into these processes. There may
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also be further opportunities to develop and embed practices and approaches 
arising from this work with the support of, for example, future Centre for 
Excellence in Teaching and Learning (CETL) and Learning and Teaching 
Institute (LTI) - based opportunities for project work in this area.
A Wider Context
As has been suggested, the fact that this work should inform Induction and 
Orientation, and assist in identifying and ameliorating difficulties that students 
have in the context of critical thinking, means that the research clearly 
contributes to the ongoing work relating to “transition” to the first year at 
university.
Transition has been more heavily emphasised in recent years due to a range of 
suggested factors, in particular external developments such as widening 
participation, the debate over the nature and quality of 'A' Levels and other 
post-sixteen qualifications; increased and government-led targets for admission 
to University, and other socio-cultural factors which influence the forms of 
knowledge, expectations and perceptions of the generations currently entering 
university. The acquisition of academic skills is seen as being a key part of the 
transitional or orientational 'phase' and critical thinking, or analysis, can be no 
exception. The findings of this work, then, are of widespread concern and will
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be used to inform current debate, by means of the preparation and presentation 
of conference papers.
There is a certain topicality to the notion of critical thinking, not least in the 
(rather instrumental) context of the introduction by some universities of 
Thinking Skills Assessments as part of their Admissions procedures, 
particularly for law and other “high-applicant number” courses:
Critical thinking skills must be more widely taught if we are to 
broaden access
(Alec Fisher: THES Dec. 19/26 2003, no.1620 
P-18)
Students applying to read law at the leading universities will have to 
sit a joint entrance paper as part of this autumn's selection 
process... The test is designed to provide “objective evaluations of 
candidates from a wide range of social and educational 
backgrounds by assessing general intellectual skills of 
comprehension, analysis, logic and judgement... in this way the test 
will help to widen participation in higher education”.
(Glen Owen: The Times, Feb.3.2004. p.8, 
quoting the “architects” of the National 
Admissions Test for Law).
It is interesting to note, (if admittedly not strictly relevant for this research 
project) how the notion of critical thinking is being related to the issue of 
widening participation within this particular set of debates. On the one hand 
(and reflected in the latter quotation) critical thinking is being presented as 
somehow being a free-floating, neutral measure of 'intellectual potential', 
unrelated to social and educational background and so useful in determining
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intellectual capacity for (legal) study in a fair and “even-handed” way. However 
as Fisher notes in the THES article referred to above, it is likely that:
...students from more privileged backgrounds will be given 
instruction in these skills before taking the TSA [Thinking Skills 
Assessment], and their advantaged position will be maintained.
An interesting and highly topical political context therefore exists for an enquiry 
into the possession of critical thinking skills, perhaps particularly among Law 
students.
Critical thinking tests (subject again to definitions as discussed in Chapter 2) of 
course also form a significant part of employers' selection techniques, at least 
in terms of the logical thinking and problem-solving aspects.
To sum up, then, the aim of this work is to provide a better understanding of 
students' perceptions and interpretation of what we as academics expect in 
terms of some of their approaches to study. It should help us better to 
understand students' ability to undertake critical analysis in a wide academic 
context and to some extent to apply it in a specifically legal context. Some of 
the factors which may inhibit their understanding may be extrapolated and this 
may lead to improved pedagogic approaches. In both the wider context of 
higher education, and legal education specifically, critical thinking is seen as 
key:
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Intellectual integrity and independence of mind. This requires a high 
degree of self-motivation, an ability to think critically for oneself 
beyond conventional attitudes and understanding and to undertake 
self-directed learning; to be reflective in the sense of being self- 
aware and self-critical... These abilities and other transferable 
intellectual skills are usually developed by degree level education...
...the Degree course should stand as an independent liberal 
education in the discipline of Law, not tied to any specific vocation.
(Paras. 2.4 and 4.6 1st ACLEC Report 1996) 
(Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on 
Legal Education and Conduct).
The different approaches to the Law Degree - as liberal education, and as 
preparation for professional practice are commented on further, particularly in 
Chapter 8.
These, then, are the key themes and principles to be pursued and developed in 
the succeeding chapters.
15
Chapter 2 
Critical Thinking
It is apparent from reading the main contributors to the debate on critical 
thinking that there exist several definitions, or purported definitions, of what 
critical thinking might mean. An initial impression of the range of possibilities is 
suggested by the existence, at one end of the spectrum, as it were, of a view of 
critical thinking as a system of logical problem-solving, for example Ennis 
(1995) and Bowell and Kemp (2005). At the other end, (for this immediate 
graphical purpose), an impression of critical thinking as an entire approach to 
life and society, in a sense that nowadays could be termed a mental ‘lifestyle’, 
can be found (Brookfield, 1987 and 2005; Moon, 2008). Conceptions moving 
towards the latter can be seen in the developing sense of critical thinking as 
being allied to, or constituted by, reflection and reflectivity. It is such 
conceptions and definitions which will be explored in further detail and analysed 
below.
Certain problems immediately present themselves within the context of such 
intended analysis. The first, and in a sense the most unwieldy, is the problem of 
isolating the notion of “critical thinking” from the study of “thinking” generally. It 
became very apparent, quite early in the reading, that there would be a need to 
construct a boundary to exclude, for example, the more psychological and 
neurological accounts of the thinking process. Theories of cognitive
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development and psychological experiments in the field are not included here, 
for reasons of space, lack of expertise and indeed relevance.
The processes of cognition are not essential to what is particularly being 
scrutinised here; namely, the attempts to define and categorise what is broadly 
termed critical thinking, from the perspective of both academics and students. 
However, it would be naive not to acknowledge that certain conditions for, and 
processes of, critical thinking, are not rooted in the deep structures and 
chemical interactions of the brain, or in key psychological aspects of thinking, 
developed from infancy, such as what Bruner et al. (1956) would term “...one of 
the simplest and most ubiquitous phenomena of cognition: categorizing or 
conceptualising.” (Preface Pviii)
Secondly, to some extent there should be an awareness of the particular 
political or philosophical contexts in which writing on critical thinking has taken 
place. Broadly, for example, there has been a shift from an essentially positivist 
or “technical” outlook to (in some cases) a view of critical thinking as being an 
aspect of the maturing self, with a greater emphasis on subjectivity and self- 
awareness. Such shifts could be linked with other changes in society, such as 
the growth of individualism, and the relative distrust sometimes evidenced in 
modern society in respect of positivism and scientific developments.
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Changes in educational policy and ideology have also taken place. It could be 
suggested that there has been some degree of shift to a more student-centred 
approach, certainly if contrasted, for example, with educational approaches in 
the 1950s and previously. However, it may appear that this shift has been 
offset to some extent by more recent political interventions such as the 
promotion of league tables, the necessity of “teaching to the exam” and the 
standardisation and homogenisation of the curriculum, at least in schools. 
Pedagogic trends will undoubtedly influence, and be influenced by, 
developments in the theory of critical thinking.
Writers such as Habermas and Chomsky perhaps particularly reflect an 
awareness of the relationship between critical thinking and the political context 
of the time:
The encroachment of economic and administrative sub-systems on 
communicative interaction can be suffocating. Nonetheless, there is 
a potential for emancipation and resistance through social 
movements concerned with the quality of life...
Habermas deems it essential that we develop the institutions and 
the communicative competence necessary to secure an effectively 
functioning public sphere in which practical questions can be 
resolved through public discussion and decided on the basis of 
discursively achieved agreement.
(Mezirow, 1991, Ch.3 p.72)
There is here a suggestion of a close and necessary relationship between what 
Habermas termed ‘emancipatory learning’, which includes critical reflection and 
the construction of rational discourse, and the wider political and economic
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world we inhabit. We will return to this idea of an emancipatory aspect of critical 
thinking below.
What will now firstly be considered is the notion that critical thinking is largely 
about logical (in the strict sense) thinking and problem-solving. King and 
Kitchener (1994) go straight to this consideration, (if only subsequently to 
critique it):
Traditional attempts to define critical thinking typically reflect two 
perspectives. From one perspective, critical thinking is viewed as 
synonymous with logic or the hypothetico-deductive method... From 
another perspective, critical thinking is seen as a process of inquiry 
or problem solving.
(Ch.1 p.8)
The connection with logic, and traditional assumptions about the development 
of critical thinking within the curriculum, is given expression by John McPeck, 
albeit while also acknowledging the “vagueness of the concept” which can 
support:
...curriculum proposals ranging from courses in Latin to logic and 
clever puzzle games.
(McPeck, 1981, Ch.1 
pp. 1-3)
This would appear to reflect the notion of critical thinking broadly espoused by 
employers’ testing techniques, for example, through the deployment of the 
typical “scenario followed by multiple choice questions” test for job applicants. 
The test is presumably designed to reveal the degree to which the candidate
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can assimilate facts, comprehend and negotiate contradictions and linguistic 
complexities and arrive at a logically deduced and correct conclusion. Such 
tests would appear rooted in an instrumental and logic-based conception of 
critical thinking. Such an approach has been given a certain topicality, as 
mentioned above in the introductory chapter, in relation to Thinking Skills 
Assessments and widening participation, for example.
It seems that such tests are being increasingly used to determine a candidate's 
intellectual capacity for academic study in a fair manner, where class, gender, 
ethnicity and other such factors relevant to educational performance are left in 
abeyance. As has been noted above, however, there remains the possibility of 
more privileged or fortunate students being thoroughly coached in such types 
of test, so that they rapidly become more conversant with the techniques to be 
applied.
In relation to such views of critical thinking, (as relating to skills in logic) I would 
agree with McPeck’s assertion of a “fallacy” which:
...consists in regarding a necessary condition of critical thinking, 
namely a concern for logic, as a sufficient condition for critical 
thinking.
(Ch.1 p.8)
The idea of critical thinking as being, if not merely to do with logic, but with 
‘process’, is one which appears to be connected with the work of Robert Ennis, 
who wrote a key article in 1962, and who appears at the time of writing on the
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reading list of the OCR Examinations Board Advanced Subsidiary GCE in 
Critical Thinking Syllabus. His work Critical Thinking (Prentice Hall, 1995) is 
recommended as “[a]n excellent critical thinking text”.
McPeck, however, subjects his work to some fairly vehement criticism. One of 
the first points he makes (and one which may be particularly relevant in its 
implications for my project) is as follows:
...it is never clear whether Ennis sees himself as providing a 
conceptual analysis of critical thinking, so that we can know more 
clearly what it is, or merely a list of suggestive ‘aspects of critical 
thinking that researchers and educators ought to use as discrete 
and testable foci. While these two endeavours are distinct, there is 
considerable evidence throughout the paper that Ennis sees 
himself as providing both. Regardless of his intent, I shall argue 
that the analysis fails on both counts, but it is disquieting not to 
know at what point precisely he is trying to carry out which.
(Ch.3 p.40)
I have quoted this at some length as this passage seems well to express some 
of the potential conceptual and methodological pitfalls surrounding this kind of 
enquiry. Primarily there may be a slippage or elision between the attempts at 
conceptual definition of critical thinking and what I would term the “how to do it” 
and therefore perhaps “how to identify it” approach, in which there may be a 
danger of declining into a limiting and potentially reductive “checklist” mentality. 
Such an approach would be useful and valid for certain purposes (and, from a 
fairly cursory view so far of the A/S level syllabus this seems to be the
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approach taken in that context) but it may fail to give full credence to any 
broader notion of critical thinking, (to be discussed below).
What McPeck mainly takes issue with in Ennis’ approach, however, is his 
apparent insistence on the notion that critical thinking is about “the correct 
assessing of statements” (quoted in Ch.3 p.41) (although it should be pointed 
out that some of his later definitions are broader than this). Ennis discusses 
twelve ‘aspects’ or ‘abilities’ (and McPeck thinks this “switch” in usage is 
significant) (Ch.3 pp.41 and 55), and “three distinguishable dimensions” (Ch.3 
p.41) of critical thinking, with the net result, according to McPeck, that his 
analysis is limited and misconceived. Put simply, there is not enough 
recognition in Ennis’ work of, for example, the problem of different versions of 
“correctness” and the question of the foundational factors on which knowledge 
is constructed. These problems McPeck terms “epistemic” (Ch.3 p.44). He 
objects to the notion that critical thinking can be inherently allied to the notion of 
correctness, suggesting instead that there can be “degrees of critical thinking” 
and that “subtlety and...flexibility” (p.45) are what is needed within the concept. 
McPeck also attacks the ‘aspects’ or ‘skills’ element in Ennis’ work:
The criterial dimension of critical thinking precludes the a priori 
isolation or abstraction of any special set of particular skills to 
characterize it. Thus Ennis’s twelve ‘aspects’ -  which, incidentally, 
he often calls ‘skills’ -  cannot contain the inherent diversity of 
critical thinking: they cannot, therefore, define it.
(P-50)
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It would seem clear that it is this element of identifiable (and hence, it may be 
presumed, teachable) skills which makes this approach to critical thinking so 
attractive to curriculum and syllabus designers in the world of education today, 
as evidenced, for example, in AS level subject specification documents and the 
debates referred to above over testing and widening participation. However, 
from another perspective, such definitions and conceptualisation of critical 
thinking appear contentious (as has been indicated above) and limited. From 
the point of view of subsequent analysis the most cogent expression of critique 
comes from King and Kitchener (1994):
Those who see critical thinking as only problem solving fail to 
acknowledge that epistemic assumptions (assumptions about 
knowledge) play a central role in recognizing a problematic 
situation. They often see a close relationship between such thinking 
and the scientific method. Typically, they specify a set of steps for 
approaching a problem, such as formulation and then testing 
hypotheses. What is missing from this approach is the 
understanding that such steps cannot be applied if the individual 
fails to recognize that a problem exists and that this recognition 
itself is predicated on other assumptions about knowledge (for 
example, that it is gained through enquiry).
(Ch.1 p.8)
We can see a connection between King and Kitchener’s categorisation of 
problems, and associated problem-solving techniques, and what will be further 
discussed below in terms of critical thinking as an approach to life and the 
world in general. They contrast “problems that can be solved using deductive 
logic” with “[pjroblems such as overpopulation, hunger, pollution...” (Ch.1 p.10). 
The difference lies essentially in the extent to which a problem can be 
definitively described and a “correct” solution determined. Working out a
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“solution” to what they term “ill-structured problems” will involve far more than a 
mere application of deductive logic or quasi-mathematical formulae. As they 
point out, people’s “knowledge about the limits of knowing...and the criteria for 
knowing” (Ch.1 p.12) will become significant. Overall, King and Kitchener’s 
“Reflective Judgement Model”, positing seven stages of reflective thinking 
development (Exhibit 1.1 Ch.1 pp. 14-16) stands as a seemingly robust and 
necessary antidote to the traditional view of critical thinking as logical puzzle 
solving.
King and Kitchener ascribe much of the early inquiry into critical and reflective 
thinking to the work of John Dewey. In his work How We Think (1933), for 
example, we can see the beginnings of an attempt to define and delineate the 
otherwise rather vague or even common-sense notion of reflection, with 
reference to problems of uncertainty, evidence, and epistemic assumption. He 
describes at one point (Ch.5 p.72) the differences between “formal reasoning 
and thinking as it actually goes on in the mind of any person”, laying particular 
emphasis on “actual thinking [as] a process... a Iways [having] reference to 
some context”.
What seems to be key, and something which will be returned to in this 
exploration of what critical thinking might be, is the notion of evidence. 
Reflective (critical) thinking, however initiated:
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...includes a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon 
a firm basis of evidence and rationality.
(Dewey, 1933, Ch.1 p.9)
Like the concept of critical thinking itself, the term “rationality” becomes 
problematic. It connotes the Latin “ratio” (reckoning; reason), invoking the 
deductive logic approach described above. But “rationality” also evokes a wider 
and more philosophic approach, through the idea of rationalism as a deliberate 
oppositional movement to, for example, supernatural, customary, or religious 
beliefs.
The principle of rationality, in one of these guises, would appear to underpin 
most definitions of critical thinking. Rationality points both to the deductive logic 
approach, through the reflective model, and toward the emancipatory or 
‘lifestyle’ approach to be described below. It is perhaps through the emphasis 
on rationality, carrying as it does these various meanings, that Dewey attempts 
to get beyond dualistic thinking in this field. In her foreword to How We Think 
Maxine Greene comments on:
...his effort to integrate...“personal attitudes and knowledge about 
the principles of logical reasoning” (Dewey, 1993, p.34). There is no 
inherent opposition, he insisted, between such attitudes and logical 
processes...
(Foreword to 1933 Edition, 
p.xv)
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Dewey however develops his account, or definitions, further. Critical, or 
reflective thinking, does not only signify the application of rationality even in its 
widest sense. Other epistemic considerations come into operation.
We may carry our account further by noting that reflective thinking, 
in distinction from other operations to which we apply the name of 
thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental 
difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, 
hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle 
and dispose of the perplexity.
(Dewey, 1933, Ch.1 p.12)
He goes on to acknowledge that a state of mere perplexity does not necessarily 
give rise to reflective thinking if the thinker is insufficiently critical. This then 
may still beg the question of what constitutes critical thinking.
What Dewey does, though, is to establish some cornerstones, as it were, for a 
wider conception of reflective and critical thinking. Rationality, evidence, 
awareness of context and uncertainty are all pre-requisites for such a process. 
He seems to stand between an excessively technical and instrumental view of 
critical thinking (technical problem-solving) and the emancipatory, 
thoroughgoing critical world view:
Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained 
power of thought, in ability to ‘turn things over’, to look at matters 
deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence 
requisite for decision is at hand...
To cultivate unhindered, unreflective external activity is to foster 
enslavement, for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, 
sense and circumstance.
(Dewey, 1933, Ch.5 p.90)
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These sentiments perhaps accord with the traditional notion of a liberal 
education, where a disinterested pursuit of knowledge, through the study of 
arts, literature or the classics, for example, was seen as being the most 
intellectually beneficial of all forms of study and particularly so in 
contradistinction to vocational training. Liberal, or humanities education, can be 
critiqued from a number of perspectives, but nevertheless:
...has traditionally concerned itself with broadening horizons and 
facilitating individual personal development.
(Fox and Bell, 1999, Ch.1 
p.5)
Unreflective, uncritical activity from this perspective is not conducive either to 
positive personal development or the good of society as a whole. Such ideas 
have been taken forward, for example, in the work of Donald Schon, (1983)
albeit in arguably a somewhat instrumental way.
The notion of reflection, and the reflective practitioner, seems to be being 
harnessed to a type of Human Resources model (“we’re all reflective 
practitioners now”) in that much professional development, appraisal and 
advancement in educational and comparable circles rely at least partly on such 
reflective principles and approaches being apparently evidenced.
However, another manifestation of reflective critical thinking, leading on to a
wider and more emancipatory view, can be found for example in the work of
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Stephen D. Brookfield. Brookfield has written a considerable amount on the 
subject of critical thinking and related issues; for example his work Developing 
Critical Thinkers (1987) not only examines what the concept might mean and 
how it can be identified and developed, but also considers it in the wider 
contexts of personal development and social and political ‘healthiness’. There 
appears to be a recognition in Brookfield’s work of critical thinking as at least 
partly being to do with the challenging of received and internalised views, with a 
concomitant benefit both for personal growth and society’s well-being. 
Brookfield describes critical thinking thus:
This activity entails much more than the skills of logical analysis 
taught in so many college courses on critical thinking. It involves 
calling into question the assumptions underlying our customary, 
habitual ways of thinking and acting and then being ready to think 
and act differently on the basis of this critical questioning.
(Brookfield, 1987, Part 1 
p-i)
In essence, for Brookfield critical thinking is not merely an academic tool but a 
way of life. Aspects of critical thinking in his conception include, for example, 
“identifying and challenging assumptions”; “challenging the importance of 
context” and the development of “reflective skepticism” (pp.7-9). Such mental 
behaviours can, he argues, help in the enhancement and strengthening of 
democracy, because people who are critical thinkers will become more mature, 
more aware and more engaged with what he terms “broader social forces” 
(Preface, p.xi). He suggests that:
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A readiness to ask why things are the way they are, a capacity to 
speculate imaginatively on alternative possibilities, an inbuilt 
skepticism of the pronouncements and actions of those who are 
judged to be in positions of political and economic power -  these 
are fundamental ways in which the processes of critical thinking, 
analysis, and reflection in adults can be recognized.
(Brookfield, 1987, Part 1, 
Ch.4 p.68)
These are qualities (notwithstanding the point about critical thinking not being 
limited to the classroom) which students in higher education (according to my 
presuppositions) ought to be in the process of developing. Arguably Law 
students in particular should develop a critical sense along the lines of 
Brookfield’s quotation from Berger and Kellner (1981, p.6); that:
...not only is the world not what it appears to be, but it could be 
different from what it is.
(Brookfield, 1987, Part 1, 
Ch.4 p.68)
There is a relationship between this view of critical thinking and the debates 
over the forms and purposes of legal education, briefly referred to earlier, which 
it will be interesting and relevant to pursue. There is a growing body of literature 
relating to these issues within legal education but the most immediately 
pertinent comment comes from Unger, writing in the Modern Law Review.
...[legal analysis]...must elect the citizenry as its primary and 
ultimate interlocutor. It must imagine its work to be that of informing 
the conversation in a democracy about its present and alternative 
futures.
(Modern Law Review,
1996, p.20)
29
The idea, then, that:
...the liberal legal education seeks to prepare the graduate for 
intelligent participation in the politico-legal life of the community.
(Brownsword, in Cownie 
1999, Ch.2 p.29)
is one which would seem to highlight the relevance of critical thinking in 
Brookfield’s sense and which meshes with my personal and professional 
interests as set out at the beginning.
The idea of critical thinking in the ‘reflective skepticism’ sense, as Brookfield 
describes it, is one of the aspects I should like to pursue in my enquiry. How far 
in practice this can be developed is a point again which will be returned to in 
the discussion on Methodology below. Brookfield’s work is also useful in this 
regard, as he gives a great deal of attention to the question of how to recognise 
critical thinking, which should prove invaluable in the interviewing process.
Critical thinking is not seen as a wholly rational, mechanical 
activity...
Being a critical thinker involves more than cognitive activities such 
as logical reasoning or scrutinizing arguments for assertions 
unsupported by empirical evidence. Thinking critically involves our 
recognizing the assumptions underlying our beliefs and behaviours.
(Ch.1 pp. 12-13)
This approach leads on to an even wider range of associated theories about 
learning, personal development and societal responsibility. Brookfield cites, for 
example, Habermas’ theory of “emancipatory learning” where “learners
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[become] aware of the forces that have brought them to their current situations 
and [take] action to change some aspect of these situations (Ch.1 p.12).
Even more interesting is his discussion of the development of critical analysis 
of political issues, and television, later in the book. What Brookfield terms 
“ideological detoxification” and “media literacy” (Ch.10 p. 189) are in my view 
crucial aspects of any attempted definition of what critical thinking might 
involve, and we will return to this below.
An arguably more radical stream of critical thinking analysis can be traced 
through the work of Stephen D. Brookfield, then, and in the writings of, for 
example, Habermas and Chomsky. While critical thinking per se is not the 
latter's immediate or obvious subject it is evident in their concern for 
“emancipatory learning” (in Habermas) and in Chomsky’s challenge to the 
“manufacturing of consent” in modern society.
Chomsky writes in relation to the methods of social control utilised in 
democratic societies:
The most effective device is the bounding of the thinkable, 
achieved by tolerating debate, even encouraging it, though only 
within proper limits.
(Chomsky, 1989, Ch.5 
p.105)
It follows, then, that the necessary corrective to the hegemonic control this 
implies, and to the ideological manipulations of the mass media, is the fostering
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of a critical awareness of the processes by which consent is manufactured in 
modern liberal societies. Chomsky puts it thus:
My personal feeling is that citizens of the democratic societies 
should undertake a course of intellectual self-defence to protect 
themselves from manipulation and control, and to lay the basis for 
more meaningful democracy.
(Chomsky, 1989, Preface 
viii)
Chomsky’s analysis clearly draws on Gramsci’s theories of hegemony and 
Althusser’s depiction of the workings of ideological state apparatuses. The 
“bounding of the thinkable, achieved by tolerating debate” (as referred to 
above), recalls Marcuse’s notion of “repressive tolerance”. The work of the 
Frankfurt School of critical social theory, set up in 1923, cannot, for reasons of 
space and because of the focus of this dissertation, be considered in great 
length or detail. However it is clear that the analysis and approaches central to 
the school are key to any account of critical thinking in the sense of it being an 
emancipatory and challenging philosophy countering dominant cultural and 
social world-views. Brookfield makes a powerful case for this form of critical 
theory to be taught in adult education, quoting Kincheloe’s approach to critical 
thinking as being:
...the ability of individuals to disengage themselves from the tacit 
assumptions of discursive practices and power relations in order to 
exert more conscious control over their everyday lives.
(Kincheloe, 2000, p.24, 
quoted in Brookfield, 2005, 
Ch.1 p.13)
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The conceptual tenets central to the work of the Frankfurt School -  ideology, 
hegemony, alienation, power, liberation and reason are seen by Brookfield as 
essential ingredients in adult (higher?) education if it is to be a transformative 
and liberating experience. He argues that examination of these theoretical 
approaches in the context of contemporary life and society can lead to greater 
recognition and challenging of one’s assumptions (Brookfield, 2005, Preface, 
p.ix). Above all critical theory provides a “far more politicized” discourse within 
adult education than has traditionally been the case (Brookfield, 2005, Preface 
p.ix).
Such politicisation, as he acknowledges, will worry some people:
Critical theory has as a priority the critique of capitalism...[I]ts 
intellectual genesis is in Marxism, a fact that is hardly likely to 
endear it to the vast majority...
(Brookfield, 2005, Preface 
p.x)
As Jonathan Wolff points out, however, it is salutary to bear in mind that:
...the failure of Communism does not mean that all is well with 
Western, liberal, democratic capitalism. And it is Marx, above all, 
who still provides us with the sharpest tools with which to criticise 
existing society.
(Wolff, 2002, Intro., pp.1-2) 
Unless critical thinking is to be robbed of all substance, then, it must be 
focussed on and attuned to analysing the forces operating around and within us 
in the society we inhabit.
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Critical theory, as described briefly above, can then provide a significant and 
potentially rewarding approach to the examination of ourselves and our society. 
Brookfield provides a nice response to those worried about, or resistant to, the 
“anti-capitalist” theme of such theory:
So at the same time as affirming students’ right to disagree with 
and condemn Marx, I also affirm my right as a teacher to insist they 
engage him before they ritualistically dismiss him.
(Brookfield, 2005, Ch.2 
p.363)
Such approaches to the notion of critical thinking, and what adult and higher 
education may be expected to promote, leads on to a necessary, if brief, 
examination of the work of Habermas in this context. As mentioned above, his 
conception of ‘emancipatory learning’ connotes critical reflectivity, the 
(re)construction of rational discourse and critique of the political world we 
inhabit. The key aspects of his thought in this respect would appear to be “the 
‘colonization’ of the lifeworld by the market economy and legal-bureaucratic 
regulation” and the ways in which “public opinion ceases to be a source of 
critical judgement and checks, and becomes a social-psychological variable to 
be manipulated” (Outhwaite, 1994, Ch.1 p.9).
Habermas’ thoughts and theories in relation specifically to learning have a 
great significance for any account of critical thinking and the learning process. 
As Brookfield puts it:
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Although his body of work is intimidatingly wide, certain theories 
close to adult educators’ concerns repeatedly emerge. There is the 
belief that adult learning is the engine of social change and that 
understanding its dynamics is as important as understanding 
mechanisms of production and exploitation. There is also the 
contention that critical reflection is a learning process observable 
mostly in adulthood, and a consequent emphasis on the possibility 
of adults reflecting back on ideological norms and behaviors 
internalised uncritically in childhood.
(Brookfield, 2005, Ch.9
p.273)
This passage is quoted at some length as it appears clearly and 
comprehensively to sum up the significance of Habermas’ work for educational 
theorists and scholars. Of course, it is clear that such a conception of adult 
learning is one very distant from:
...the “real world” of adult education as practiced in adult basic 
education, adult undergraduate degree completion programs, 
corporate training, and so on.
(Brookfield, 2005, Preface, 
p.X)
Critical theory generally, including Habermas’ approach, is by definition going 
to be, and be perceived to be, oppositional and counter-intuitive in a society 
where instrumental, quantifiable and vocational values predominate in 
education. In such a society there is potential for ‘subversion’ of any notion of 
critical thinking from that envisaged within a critical theory, or emancipatory 
framework, to one where it becomes apparent that:
What is in evidence is, rather, a form of critical thinking that serves 
the operationalism and decisionism of the modern organisation.
(Barnett, 1997, Ch.4 p.56)
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In a further very astute observation Barnett writes:
Schon (1983) thinks that he is describing how the skilled 
professional functions; in fact he is telling us about the character of 
modern society as such. We are all reflective practitioners now. 
Critical thought, as reflective practice, is a constitutive element of 
the working life of the highly educated. ...In that sense, the idea of 
the reflective practitioner may be ‘reflective’, but it is thoroughly 
uncritical.
(Barnett, 1997, Ch.3 p.39)
What is signified by reflective practice, as well as critical thinking, depends on 
political context, purpose and the contemporary social meanings with which the 
terms are imbued. For Habermas the construction of knowledge and the nature 
of learning embraces three particular elements: “the technical, the practical, 
and the emancipatory” (Mezirow, 1991, Ch.3 p.72). The first two of these relate 
to what Habermas termed instrumental and communicative learning.
It is the “emancipatory interest...[which] impels us, through 
reflection, to identify and challenge distorted meaning 
perspectives”.
(Mezirow, 1991, Ch.3 
p.87)
Reflection, for Habermas, then, involves critical self-reflection as to, for 
example, the ideological forces which underlie our existence, and hence the 
conditions governing our “lifeworld” and the changes taking place therein. This, 
then, is a manifestation of critical thinking as a form of theory-into-practice:
In self-reflection knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains 
congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. The 
emancipatory cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of reflection as
36
such. My fourth thesis is thus that in the power of self-reflection, 
knowledge and interest are one.
(Habermas, 1972,
Appendix, p.301)
As has briefly been indicated above, Ronald Barnett has also explored various 
aspects of critical thinking and reflectivity. In essence, he classifies critical 
thinking in four ways: critical thinking as control, reconstitution, the 
development of wisdom, and praxis. In his conception these relate to, (in turn, 
and in short), principles of validity; intellectual scepticism; autonomous thinking, 
understanding and contemplation; and finally emancipatory thinking and 
interventionist action (paraphrased from Barnett, 1997, Ch.1 p.21).
The first conception would appear to recall the technical, logical problem­
solving approach discussed at the beginning of this chapter. There is then a 
deepening development of the conceptions until something more akin, perhaps, 
to Habermas’ approach is reached. There is also an apparent similarity with the 
reflective judgement model posited by King and Kitchener (1994).
Barnett acknowledges that critical theory, as outlined above, can be an 
important part of this development:
...our cognitive efforts have the power not just to cloak us with 
illusions or ideologies, but also to critique the world -  and, in that 
critique, to have a self-referential capacity.
(Barnett, 1997,
Introduction, p.5)
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In Chapter 5 Barnett develops his categorisation of critical thinking further, in 
what he terms a ‘schema’. Clearly any such attempt at categorisation of such 
intangible thought processes is bound to be subjective to some extent but his 
classification seems to add depth and sophistication to what in my overall 
analysis here appears as a rather linear ‘progression’ from critical thinking as 
the logical problem-solving model to critical thinking is the ‘lifestyle’ or lifeworld 
and social analysis approach.
In terms of the ‘schema’ he proposes, one axis is formed by the domains of 
knowledge, self and world, which relate to the forms of criticality of (in turn) 
critical reason, critical self-reflection and critical action. This is then given 
perspective by the other axis, levels of critical thought. These he posits as 
being critical thinking skills, metacritical (reflexive) capacities and critical 
thought (Barnett, 1997, Ch.5 pp.69-71).
In this categorisation of students’ development, then, there is a movement from 
the capacity of “making permitted cognitive moves of rational argument” (p.70) 
to a capacity “to reflect critically on one’s own understanding...to the 
development of the reflexive capacity to evaluate that understanding and its 
epistemological standing” (p.71).
These qualities start to “point towards critical thinking” -  which can develop into 
“critical thought’. For Barnett there is a difference.
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Barnett’s analysis of the uses (and arguably, abuses) of critical thinking in the 
modern world and the modern university is particularly arresting. He recognises 
and describes, in an entirely judicious and fair-minded way, the almost 
necessary pressures and limitations which are in practice brought to bear on 
any curricular development of the ‘higher levels’ of critical thinking. Changes in 
the range of academic disciplines offered; the development of mass higher 
education; changing relationships between universities and wider society and 
the effects of post-modernisation and globalisation are some of his examples 
(pp.78-90) which are contributing to changing conceptions of critical thinking, 
despite an apparent universality of approach within academe.
Problems of Definition
Since the mid 1970s, the proponents of thinking in the schools (and 
colleges) have become distinctly more numerous and more vocal.
The banner they have unfurled is emblazoned with the phrase 
'critical thinking' and although neither they nor those who oppose 
them are very clear about just what critical thinking entails, the hue 
and cry continues to mount.
(Lipman, 2003,
Introduction p.2).
While this quotation reflects a particularly American emphasis it serves well to 
express the definitional problem. One of the most apparent and besetting 
problems in this research, and the critical thinking literature review in particular, 
has been the difficulty in defining and capturing what is meant by 'critical 
thinking'. It is an issue which the interviewees allude to, both implicitly and
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explicitly, in their discussions, and which eludes all but the most narrowly- 
focussed and technical writers on the subject. Later (in Chapter 5), in the 
attempt to give shape and categorised expression to students' perceptions, in 
effect there is created a set of student-generated quasi- definitions which may 
to some extent mesh with or reflect some of the 'givens' in the literature (this is 
developed in Chapter 8). However, the uncertainties, assumptions and 
preferences of the students (as we shall see, for example in preferring the word 
'analysis' to 'criticism') in themselves would appear to indicate a definitional 
problem.
As we have seen above, the literature describes a range of approaches, from 
the technical to the philosophical or political. To attempt to encapsulate in a few 
terms what critical thinking is or might be appears to me both difficult and, 
potentially, reductive. Nevertheless Ennis (referred to above) and others have 
provided lists of qualities which may be associated with critical thinking; 
summaries of some of these together with their 'authors' are presented by 
Lipman (2003, Ch.2 pp.56-60). Definitions tend to centre around, for example, 
problem-solving and decision-making; attention to formal thinking processes; 
claims testing, and evaluation of interpretation. The point is, that as Lipman 
suggests :
No doubt there are dozens more of such characterizations that are 
equally worthy of mention ...The problem is that we lack an 
organizing principle that will enable us to put these random 
characterizations together in a consistent and coherent way.
(Ch.2 p.58)
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From this perspective it is perhaps not altogether surprising that the students 
do not in general evince very highly conceptualised or completely articulated 
perceptions, tending (as will be seen) to rely on a set of more or less 
fragmented or goal-oriented apprehensions of what is expected of them in this 
area of their academic life.
If we were to go on to locate the 'random characterizations' of critical thinking 
within the often contested context in which debates about educational theory 
and practice take place, the situation becomes even more complex. For 
example, a fundamental (possibly) disagreement is described by Lipman (2003, 
Ch.3 p64):
The conception of thinking [which] primarily entails problem solving
versus
The conception of thinking [which] primarily entails problem 
seeking.
He denotes this difference as relating to education in the sciences (in the 
former conception) and the humanities. (This, incidentally, raises an important 
and interesting question in relation to legal education which is developed in the 
concluding chapter. Put simply it is the continuing and largely unresolved 
question about the nature and purpose of legal education as being 'technical' or 
humanities-based).
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In the context of critical thinking both these conceptions would appear highly 
significant, although there has probably been a tendency for the former to be 
prioritised.
Conditions for the development of critical thinking will depend to a great extent 
on the model of educational practice being pursued. What Lipman (Ch.1 p18) 
terms the 'standard' and 'reflective paradigms' also bring in considerations, for 
example, of the extent to which interdisciplinarity, autonomy, research and 
creativity are incorporated within a particular curriculum. It is difficult to see how 
critical thinking can or should be viewed in isolation from the wider educational 
context or ethos.
A different emphasis in attempts at definition can be traced, for example, in 
King and Kitchener's work (1994):
there are obvious conceptual similarities between some definitions 
of critical thinking and reflective judgment. There are also some 
definitions of critical thinking that differ in substantial ways from the 
definition of reflective judgment... critical thinking is typically defined 
as logic or as a set of general problem-solving skills, and many 
definitions focus on the role of formal or informal logic to illuminate 
basic reasoning skills.
By contrast, those who write about critical thinking within a 
cognitive psychology tradition tend to be more concerned about the 
thinking process and how it develops...Neither group acknowledges 
the importance of epistemic assumptions in distinguishing between 
problem types or the role that these assumptions play in 
formulating solutions.
(Ch.8 p.190)
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The relationship between critical thinking and reflective judgement, and other 
forms of related thinking such as moral judgment, appears to be a complex and 
contested one. Perhaps one route into an examination of this relationship is, as 
King and Kitchener suggest, to consider that:
...the domain of reflective thinking focuses on issues of how we can 
know and how we can make the best possible decisions in light of 
intellectual uncertainty.
(Ch.8 p.206)
The problem of the definition of critical thinking appears to widen the more it is 
considered, and, like the path Alice tries to take to the hill in Carroll's Through 
the Looking Glass', to shift according to one's position at any given moment. 
Logic, (formal and informal); problem solving; problem seeking; use and 
evaluation of evidence; probing of argument; academic analysis; reflection; 
moral thinking; epistemological issues and intellectual and societal scrutiny are 
just some examples, as we have seen, of what critical thinking might be said to 
signify.
It would be problematic enough to take even one or two of these, and attempt 
to relate them in any rigidly systematic manner to the students' perceptions, as 
captured and described in Chapter 5. Given the complexity of 'thinking about 
critical thinking' there is a difficult adjustment to be made when trying to 
categorise and then review, in the light of available literature, the students' own 
apprehensions. This is developed a little further below, in the concluding 
chapter.
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Chapter 3 
Methods of Research
The development of qualitative, as opposed to quantitative research methods, 
at least in the social sciences, can be linked to the increasing dissatisfaction 
with and disavowal of the philosophical and scientific approach of Positivism. It 
could be said that Positivism has enjoyed an interesting history. From being 
effectively a liberating antidote to superstition and religious obsession, rooted in 
the eighteenth century Age of Enlightenment, it has come to be seen at least 
from some perspectives as a limited and one-dimensional approach unsuited to 
particular forms of research (within for example, the social sciences). 
Positivism's association with the idea of the search for objective truth, its 
emphasis on separating fact from value, and reliance on what have been seen 
traditionally as scientifically rigorous methods of enquiry have all come to be 
questioned, from within the social science community itself, as to its 
methodological fitness for purpose, and from the broader philosophical critiques 
stemming from post-structuralism and particularly post-modernism.
To have awareness and understanding of the debates and critiques 
underpinning social science research methods is essential not least for the 
determination and selection of the particular method to be used in a specific 
research project. But the issues lie more deeply: questions of methods and 
their underlying philosophies relate to the other key debates within research -
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the relationship of subjectivity and objectivity; the status of the researcher 
relative to the 'researched1, questions of interpretation of data, triangulation, 
and problems of discourse, for example.
It is the intention here to illustrate some of these issues with reference 
particularly to three key areas -  interviewing techniques, transcription of data, 
and analysis (in broad terms) within qualitative research. Questions of 
subjectivity and objectivity permeate these areas, inevitably, and will be 
addressed where possible.
Interviewing
At its simplest:
The interview is a dialogue between two people, and its structure is 
shaped by the process of interaction: the interplay of question and 
answer, taking turns in speaking, both of you knowing what has
already been discussed as you progress through a series of topics.
(Drever, 1995, Ch.6 p.62)
This quotation might be said to represent more the 'common-sense' approach -  
which is done “without thinking much about how we do it” (Douglas, 1985: 12, 
quoted inArkseyand Knight, 1999, Ch.1 p.7).
Reflection, however, might suggest that as with any formalised or semi­
formalised (or indeed any) verbal interaction there will be several layers of
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significance, potential dissonance, power relations, ambiguity and tension, to 
name a few, which will attend, implicitly or explicitly, any interviewing situation. 
For a sensitive, meaningful and, from the point of view of the research project, 
ultimately useful interview to take place more is needed in terms of examination 
both of the mechanics of interviewing and of the attendant sub-texts which 
arise from the process. This will be returned to below.
Interviewing (in various forms) has become a mainstay of qualitative research 
methods especially where the objective is to:
...explore areas of broad cultural consensus and people's more 
personal, private and special understandings.
(Arksey and Knight, 1999, 
Ch.1 p.4)
Still using 'interviews' in the broadest sense we can begin to see why they are 
so predominant (although not exclusive) within qualitative social science 
research. If, as one definition puts it:
Social science disciplines are concerned with the sentient 
experience of being human and have in common an interest in 
human thought, life, culture and action.
then it would appear appropriate to use:
Alternative, qualitative approaches [which] concentrate on 
understanding the thinking and behaviours of individuals and 
groups in specific situations.
(Arksey and Knight, 1999, 
Ch.1 p. 10 (both 
quotations)
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Interviewing allows the researcher some access to personal perceptions and 
therefore to a sense of the degree of shared (or not) understanding of a 
phenomenon (in the particular case of my research) within a particular, 
localised community.
In terms of the mechanics, and types of interviewing, one of three forms is 
usually employed, again the choice being largely dependent on the objectives 
of the research and the research question being asked. Structured, semi­
structured and unstructured approaches reflect the different 'agendas' which 
researchers may have and the type of knowledge they are seeking to construct. 
Broadly, structured interviews involve a set of predetermined questions which 
must be adhered to while semi-structured interviewing allows for more 
exploration and further questioning, within the parameters of some key, 
predetermined questions. Unstructured interviews may or may not involve 
explicitly articulated themes for exploration; there is here more emphasis on the 
interviewee's interests.
For my purposes, in this research, a semi-structured approach seemed most 
appropriate. I wanted to elicit a set of perceptions around a theme (critical 
thinking) within, mainly, a particular context (academic life) so a number of 
guide, or prompt questions would be essential in helping to set out the research 
concern and channel the students' thinking to some extent. However, I did not 
want to lose valuable data referring to other aspects of the student perception
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relating, for example, to their views on personality, life-experience and 
'lifeworld', and on our approaches to teaching on the Law Degree. Drawing 
boundaries round critical thinking, and abstracting it from the 'lifeworld' are in 
any case highly problematic, as has been illustrated in Chapter 2. Wider 
questioning and, to some extent, improvisation enhanced this aspect of the 
interviews, whereas a more strictly scripted approach may have stifled both the 
expression of such ideas and probably their articulation of views on critical 
thinking itself. I mention briefly, in Chapter 5, that this was not an easy or 
straightforward concept for several of the interviewed students to deal with.
As indicated above, however, there is much more to the art of interviewing than 
merely deciding on a structure and the set of questions to be asked, important 
though these are. Different writers (in particular, Kvale, 1996) have identified 
various aspects of qualitative research interviewing which need to be reflected 
upon and consciously thought through by the researcher -  at best so that she 
initiates and arrives at the most satisfying (for all concerned) possible interview 
outcome, and at least that no damage is done (I shall return, briefly, to this 
point, below).
The theorisation of interviewing appears to concentrate around on the one 
hand, the positioning, and role of the researcher and the respective personal 
and cultural histories of the researcher and the interviewee -  what I might term, 
albeit crudely, the question of personal interaction - and on the other hand, the
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more linguistic and philosophic approach to the discourse involved. These are 
not necessarily unrelated, but are different in their emphasis. The issue of 
positionality in research is well-documented (see for example Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998), but within the specific context of interviewing it relates more, as 
I see it, to the question of how the interviewer comes across, what persona she 
inhabits or adopts, and the relationship between the interviewer's personal 
sincerity and authenticity and potential for manipulation of the 'subject'.
A possibly extreme example of the last point above is provided by Arksey and 
Knight, in the context of interviewing and participant research:
His [a young interviewer] lack of familiarity with the trade meant that 
he was not treated with seriousness. The woman, on the other 
hand, could take the role of the 'dumb broad' and ask naive 
questions that would expose answers that would be hidden by 
assumptions were the interviewer more expert-seeming.
(Arksey and Knight, 1999, 
Ch.1 p. 10)
Such observations start to take us into the area of ethics. At the very least it is 
important to be mindful of:
...the question of 'social roles' ... It is important to note that you do 
not just inhabit one social role ('research interviewer'). In fact we all 
carry around a bundle of roles with us ... and the fore-grounded 
interviewer-interviewee roles are not the only ones to be operative.
(Wengraf, 2001, Ch.2 
p.44)
Social roles may relate to, as Wengraf also points out (Ch.2 p. 18) the kinds of 
“secret personal histories” we all have relating to interviews. Such past
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experiences will to some extent “shape and colour” how interviewers conduct 
the proceedings, both consciously and unconsciously.
You are likely to respond by 'playing particular interview scenes' or 
the whole cycle in terms of your unconscious repertoire. In the 
same interview, both informant and interviewer may be constantly 
switching roles through a medley of historic 'interview identities' 
without ever realising what they are doing.
(Wengraf, 2001, Ch.2 
P-18)
The question of ethics in research and interviewing is clearly a large and to 
some extent separate area which would merit in-depth consideration. For the 
present, however, and as mentioned briefly above, the overriding consideration 
is, as Wengraf puts it (also on p. 18) “to provide relatively safe research 
interview experiences for myself and my informants”. For the interviewer there 
should be awareness of potentially distressing lines of enquiry and the potential 
for the calling-up of uncomfortable or buried memories, together with a sense of 
the positioning within the interviewer relationship, as an ethical minimum. This 
is assuming the necessary formalities as to explanations, consent and so on 
have been gone through.
Clearly some situations will require much more consideration from an ethical 
point of view -  vulnerable individuals, sensitive or confidential personal issues 
and so on -  but such subjects lie outside the scope of this particular research 
project. However, whether or not a more formalised consideration of ethics is 
felt to be appropriate in a particular case, an understanding of these other
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questions of social role, power relations and “human intersubjectivity” 
(Wengraf, 2001, Ch.2 p.46) are important for the creation of positive 
experiences for interviewer and interviewee, and for a sensitive and fully 
appreciative interpretation of data. The “common-sense” view of interviewing 
alluded to above may be the kind of approach which makes the following 
observation necessary:
I wish only to stress that power is a dimension of the interview 
interaction dangerously likely to be overlooked or ignored or denied 
by the well-intentioned and good-natured interviewer.
(Wengraf, 2001, Ch.2 
p.44)
We can now turn to what I have termed the linguistic/philosophic analysis of 
interviewing. Writers such as Kvale, in particular, are beginning to apply some 
of the more recent developments in discourse analysis, philosophy of language 
and theories of knowledge to “the conversation” which is the social science 
research interview (“a construction site of knowledge” Kvale, 1996, Ch.3 p.42).
Such approaches can provide a shift in emphasis in qualitative research; an 
aspect which I was originally interested in pursuing within this project, but 
needed to abandon for reasons of space, time, and the focus of this research. It 
relates to the:
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...application of discourse analysis [in which] interview texts do not 
merely refer to some reality beyond the texts, but the participants' 
discourse is of interest in its own right, and the authors pose 
questions, such as, how is the talk constructed? And What (sic) 
does it achieve?
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.3 pp.42- 
43)
From this perspective:
...discourse analysis [is] not so much a method as an approach, 
focusing on the constructive nature of questioning, transcribing, and 
analysing in interview research.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch 3 pp.42- 
43)
Discourse analysis potentially enables us to look more deeply not just at an 
external 'reality' or set of views and thoughts generated by the interview 
process, but at how those views and thoughts are themselves constructed by 
language:
Structuralists ... attack the idea that language is an instrument for 
reflecting a pre-existent reality or for expressing a human intention. 
They believe that 'subjects' are produced by linguistic structures 
which are 'always already' in place.
(Selden, 1989, Ch.4 p.74)
Such a shift in emphasis also has implications for an understanding of the 
relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. The linguistic-philosophic 
analysis suggests that:
Language constitutes reality, each language constructing reality in 
its own way. The focus on language shifts attention away from the 
notion of an objective reality, as well as from the individual subject. 
There is no longer a unique self who uses language to describe an
52
objective world or to express itself; it is the structures of language 
that speak through the person.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.3 p.43)
To put it another way, what underpins this mode of analysis is the Lacanian 
view that 'consciousness is constructed by language' (Delanty, 1997, Ch.5 
p.99). Such recognition could have significant effects if more fully incorporated 
into research methodologies (see my concluding point to this chapter, below). 
Discourse analysis, together with the post-modernist questioning of notions of 
objective reality, provide further theoretical challenges to the positivist 
approaches to social science research outlined, for example, at the beginning 
of this chapter. If knowledge can be said to be constructed through language, 
through conversational interaction then this can lead to a different 
understanding of the nature of 'objectivity':
When we understand knowledge as the social justification of belief 
rather than as accuracy of representation, conversation replaces 
confrontation with nature ...
Human reality is understood as conversation and action, where 
knowledge becomes the ability to perform effective actions. Today, 
the legitimation question of whether a study is scientific tends to be 
replaced by the pragmatic question of whether it provides useful 
knowledge.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.2 p.37,
Ch.3 p.42)
Kvale further interrogates the notion of objectivity in the context of qualitative 
research interviewing, in Chapter 4, where he defines the concept of 
'intersubjective agreement' and tries to encapsulate the meaning and purpose 
of the research interview within a perspective of linguistic, philosophic and
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social awareness. I quote again at some length as this analysis moves us on a
great distance from the 'common-sense' approach to interviews.
With the object of the interview understood as existing in a 
linguistically constituted and interpersonally negotiated social world, 
the qualitative research interview as a linguistic, interpersonal, and 
interpreting method becomes a more objective method in the social 
sciences than the methods of the natural sciences, which were 
developed for a nonhuman object domain. From this perspective 
the qualitative research interview obtains a privileged position 
concerning objective knowledge of the social world: The interview is 
sensitive to and reflects the nature of the object investigated, in the 
interview conversation the object speaks.
In conclusion, the interview as such is neither an objective nor a 
subjective method -  its essence is intersubjective interaction.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.4 pp.65-
66)
This analysis also provides a more subtle unravelling of the subjective/objective 
argument, partly by drawing an explicit contrast between the natural and other 
sciences and their objects and concerns, and partly by situating the interview 
within the complex context of the interacting and interweaving strands of 
psychology, culture, language and society. This militates against any received 
notion of a clear, distinct objective entity which is awaiting discovery -  the 
'miner' image which has been used for example by Kvale (1996, Ch. 12 p.226) 
to convey this approach (as opposed to, for example, the 'bricoleur' image of 
the researcher):
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The bricoleur understands that research is an interactive process 
shaped by his or her personal history, biography, gender, social 
class, race, and ethnicity, and those of the people in the setting...
The bricoleur also knows that researchers all tell stories about the 
worlds they have studied.
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1998,
Ch.1 p.4)
Having looked at the art of qualitative interviewing in some depth, I will now 
briefly consider some other key aspects of this particular research approach, 
aspects which again may seem to allow for a 'common-sense' evaluation but 
which also carry potential for a more complex consideration. Issues relating to 
transcription and interpretation to some extent overlap, but I will attempt to 
outline some key critical points, while acknowledging that the literature and 
discussion on textual interpretation is extremely wide and forms a discipline in 
itself.
Transcription
There is some debate in the literature (eg Drever, 1995, Wengraf, 2001) as to 
the extent to which full transcription of interviews is necessary, and how best 
transcription can be achieved. Much of this is concerned with the mechanics of 
the process, in the sense of, for example, whether every single “urn, er” should 
be rendered or whether this interrupts the flow of narrative and meaning for the 
interpreter/reader to the extent that they should be edited out. Few transcripts 
will be 'perfect' in the sense that they may have to represent indistinctness or 
other problems with the recording medium; background noise, coughing,
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interruptions and unclear interjections and so on. As with interviewing itself, 
though, the mechanics of the process interact with and to some extent 
contribute to the construction of meaning and the potential interpretations 
available:
...such factors as location, type of day, time of day, social 
constraints, physical and social arrangements and interruptions 
need to be considered. These physical and temporal arrangements 
are always of considerable importance.
(Wengraf, 2001, Ch.2 
p.43)
To this one could add factors such as the act of recording itself (elevating the 
'status' of the occasion, perhaps, and subtly altering the dynamics of the 
interviewer/interviewee relationship) and, subsequently, as referred to above, 
the issues which arise through the transcription process. The particular 
approach used in transcription could, it could be argued, affect the meanings 
subsequently attributed to and generated by the interview. As will be seen, 
however, the idea of 'meaning' becomes more complicated when a further 
analysis of the process is undertaken.
The most significant critical point in relation to the act of transcription (though 
also relating to the question of interpretation) is the question of paralinguistic 
expression -  which could include what is colloquially termed 'body-language', 
spatial arrangements, and other aspects of non-verbal communication. As has 
been pointed out:
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Transcripts are decontextualised conversations. If one accepts as a 
main premise of interpretation that meaning depends on context, 
then transcripts in isolation make an impoverished basis for 
interpretation.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.9p.167)
It is the “slightly blank gazes, sudden leaning-forwards in the seats” (Wengraf, 
2001, Ch.2 p.47) which I as an interviewer was acutely conscious of, which 
also lent meaning and subtlety to the students' expressed views, and made 
interviewing a vivid and enriching experience.
In this study I aimed as far as possible for full transcripts in the sense that there 
are almost no omitted passages, and I have aimed to give a 'flavour' of the 
students' responses by leaving in 'urns', 'ers', repetitions and 'non-sense' 
expressions. However the transcription is not exhaustive in the sense that, for 
example, I have not detailed the length of pauses, coughs, references to facial 
expressions or, in a very few cases, 'aside' dialogue relating to an individual 
student's progress. Such detail would be relevant for some types of research of 
an ethnomethodological nature but it would not directly enhance the immediate 
concerns of this research project. In general I have not punctuated their speech 
- it seemed to me that leaving their responses as more of a 'stream of 
consciousness' was a more appropriate way for me to represent their views 
than to impose what could be a misleading or strained syntactical structure. 
Where parts of the tape are indistinct I have indicated this, and I have included 
remarks as to, for example, 'laughter...', again to help to provide a sense of 
context.
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Interpretation
The question of textual interpretation has become central in more recent years, 
not least due to the pervasive influence of post-structuralist and post-modernist 
theories of discourse and interpretation, initially mainly within university English 
Departments but now more widespread within, for example, the disciplines of 
History, Law and the Social Sciences. In Law the main exponent, Peter 
Goodrich, has used such theory for example to begin to deconstruct orthodox 
doctrines of precedent (Goodrich, 1986) and to establish new approaches to 
discussions of the history and symbolic language of the common law (1990).
From such perspectives, and put rather simply, texts are no longer to be seen 
as authoritative documents where authorial intention is paramount; rather there 
is a multiplicity of possible interpretations where the reader takes an active and 
(consciously or unconsciously) direct role in making and establishing meaning 
from the text, constructing rather than deciphering meaning. Such nuances of 
interpretation, and of theory, could of course be applied to a set of interview 
transcripts as to, say, a law report or a nineteenth-century novel. The point is 
that interpretation, from this viewpoint, is necessarily fallible and largely 
subjective.
If we relate this to the medium of the interview, then again something rather
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different from the 'orthodox' Positivist-inspired mode of analysis and 
epistemology starts to emerge. Such an approach also begins to address the 
questions of validity and objectivity which may be posed in relation to 
qualitative research, as referred to briefly above.
A postmodern approach forgoes the search of true fixed meanings 
and emphasises descriptive nuances, differences and paradoxes. 
There is a change from a substantial to a relational concept of 
meaning, with a move from the modern search for the one true and 
real meaning to a relational unfolding of meanings. Different 
interpreters constructing different meanings of an interview story is 
then not a weakness, but a strength of the interview method.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.12p.226) 
(emphasis added)
This presents one of the major challenges to the proponents of triangulation in 
this form of research, which “implies there is only one true social reality” and is 
a “concept [which] carries too positivist a bias” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, Ch.2 
p.24). Instead, a reasoned and sensitive appreciation of what interviewees say, 
taking into account the contextual and other aspects of communication 
mentioned above, and with an awareness of:
...the tone of voice and the speed of delivery, the silences, the 
hesitations, the mode of delivery of the words [which] can be 
important in determining meaning and reception as the actual 
words themselves.
(Wengraf, 2001, Ch.2 
p.47)
can create a different kind of'validity', in which:
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The basic subject matter is no longer objective data to be 
quantified, but meaningful relations to be interpreted.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.1 p.11)
Principles other than Positivism-based instruments for 'checking' come into 
play, as described by Booth (1996) and quoted in Clough (1996):
Standard tests such as reliability, validity and replicability are 
neither appropriate nor adequate when lives are not consistent, 
biographical truth is a will-o'-the-wisp and stories inevitably reflect 
something of the teller.
(p.72) (Clough's emphasis)
What I have tried to outline here are some of the critical and sometimes 
perhaps easily overlooked aspects of qualitative research interviewing. What 
remains for me the most potentially interesting idea is that again expressed by 
Kvale:
Interview research, language, is both the tool of interviewing and, in 
the form of tapes and transcripts, also the object of textual 
interpretation. Nevertheless, it has been rare in the social sciences 
for interview researchers to analyze the language medium they use 
as tools for and objects of their research.
(Kvale, 1996, Ch.3 p.43) 
(emphasis added)
While it is important to recognise that interpretation is a complex and contested 
phenomenon, it should also be remembered that the particularities and 
peculiarities of discourse and interpretation theory do lie largely outside the
scope of this work. A full linguistic analysis, which would be founded on the
theories outlined above, is not being attempted here. In interpreting the
transcripts I have relied fundamentally on accurate transcription, a good
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working knowledge (based on several years' experience) of the type (in the 
broadest sense) of student being studied, and a strong sense of the context 
and distinctive flavour of each interview.
The style, or nature of each interview was open, interviewee - focussed and in 
a sense collaborative, with an awareness that the accounts of critical thinking 
produced do reflect interviewer participation in the interviewees' explorations.
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Chapter 4
Phenomenography: Describing students' different perspectives
As mentioned above, the methodological approach known as 
Phenomenography will be used in relation to the discovery of students’ 
perception of critical thinking. A classic definition and introduction to 
Phenomenography and the work of Ference Marton can be found in Husen and 
Postlethwaite (1994) (pp 4424-4429):
[it is]...the empirical study of the limited number of qualitatively 
different ways in which various phenomena in, and aspects of, the 
world around us are experienced, conceptualised, understood, 
perceived and apprehended.
Phenomenography provides a methodology for analysing qualitative data, 
gathered for example through interviewing, so that the elements of (in this case 
students’) perceptions of a subject may be expressed and ordered in 
categories, known within this approach as “categories of description”. These 
categories, once set out, (normally hierarchically), give rise to an “outcome 
space” as Marton described it, so that the researcher can arrive at a view of the 
variations of perceptions demonstrated by the subjects under study. The 
emphasis is on the types of conceptions and perceptions which are manifested, 
not on the individuals themselves. In this sense, then, Phenomenography is 
concerned with “second order” experience i.e. experience which is already 
reflected on or internalised by the subject. It places emphasis on what is said
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by the interviewee -  that is what constitutes the data of the reflected-upon 
experience.
To sum up, then, at this point, the key aspects of the phenomenographical 
approach are as follows: it attempts to “map” the student experience; it looks at 
the (perceived) relationship between students and the world in respect of the 
phenomenon being researched; it looks at the degree of variation of perception 
within a group, and attempts to categorise, in an ordered manner, the range of 
responses within a group.
Phenomenography offers a methodology, well-established (particularly within 
higher education contexts1) for eliciting and analysing data relating to students’ 
perceptions of pedagogic concepts. The hierarchical ordering of categories 
should give rise to knowledge or awareness of the most meaningful and 
significant of students’ conceptions which can then be used to inform projected 
change in the curriculum or whatever other area may be appropriate. (Some 
studies may not place such emphasis on the question of hierarchy but it 
appears as an important element in the original writings). However, it should be 
borne in mind that Phenomenography offers, by definition, a fairly restricted 
form of analysis (categories, for example, are normally limited to six) and also 
that inherent in this approach are several philosophical and methodological 
problems which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
1 Studies have been conducted, for example, into students learning Accounting (Lucas, 1998), 
creative practice (Drew and Williams 2003), concepts in Chemistry (Lybeck et a/, 1988) and 
aspects of physics (Prosser and Millar, 1989).
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The results of a phenomenographic study, even where (particularly where, 
perhaps) on a small scale, can clearly reveal to the researcher the variations, 
strengths and weaknesses in students’ apprehensions of the concept being 
studied. Admittedly, the nature of this research approach provides no more 
than a ‘photograph’ at a particular point -  there is not necessarily any follow-up 
or developmental frame of reference built in, as in longitudinal forms of 
research. But if the aim of the research is to ascertain how a particular, and in 
all senses, typical, cohort of students perceives a particular concept, in order to 
inform teaching or other practice initially in the short term, this approach can 
reveal some evidence on which local change of practice, or at least 
assumptions, can be based. As the emphasis in phenomenographical analysis 
is on the group, not the individual, it follows that the findings can and will 
contribute meaningfully and practically to local curriculum (or other) 
development. Emphasis being on the group also, of course, has implications for 
the writing-up of data -  too much, or injudicious use of quotations from 
individuals may have the effect of shifting the focus away from group and 
category findings, which it is crucial to keep at the forefront for purposes of 
interpretation and expression.
Interpretation is of course, of the essence. One strength of phenomenography 
is that it:
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...aims at the construction of a typology of the different kinds of 
conceptions held by students themselves, albeit interpreted by 
researchers in such a way as to provide what may possibly be a 
clearer and more articulate account of student conceptions than 
students would themselves generate unaided.
(Lucas and Ashworth,
1997, p.4)
How far do the acts of interpretation and categorisation compromise, or even 
effectively re-write, the students’ expressions of their experience? In 
phenomenography there exists, even more apparently perhaps than in some 
other forms of research, a double regression or mediation process. As Ashwin 
has pointed out (2005), in phenomenography it is the conception of students of 
their experience which is being captured, not the “actual” experience:
Phenomenography takes a ‘second-order approach’, by which is 
meant that focus is on the experience-as-described, rather than on 
either the psychological process generating the experience or the 
‘objective facts’ themselves.
(Lucas and Ashworth,
1997, p.1)
Recognising this essential aspect of phenomenography leads on to awareness 
of some of the inherent problems and limitations of this form of research. 
Firstly, listening to and recording, and subsequently categorising, the 
“experience-as-described”, invokes the issue of what can broadly be termed 
“positionality”. Secondly, it could appear that phenomenography can only show 
how student experiences and awareness are perceived -  not why or how these 
experiences have been sorted, for example by social class (Ashwin, 2004).
65
In relation particularly to first-year students and research relating to what is now 
frequently termed the “transition” problem (18 year-olds finding the demands of 
university work very difficult after ‘A’ level) it would be useful to look at 
structural factors such as class, prior educational experience, family experience 
of university and so on. But such analysis is absent from the 
phenomenographical approach. While noting this limitation, it is suggested 
however that the insight provided by the phenomenographical approach into 
students’ perception is in itself valuable basis (as suggested above) for 
changing and developing local practice.
The problem of ‘positionality’ however requires further and deeper attention, 
going as it does to the heart of the research question, whichever methodology 
is adopted. In interpreting and categorising the students’ experience there will 
be, almost inevitably, a degree of researcher subjectivity in the typology and 
categories drawn, the selection of what is “key” for these categories and in the 
interpretation of the students’ voiced conceptions.
Several theoretical, and practical, issues arise from this in the deployment of 
the phenomenographic research approach. The whole question of the 
relationship between data analysis and literature review becomes, to an extent, 
problematic:
The conventional structure of an empirical research project, echoed 
in the layout of scientific papers, is to become familiar with the 
relevant research literature at an early stage. This is appropriate in
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positivistic research in which earlier work suggests a hypothesis 
which the new study sets out to test. But phenomenographic 
research is not set up from such a standpoint, and the ear of the 
researcher must be open to aspects of the participants’ lifeworlds 
which run directly counter to existing conceptualisations or (and this 
is hard to detect, needing the full resources of empathy of the 
interviewer and transcript-analyst) aspects which are only subtly 
different (but -  on reflection -  tellingly different) from existing 
expectations.
(Lucas and Ashworth,
1997, pp.10-11)
This quotation is at some length as it appears to me to encapsulate one aspect 
of potential researcher intervention (if not bias) in the act of listening and 
writing-up. The researcher should, in effect, carry out a continuous and vigilant 
form of what has been termed ‘bracketing’ (which is further developed below). 
Certainly I became aware, at an early stage in the interviewing process, that my 
personal preconceptions and ‘biases’ as to concepts of critical thinking were 
greatly at variance with what most of the students seemed to be expressing. In 
a sense this made the process clearer, because there was so little potential for 
a meshing of the students’ and my views. In effect I was putting into practice 
the following exhortation:
To hear these expressions clearly and to retain a continuing lively 
interest in the life-world of the person who is possibly very 
differently inclined from themselves, certainly requires the 
researcher to bracket their own experience and attitudes.
(Ashworth, 1996, p.20)
This notion of ‘bracketing’ requires further development. It derives from the 
work of Edmund Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenology, one of the 
key philosophical viewpoints in the development of phenomenography, in the
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mid twentieth century. This philosophical approach has underpinned many 
qualitative research methodologies, and seeks to solve epistemological 
problems by emphasising the need to enter and access an individual’s 
“lifeworld” so that the researcher can begin to understand the significance and 
meaning of particular phenomena for that individual. Phenomena are located 
within our consciousness so as researchers we need to try to study how things 
are presented, in our minds, largely through language, although the latter 
approach has been subsequently more developed through the work of, for 
example, Gadamer (1989). As we have seen, phenomenography aims to map 
the variety of reflected-on conceptions, not the 'phenomena of consciousness'; 
however many of the issues of phenomenology are pertinent to 
phenomenography and the approaches are strongly related.
It follows that in the attempt to access and describe the individual’s lifeworld, 
the researcher’s personal presuppositions and knowledge of existing 
conceptualisations and categories must be consciously set aside, or 
‘bracketed’. The description will then approach as near as can be the 
conceptualisation of the research participant.
It is possible to break down the notion of bracketing into further sub-categories, 
as has been suggested for example by Ashworth (1996) and Lucas and 
Ashworth (1997) but for immediate purposes the two most significant types of 
presupposition which could contaminate the students’ expressed experience
68
would appear to be those relating to the researcher’s personal pre­
commitments, and those deriving from the research literature. Both of these 
lead almost inevitably to a paradox...
The phenomenographic epoche should entail a suspension of 
commitment to the accepted view of the subject matter in order to 
grasp the meaning of the material to the student, yet it is only 
through some knowledge of the material that the student can be 
understood.
(Lucas and Ashworth,
1997, p. 14)
Some might argue that “researchers should wait until their analyses are 
complete before reviewing the existing literature” (Lucas and Ashworth, 1997, 
p.11). Where existing studies or models are very dominant there may be a 
temptation for the researcher to interpret and classify their own data (whether 
consciously or unconsciously) in a manner ‘in line’ with existing “knowledge”, 
rather than in a truly revelatory and illuminating manner.
In my own research I have surveyed a range of academic literature prior to the 
analysis of data.
As suggested above, I have particularly observed that my personal views and 
pre-commitments as to notions of critical thinking, accord far more with some 
academic theories than do the students’ views. This is clearly a rather 
generalised statement, but one which refers us back to my personal reflections 
expressed in Chapter 1. However as a basic example, the approaches taken by
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Stephen Brookfield strongly reflect my own views and yet were the kind of 
approach adopted least (by a long way) by the students. This serves as a 
salutary reminder, then, both of the need to absent, as far as possible, my own 
prejudices, and to “focus on similarities and differences between the ways in 
which the phenomenon appears to the participants” (Husen and Postlethwaite, 
1994, p.4428). Which, after all, is the whole point of the exercise.
To return to the starting point, then, the salient point about phenomenography 
is that it provides:
...a description of variation, a description on the collective level, 
and in that sense individual voices are not heard.
(Marton and Booth, 1997,
Ch.6 p.114)
The other key aspect, as mentioned above, is that it is concerned with second- 
order experience. By this is meant that the focus of study is not experience 
itself, but experience as already reflected-on or conceptualised.
Expressed in a different way, this concerns the “internal relationship between 
the experiencer and the experienced” (Marton and Booth, 1997, Ch.6 p.113). 
Phenomenography attempts then to map the variations of experience-as- 
perceived, not cognitive processes as such, as would be, for example, the 
focus of a psychological, or physiological, investigation.
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Phenomenographical research can, it would seem, help to give a rich picture of 
student perceptions of learning and thinking. Saljo (1982) has described the 
difference between what have been termed “compositional” and “contextual 
view[s] of reality and research” (Ch.1 p.22) and the relative merits and demerits 
of each; phenomenography would appear to relate more to the latter where it 
becomes:
...evident that our understanding of how learning functions 
increases when information coming from the actor’s perspective is 
taken into account.
(Ch.2 p.37)
As he states (Ch.2 p.48) “a vital role could be played by information emanating 
from a second-order perspective”.
As suggested above (Ashwin 2004) phenomenography may not provide a full 
and detailed context for students’ perceptions but it can certainly help to reveal 
the presentation of the subject under study (Newton’s Third Law of Motion, 
critical thinking or other phenomenon) to the student. Saljo cites Colaizzi’s 
study (1971) where there was an attempt to:
...compensate for the traditional emphasis on behavioural data by 
building a body of experiential data (p.101)...[what matters is 
the]...presentational side, i.e. how the material to be learned 
appears to the learner.
(quoted in Saljo, Ch.2 
p.35)
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Once the data has been collected, analysis will be carried out in order to 
present a view of the pattern of variation in the students’ perceived experience. 
It is this variation which is the main concern of the phenomenographical 
researcher. “Categories of description” provide an ordered, and normally, 
hierarchical depiction of the range of conceptualisations (the “outcome space” -  
terms deriving from Marton’s work) present in the students’ discussions. The 
emphasis is on the categories of conceptualisation, not on the views of 
particular individuals, or, as Marton and Booth (1997, Ch.6 p.128) put it: 
...“categories of description refer to the collective level”.
...the goal is that [the categories] should be complete in the sense 
that nothing in the collective experience as manifested in the 
population under investigation is left unspoken.
(p.125)
Here, then, lies the challenge for the interpreter/researcher. Analysis will 
involve an immersion in the interview transcripts with a consequent attempt to 
interpret and categorise quotations according to their apparent similarity of 
meaning and significance. For a phenomenographic analysis there is a shift...
from the individual students (the interviews which had lent 
meanings to the quotes by being their contexts), to the meanings 
embedded in the quotes regardless of whether these different 
meanings originated from the same individuals or not.
(Marton and Saljo in 
Marton etal., 1997, Ch.3 
p.42)
In the categorisation process there will be a judgement made as to how the 
students’ comments relate to each other, and a necessary process of
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interpretation and interpolation in deciphering the students’ different modes of 
expression, vocabulary, conceptualisation and so on, in order to arrive at a 
meaningful set of categories of description which have integrity and validity. 
The process of construction of the categories would seem to be key in terms of 
the yielding of meaningful conclusions from the study, and for satisfying 
requirements of rigour and validity. Marton and Saljo (1997, Ch.3 p.42) 
describe the...
lengthy and painstaking iterative procedure with continual 
modifications in which quotes are assembled, and consequently 
further changes in the precise meaning of each group of quotes 
take place.
To return to one of the points first made in this chapter, then, the validity, not 
replicability, of a phenomenographic study stems partly from this iterative and 
intense analytic process, and partly from the attention paid to the second-order 
nature of the students’ perception, which, as has been suggested above, can 
provide a different and arguably richer picture of ‘how students learn’:
What can be seen from a first-order perspective could -  and, we 
think, should -  be informed by that which can be seen from the 
second-order perspective.
(Marton and Booth, 1997,
Ch.6 p.121)
Having said this, two last main observations perhaps need to be borne in mind. 
The first relates to research in general, and no less to phenomenography:
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We can’t describe a world that is independent of our descriptions or 
of us as describers...There is no complete, final description of 
anything and our descriptions are always driven by our aims.
(Marton and Booth, 1997, 
Ch.6 pages 113 and 123)
The issues of subjectivity in research, and the limitations on claims for 
knowledge, lie largely outside the scope of this project, although they are 
referred to in Chapters 3 and 6.
Lastly, and with particular reference to phenomenography, it is worth quoting 
Marton and Saljo, at relative length, in identifying perhaps the particularities 
and peculiarities of this research approach:
We do not believe there is any uniform technique which would allow 
other researchers to go from “the pool of meanings” to the 
emerging pattern of a hierarchy of similarities and differences. It is 
essentially a discovery procedure which can be justified in terms of 
results, but not in terms of any specific method. In each study the 
discovery process will inevitably be different, depending on the 
specific purpose and the context of the research.
(Marton and Saljo in 
Marton etal., 1997, Ch.3 
p.43)
The Interviews
In order to collect data I used a semi-structured interview approach with each 
student, using six ‘prompt’ questions (Appendix A) and making use of the Law 
Group’s feedback sheet (Appendix B) as material to stimulate reflection. On 
average, interviews lasted about forty minutes though clearly some students
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were less loquacious than others. The interviews took place between October 
and March of their first year here, the aim being as far as possible to capture 
reasonably ‘fresh’ perceptions. Of course, one of the incidental benefits of this 
form of research was that I gathered other insights and observations, for 
example more generally on the transition from school to university, and some of 
these are commented on in my concluding chapter.
I had carried out a small ‘pilot’ study the previous year to give practice in 
interviewing, and I found this to have been very helpful. The students 
appeared, on the whole, reasonably relaxed and seemed to find the process 
interesting and enjoyable. I was careful to reiterate and explain the aims and 
potential outcomes of the research and to link it with the wider research 
developments in higher education concerned with transition, student 
experience of learning and so on, so putting my ‘local’ project into a wider 
context for the students. Again, almost as an incidental benefit, I found that my 
relationship with the students, at a personal level, was much enhanced by the 
interviewing process. Above all it seemed that their education here became 
slightly more humanised and personalised by the process, as we were able to 
talk about a wider range of issues than “merely” the legal curriculum. I should 
like to think the students began to gain a broader appreciation both of our 
professional concerns, as staff responsible for teaching them, and of the wider 
background and context of academic research generally.
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Interviews in Phenomenography
There is clearly much writing about interviewing -  techniques, pitfalls, 
structures, types of questioning, and this was developed further in Chapter 3. 
The aim here is to give some insight into the particular issues in interviewing for 
a phenomenographic study. In this research we have not been concerned with 
the setting of a specific task for the students to undertake, as has been the 
case with some well-publicised phenomenographic studies such as Saljo’s 
research into students’ reading of texts (1982). The emphasis in my study (as 
he said) has been on the second-order concerns:
...the particular aspect is that of the interviewee reflecting over his 
experience in a state of “meta-awareness”, being aware of his 
awareness of something.
(Marton and Booth, 1997,
Ch.6 pp.129-130)
It is subsequently pointed out in this chapter that:
Sometimes such reflection occurs spontaneously, and sometimes 
the interviewer and the interviewee have to persist to reach the 
required state.
(p.130)
The latter was found to be the case in my experience. In asking students about 
their notions of critical thinking there is an assumption that the concept 
(phenomenon) exists in their conscious mind, to be reflected on and talked 
about. One challenge for me as interviewer was how to stimulate (adequate)
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reflection without pre-empting or leading the students towards inauthentic or 
spurious responses.
In this respect I feel there was particular value in my opening questions which 
established the terrain of the interview but rooted the emphasis at once and 
firmly in the interviewees’ own experience and perception.
Another problem related to questioning technique emerges in relation to what 
can be broadly termed the issue of context:
How do we know that the interviewees would not have said 
something different had we asked the question in a different way, 
using a different strategy and other examples? The answer to this 
question is that one has to accept human thinking as contextually 
determined.
(Saljo in Ramsden, Ed.,
1988, Ch.2 p.42)
For phenomenography, Saljo argues, (as opposed to “traditional perspectives 
on learning”), “context is integral to our way of making sense of reality” (p.44). 
In other words, our awareness of context contributes towards the 
phenomenographical registering of students’ conceptions of reality.
The issue partly relates back to the problem of discourse, and interpretation (as 
outlined in Chapter 3) and back to the problem of subjectivity (interviewer and 
interviewee). As Marton and Booth (1997) put it:
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We cannot describe a world that is independent of our descriptions 
or of us as describers.
(Ch.6 p.113)
and this is as true of those being researched as it is of the researcher.
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Chapter 5
Data: Five ways of understanding critical thinking
Introduction
One of the dynamics underlying this phenomenographic research can be 
summed up as follows:
From an instructional point of view, it may be more useful to know 
about an inappropriate model that a student has assembled of a 
phenomenon than to be aware of the 'missing' knowledge or skill 
that results from his or her application of that inappropriate model.... 
One side of this view of learning is that what a student does should 
be understood in the context of the task: the other side is that the 
effect of the conditions has to be understood in terms of the 
perception of the individual learner.
(Ramsden, 1988 Ch.1
pp.22 and 24).
The following review of the interviews conducted with First-year Law students 
should help to illuminate some of the preconceptions, perceptions and possible 
lacunae in their apprehension of critical thinking and critical analysis; perhaps 
confirming or dispelling academics' own presuppositions about students' 
approaches and understanding.
It was difficult to establish very clear complete categories, as much of the 
students’ response was in effect to conflate and confound several aspects of 
critical thinking, and their vision of critical thinking as a concept appeared 
somewhat fragmented. It was also difficult, therefore, to see how certain
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categories could be neatly subsumed by subsequent categories. However, as 
will be seen, five categories did emerge with some degree of hierarchical 
relationship, and these are described below.
Phenomenographic analysis, as has been explained above in Chapter 4, does 
not claim that there is a unique position in the outcome space for each 
individual. Rather, the outcome space is the researcher's construction of the 
variations in conceptualisation rather than variations in personal position. There 
is an important role for researcher interpretation here, which will be discussed 
in the following chapter.
Method
The data was collated from a series of interviews with fifteen first-year LLB 
students (including one English LLB/MaTtrise student) conducted between 
October 2005 and March 2006. Each interview lasted approximately forty-five 
minutes to an hour, and they were taped (with the students’ permission). Six 
broad prompt questions (see Appendix A) were used to give some structure 
and consistency of approach to the interview, but students were not prevented 
from digressing (subject only to time considerations). The questions were 
designed to elicit responses which would reveal something of students’ 
perception of what critical thinking meant to them. Tapes were subsequently
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transcribed and a phenomenographic analysis constructed as will be described 
below.
Initial Observations
On studying the transcripts two related features of the interviews rapidly 
became apparent. Several students had little to say and/or found it difficult to 
reflect upon or articulate views on critical thinking. This resulted in some 
somewhat vague and inchoate comments at times, or somewhat circular 
observations. The other related aspect emerging from some of the interviews is 
that in places the interviewer, anxious perhaps to encourage comment by 
promoting different ways of looking at the topic, starts talking too much and 
over-complicating the questions. It is clear, though that for some of the students 
this was an exercise in self-reflection not previously undertaken and is in some 
senses challenging and even anxiety-provoking. This becomes more apparent 
in the parts of the interview relating to life “here”.
[of studying Law here] I really don’t know, it’s something where I 
just need I think to get to grips with it now. It’s quite of a shock.
(D, p5 16) (transcript 
quotation references are to 
page number and line 
number)
Overall, however, it is true to say that there was a very positive atmosphere in 
the interview sessions. There was some laughter, opportunities to give advice 
mentioned, and specifically I as a tutor felt that the interviewing process led to a
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better degree of understanding, relationship-building and empathy with the 
students than I had hitherto experienced.
In terms of the students’ expressions of their thinking and perceptions based on 
experience, five categories would suggest an adequate representation of the 
trends discussed. Of these, categories three and four are particularly difficult to 
differentiate.
In extrapolating the categories, two particular principles have been borne in 
mind; the ‘commonality’ of perception across the study, together with the 
‘completeness’ of conception articulated. Where these two features mesh, this 
would signify an especially strong theme for categorisation.
The categories constituted through analysis of the interviews are described as 
(1) Critical thinking as negative (2) Instrumental critical thinking (3) A sense of 
argument (4) A general sense of analysis and (5) Critical thinking as a way of 
being.
A gloss on these categories would provide the following: there was 
considerable discussion ranging round issues of argument, ‘two-sidedness’, 
use of evidence and “picking things apart” which have mainly been used to 
support the third category. More generally there were references to ideas 
relating to comparison, ‘analysis’, and ‘depth’ -  these have been incorporated
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into the fourth category. Instrumentality refers to the idea of critical thinking 
being regarded as a necessary tool for academic (examination and/or 
coursework success) at school and university, but as something not relating to 
anything outside the academic sphere. Category one captures the notion of 
criticism being equated with negativity. Category five relates to those who took 
a more developed view to category four, in seeing critical thinking as an 
intelligent, rational approach to the world and society in general -  essentially 
not confined to its deployment as an academic tool.
1. Critical Thinking as Negative
1a. Being critical as fault-finding.
A feature of some of the students' responses was that the word 'critical' 
appeared to suggest notions of negativity and disparagement. The vocabulary 
of academic analysis itself appeared to be 'loaded' in various ways. While this 
was not a very widespread concern it was quite deeply felt by those who 
mentioned the notion.
I mean it automatically puts into people's minds they have to be 
harsh and judgmental or something as opposed to put forward a 
good and bad argument.
(O, p4 117)
...critical analysis where now I mainly think of the weaknesses more 
than the strengths ... I think it's the word critical that does it to me ... 
some of us think critical I don't know why I think it's because of the 
word.
(B, P4 I29)
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...when you hear the word critical ... I'm not sure how to word it but 
initially you have to put bad points as opposed to good ones.
(O, p2 134)
...because when you think critical you always think negative and it's 
not necessarily
(F, p3 124)
There was a preference expressed for words such as 'evaluation', 'analysis', 
'present an argument' which appeared less negative.
...analysis... it's a bit more even...
(F, p4 19)
I'd probably say analyse it rather than critical because you know I'd 
focus more on the weaknesses being critical...
(Interviewer: And of the two in that sense analyse conveys a similar 
kind of meaning but without the negativity?)
Yes
(B, p5 114)
...I've learnt that critical means to represent an argument...
(O, p2 I36)
It would seem that the negative associations of the word 'critical' form a sort of 
subset of the general uncertainties surrounding the word, as evinced by the 
students:
I think it [the feedback sheet] could be more helpfully worded 
because quite a lot of people do not necessarily understand what 
critical means and everybody just keeps going about it as it's so 
important...
(N, p4 114)
...evidence of critical thought needs to be more analytical I think 
that's always something I'm not too sure I suppose I need to ask 
about
(D, P3 19)
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If you display critical thought I would transpose that with analysis 
and do what I used to do in History ... I would just ignore what it 
says critical analysis because I'm not sure what it means and just 
analyse it like I used to do in History and hope that's what I need to 
do.
(M,p2 135...)
I think it's because like because it's difficult, coming to this subject 
you don't know anything ... If I knew, if it was already in my mind I'd 
be able to criticise i t ... but I just need more knowledge before I can 
start doing that.
(E, p3 11)
1b. Confident and Critical Students
The last quotation also introduces the view of being critical as perhaps 
relating to questions of confidence and familiarity with material:
...cyberlaw it's all around and it does affect me I feel I can deal with 
especially well because I can criticise it because it does relate to 
me but in Constitutional Law I didn't have a clue when I came here 
what a constitution was and I didn't think I could like criticise it I feel 
a little bit I didn't really know enough a little bit for want of a better 
word inferior to argue about it...
(E, p3 114)
I think sometimes it's not a case of knowing what it is it's whether to 
put it in or not, whether you'd be right to look at it that way, it's all 
confidence.
(D, P3 114...)
1c. Criticism as discipline-related.
Perhaps some subjects (both in the sense of different disciplines, and as 
topics within the study of Law), are perceived as lending themselves more 
easily to critical investigation, perhaps where they mesh more either with
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students' prior knowledge or with notions of 'allowable' subjectivity, as seen 
here:
With English Lit you think it's sort of your opinion and you'd be 
looking at a book and it's your opinion but with Law you have to 
incorporate everyone's opinion.
(H, p4 11)
...English it [critical analysis] was never really, it never really came 
up in English much...
(M, p1 116)
...critical analysis what we've now been told it's not anywhere near 
what we sort of did before. Before it was just sort of regurgitation 
what we'd been told and story writing.
(K, p1 114)
...I think after I've got my knowledge I'll be confident to criticise it...I 
will go and think about things and start to begin to criticise in my 
mind it's beginning, when a lecturer says something it'll throw up in 
my mind what do I think about that but em, I never really expected 
to have a lot of you know analytical skills first off.
(E, p4 12)
It seems, then, that the initial barriers preventing students from fully engaging in 
critical analysis and thinking from the outset may consist of issues of 
confidence, familiarity, perceived nature of the subject, lack of understanding of 
these terms and association of terms with negative discourse. The more 
common ways in which the terms are interpreted and 'implemented' by 
students are explored further below.
86
2. Instrumental Critical Thinking
2a.Critical Thinking Skills.
As suggested above, this category relates to the students’ perceived 
need to acquire a set of ‘technical’ skills and approaches necessary to success 
at A level and beyond. Their conception appears firmly rooted in the instruction 
and suggestions imparted by their teachers, although there is some variation in 
opinion as to the cogency and clarity of such instruction. Nevertheless it is 
evident from the reflection on past academic experience together with the 
responses sparked by the feedback sheet criteria, that the students have a 
more-or-less articulated sense of what analysis (the preferred term by some -  
see further category One) means specifically in this context. To the extent there 
is variation within this category this relates to the ‘success’ of the teachers, as 
mentioned above, and also to the degree of detail and accuracy with which the 
ideas are expressed -  but there is a broad consonance among the students as 
to what critical analysis signifies here.
2b. The teaching of critical thinking.
The students' responses illustrate various efforts being made to 
demonstrate what critical analysis meant in this context:
... they just like passed round essays which people had written 
which showed really good analytical skills ... and you know just 
every time she made comments on my work it was feedback of how 
you could improve that skill em, it was just like trial and error really
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you know just constantly doing essays till you could see us you 
know progressing in that skill.
(N, p1 115)
Em, they taught it you need to have at least two or three arguments 
for each point and then em just kind of summarise and make your 
own conclusions ... they didn’t really do anything special from what 
I can remember basically just to say that telling us like giving 
examples.
(F, p1 I29, p2 111)
...we had say an essay that we’d done and we went through it as a 
class afterwards then we’d go through the best sort of order that 
points should have been put through in ...
(G, P1 I25)
She explained a little bit about it but they didn’t do a whole session 
or anything like that just like breaking it down and em weighing up 
pros and cons and that.
(H, p1 117)
It wasn’t like a critical thinking lesson as such it was more like em 
usually he’d read the essays and then it came back but how do you 
come to this conclusion, could you analyse better and little 
comments like that, to try and build your argument -  we looked at 
like model answers as well to see how they did it to try and get the 
gist of it
(E,p1 116)
Critical thinking, analysis, structure, sense of argument -  these all appear to be 
different aspects of the package of skills which students expect to have to 
deploy for success.
Yes if you wanted to get a good mark you had to do critical thinking, 
make sure you always back everything up with a case or something 
like points you thought were flaws and then how it could be made 
better.
(L, p2 I20)
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There is little evidence of a strong sense of purpose, or reason (other than what 
I have termed ‘instrumentality’) or acknowledgement of any notion of 
scholarship or intellectual pursuit in these responses.
... like picking out theories and ...then trying to like pick an 
argument between them -  which was the best one sort of thing 
(Interviewer) And did students in general see the point of that, 
understand what it was, in a sense why you were being asked to do 
that?
Yes, but I don’t think a lot of students really understood how to 
differentiate between the two things and try and pull them apart I 
mean we didn't really have any in-depth lessons on it If we’d have 
been told everything that we needed to do it would have been a lot 
easier.
(Interviewer) And why perhaps.
Yes and so we’d just talk a bit about a theory and a couple of 
critical things and then talk about another theory and get a few 
more critical things and that would be it and remember where to put 
them in the exam.
(L, p2 128)
2c. Skills for success.
In their responses to the Law Assessment feedback sheets the students 
displayed a comparable ‘technical’ approach -  seeing the requirements 
necessary for success as more or less a set of skills to be deployed and 
demonstrated, perhaps, rather than seeing academic work and critical thinking 
as being contiguous and as being more holistically defined. Critical analytical 
work is seen as being made up from almost a set of (learned) responses rather 
than perhaps being a meaningful, highly conceptualised approach in its own
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... not just straight describing -  need to do your critical thinking of it 
the descriptive content , evidence and then obviously just 
describing the facts, evidence then that one exploring the evidence, 
research methods and what have you.
(I, p3 128)
... analysis gets you extra marks ...
(M, p3 116)
...make sure every point you make every quote you're using was 
related to the question, you analyse that point and kind of explain 
(rather than) just put the point down and just leaving it ... saying 
how the point is relevant to the answer you’re giving how it's going 
to support the answer
(A, P3 15)
... demonstrates understanding and awareness of appropriate 
theory, to me that would, I would approach that in a question that’s 
researching the answer using texts and theoretical views and 
attempt to put that into the essay.
(O, p2 I37)
In general the response to the feedback sheets was positive, and it would 
appear that the layout and language of the sheets do correspond to the forms 
and approaches to assignment-writing and critical analysis with which the 
students are broadly familiar. Whether this has the effect, however, of 
reinforcing patterns of instrumentality in the students’ academic behaviour, 
though, is perhaps an interesting issue.
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3. A Sense of Argument
3a. Two sides of the question.
Such conceptions of critical thinking appear related to school 
experiences of A and AS level. Where students had been given some guidance 
as to ‘how to do critical analysis’ (see some observations in category Two, 
above), it has tended to be along these lines:
... to I suppose see different sides of things that you have been 
taught or things that you were reading on and to try and bring other 
things and information in with it and strengthen your arguments...
(D p2 113)
... like planning and er put forward a balanced argument but to 
always back up what you are trying to convey
(Gp1 118)
... using relevant information and then like sort of weighing it up em 
with evidence of your arguments...
(N p1 I27)
Where students had a reasonably clear and articulate view of what critical 
thinking might mean it tended to be focussed on these key words; “argument”, 
“backing-up” (or “evidence”) and “sides”.
It could be inferred that these are the skills, albeit fairly traditional, that teachers 
have been keen to inculcate, more recently in view of the concentration of 
press and parents on school league tables and examination success. If these 
are the learning outcomes and skills demonstrably and explicitly to be tested in 
public examinations, teachers will be astute to the necessity of "hammering it
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in" (A p 1 I 11) and it is apparent that several students have internalised that 
message.
Again (subject to some of the observations in category Two) it is clear that 
several students have had the experience of various pedagogic attempts to 
communicate these approaches to critical thinking. Teachers used a variety of 
approaches -  going through cases in lectures and asking students questions; 
using model answers containing good analysis, and using a degree of peer- 
assessment and comment.
3b. Critical thinking as subject-specific argument.
There was virtually no reference to critical thinking “as such” -  critical 
analysis was in the students' experience always linked to particular subjects -  
only in passing was there any reference to critical thinking as a “separate” 
notion; (although apparently related to science).
... work out why I thought it was like that, is there anything other 
that makes me think like that within your argument.
(E p1 I29)
...we had em options, you know you do your general studies and 
things like that, we did have an option it was Science and Critical 
Thinking, em, that’s instead of General Studies ... but I know tha t... 
the options that they had ... they weren’t very successful at getting 
people to go.
(J p1 15)
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3c. Evidence and argument.
The idea of ‘argument’ appears closely related to the notion of ‘pulling 
things apart’ as well as use of evidence. ‘Pulling things apart’ is a recurrent 
theme and clearly associated with what critical analysis ‘is’:
... I felt that I needed to instead of just saying this is this and that is 
that I needed to pull the arguments apart...
(E p1 I28)
... like breaking it down and em weighing up pros and cons ...
(Hp1 118)
... that idea o f ... critically looking at how that relates to the other bit
(A p4 112)
...you didn't just take one straight and narrow approach with the 
critical thought it would be that you could look at what the 
question's asking you to do and then sort of analyse it in the end in 
your conclusion but that could have different points that could either 
go against it or to the point the question asked for
(I, p3 I20)
...showing that you know something and showing that you can look 
into it, put it together, take it apart and analyse it...
(J, p5 I25)
Critical analysis for several students embraced these various related notions of 
argument, “pick[ing] out things and ...pick[ing] out bits and strengths of the case 
and weaknesses' (L, p 1 I 36...) and a sense of there being more than one way 
of looking at an issue -  what could be termed “two-sidedness”. Showing 
awareness of a range of perspectives is central to these students’ perception of 
criticality, both in relation to past academic study and their current study of law.
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Em, I suppose like rather than just reading one article or one book 
I’d read a range of things then draw your own conclusions from it 
rather than just taking one person’s view of it I suppose.
(F, p4 130
...you use other sources, other people’s ideas, other literature to try 
and support your view or support the view that’s presented in the 
question, or disagree with that view.
(O, p2 18)
(This also refers to the idea of evidence; see below)
You assume straightaway ‘tho ‘cos it’s Law you’ve got to criticise 
and argue both sides ... if you’re asking for sort of critical analysis 
of a case or a judgement or something you look at to argue both 
sides and criticise the arguments for it and criticise the arguments 
against it and that sort of thing.
(K, p3 13)
I think you need em, you’ve got to have perspectives because Law 
I think of it from sort of legal and moral you know ... I just think 
perspectives em opinions like on the police and judges there are a 
lot of different perspectives ...
With English Lit you think it’s sort of your opinion and you’d be 
looking at a book but with Law you have to incorporate everyone’s 
opinion.
(H, p3 125)
This idea also leads in to the reflection of a sense of ‘evidence’ and the ways 
and degree to which the study of Law appears to present different challenges 
to the students, at least from that academic perspective:
... in History you used the evidence em as a fall-back just to give 
your opinions a bit of weight. In Law you can’t actually make an 
opinion without having a source behind you ... In History you know 
you’d use the source as an afterthought and just say what I wanted 
and then find the source to back me up whereas in Law if I did that 
I’d fail. It’s really hard to have to get used to looking at the sources 
and then using them to form your opinion.
(M, p3 129)
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The following quotation appears to place more emphasis on subjectivity within 
the process of legal analysis but also notes the importance of external 
‘authorities’ or evidence:
...critical thinking in Law compared to say Economics, it would be 
like Economics there is no sort of, in Law both sides could be the 
right answer whereas in Economics it’s sort of, there’s one answer 
and so you need to be able to examine in Law and use your ideas 
and your opinions to find your own sort of answer so you need to 
critically er analyse and think about what you do by reading books 
and cases and have your own opinion.
(G, p5 15)
Ideas of “backing-up” with evidence overall figure largely:
... backing it up with something that's analytical ... cite a case 
which is em backing up the point ... the authority would be the 
case.
(J, P4 124)
...before you could rely on the facts and knowing things and your 
opinion whereas now you’ve got to be so careful of your opinion it’s 
always as a reference ...
(D, p5 125)
These facets of critical thinking, then appear to overlap to some extent in 
students’ perceptions and together constitute a significant category. As 
suggested above, much of this form of conception would appear to derive from 
the (albeit varying) types of tuition -  implicit and explicit, experienced mainly in 
the sixth form at school or college. Some students, as also referred to above, 
expressed a significant awareness of changing expectations in the study of 
Law, although there were clear exceptions to this:
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No not at all I thought it [studying Law] would be a lot different... I 
knew I wanted to do Law but I thought that the changeover I would 
like being thrown in the deep end I was really concerned about that 
em, but it’s not been half as bad as I thought. It’s been I don’t know 
how to say it, it’s not a complete, not at all shock.
(N, p6 123)
For this category then, there appears to be a widespread, coherent, reasonably 
relational set of views as to what critical analysis (see further; category four) 
‘means’ in the context of academic performance. Students were able to relate 
these views to the categories defined in the assessment feedback sheets, with 
the language used apparently being in keeping with the sort of approach 
previously inculcated.
4. A General Sense of Analysis
4a. Looking in depth.
Some commonly articulated variants of a sense of analysis related to 
notions, for example, of depth, comparison and structure, and continue the 
'pulling apart1 aspect referred to in the previous category.
When they said critical thinking I heard analyse in depth and 
basically scrutinise it in every way you know...
(B, p1 I23)
It’s a lot more in depth [here] and we have seminars we have a lot 
more time to analyse things ...
(L, p4 15)
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... look at things more in depth rather than just like stating them ... 
[in response to being asked to say a bit more about what you mean 
by depth] ... putting the good aspects and the bad aspects about it 
and then maybe suggesting an alternative ...
(F, p2 131)
...There were lots of different approaches [in Psychology] ...and 
then you look at whether your personal opinion whether people 
support it or whether they don't support it look at arguments against 
it and it's up to you then to go and do your critical thinking and 
come up with whether you believe it and contrast it with other 
approaches and see how they reflect on each other and how they 
go against each other...
(I,p1 H9)
...point out a critical point and compare it with something else as 
well
(C, p4 13)
...I’d just maybe compare it to you know how does it fit in to the 
whole you know just fit it into everything - the big thing
(B, P4 112)
What appears evident is that students’ perceptions of critical 
thinking/analysis seem somewhat fragmented. There is little reference to any 
particularly coherent model of what critical thinking might connote; rather there 
are several disparate elements which the students describe (usually fairly 
superficially) as making up the ‘package’ of critical analysis required for 
academic success (see above, category Two). Critical analysis seems to be 
constituted from these, more or less discrete notions which, from the students’ 
perception, can then be translated into the necessary techniques for 
coursework and examination assessment. The degree to which Law as a 
discipline, in higher as opposed to further education, is seen as presenting 
different challenges to this perception, is developed below.
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It is partly because of the fragmented nature of the students’ perceptions that it 
does appear difficult to categorise them in any obviously hierarchical manner 
(this applies especially perhaps to categories Three and Four). It is difficult in 
any case to extrapolate many complete articulations of what critical thinking 
might mean. It appears as something which the students have a sense of as 
being important (certainly for academic success); as being something more or 
less successfully transmitted to them by teachers, (described in category Two) 
and as something which can be demonstrated in a more or less technical 
fashion through coursework and examinations.
We never really got told exactly how there’s different ways of critical 
thinking you know but in History and things like that we got told to 
do more em analysis of things. Yes there was more in History 
rather than - I got pulled up on quite a lot of English actually, they 
told me to do more on but I didn’t always know what they expected 
me to do.
(D, p1 18)
... they kept saying you've got to be analytical ‘cos hardly anyone 
was analytical ... they kept saying be analytical, be analytical but I 
asked them how to be analytical you know like and they actually 
wouldn’t tell me how to be analytical at all because obviously it’s 
quite hard to describe.
(J, P2 16)
... kind of just saying that you needed to be more analytical and 
that was it there was no kind of how or why, in your thinking
(A, P1 116)
...he gave us examples ... he gave us an example of an analytical 
answer one that’s put an interpretation on things ... this is what’s 
gonna get your marks.
(M, p1 I29)
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The extent to which the “message” of the importance of critical thinking/analysis 
has been transmitted and formulated to the students has been developed 
above, in category Three. The students’ views of what critical thinking signifies 
appears closely connected to what has here been termed an ‘instrumentalist’ 
conception, of a set of techniques which are not highly conceptualised but 
appear to exist as learned ‘tools of the trade’ for the A-level and first-year 
undergraduate scholar. However imperfectly understood (as exemplified by the 
quotations from D and J above) there is clearly a reliance on these approaches 
as they have been legitimated by teachers and will have ensured at least 
relative academic success so far, across a range of subjects.
4b. Critical thinking and Law.
The particular challenges posed by the study of Law at Higher Education 
level will now be addressed.
Perceptions of critical thinking in relation to Law raise some similar, but some 
distinct issues.
I think there’s a lot more critical analysis needed doing now, a lot 
more because before you could rely on the facts and knowing 
things and your opinion whereas now you’ve got to be so careful of 
your opinion, it’s never your opinion it’s always as a reference ...
(D, P5 124)
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... you have to keep your own views separate from you analysis, I 
think, because analysis can to a certain degree, especially if you’re 
writing an essay and you are tying up the ends it can have your 
own opinion in it, but there is quite a fine line I think between your 
own opinion.
(J, p6 125)
With English Lit you think it’s sort of your opinion and you’d be 
looking at a book but with Law you have to incorporate everyone’s 
opinion.
(H,p4 11)
These quotations would suggest a strongly-perceived sense of the study of 
Law as requiring a particular objectivity; a distancing of self from the discipline, 
perhaps, in contrast to other subjects where a more subjective involvement 
could be envisaged.
In terms of potential success students evinced the following, relating 
specifically to Law:
You’d have to really like use -a wide range of cases and try and 
think analyse the cases and then try to be critical about them as 
well.
(L, p3 I32)
... somebody says in a case law you know critically analyse it and 
I’d probably look at it and think ok where did they go wrong, you 
know where did they -  didn’t do this bit very well ... in the 
judgement.
(B, p6 I29)
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You assume straight away ‘tho ‘cos it’s Law you’ve got to criticise 
and argue both sides ... if you’re asking for critical analysis of a 
case or a judgement or something you look at to argue both sides 
and criticise the arguments for it and criticise the arguments against 
it and that sort of thing. But yes it’s sort of, rather than just writing 
what happened it’s sort of analysing why it happened and what 
could have happened isn’t it.
(K, P3 13)
The idea of critically analysing case-law does emerge as quite a widespread 
and dominant notion:
... Contract -  one case, I think it's Manchester and a housing 
association another case both had same principles two different 
rulings just ‘cos of the wording you’d think it would apply to both.
(I. p4 131)
Students’ perceptions of the study of Law tend to revolve then around the 
importance of case-law, the significance of mooting as a highly positive 
experience, and the specific analytical demands made by Law, partly (as 
indicated above) in relation to case-law, but also in other ways.
While there is a lot of attention paid to the significance of case-law study the 
students also showed awareness of other aspects of legal study and analysis 
important for good performance:
... like theories ... try and use that as well.
(L, p3 I36)
... like critically analysing the judiciary then I’d probably start 
looking at all the weakness in there, why you know in all three 
branches of Law you know the weaknesses of that in relation to 
Law. Or if I had a statute I’d start by saying well you know this
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statute is all very nice and everything, however it doesn’t cover this 
part of you know the Law it’s trying to ...
(B, p5 114)
... researching the answer using texts and theoretical views and 
attempting to put that into the essay ... critically evaluating the 
theory you’ve used...
(O. p2 I39)
Again it could be inferred that the students have some sense of critical analysis 
in the context of specifically legal study, but it is far from being a complete, 
coherent or confident categorisation or articulation.
The experience of mooting is to be dealt with largely in Chapter 7, as it would 
appear to have particular significance for practical curriculum development and 
the positive personal and academic development of students.
5. Critical Thinking as a Way of Being
5a. The student lifeworld.
A small number of students gave some reflection to the notion of critical 
thinking as something wider than being a set of more or less understood 
approaches to academic work. Such perceptions, where they existed tended to 
emerge from the more 'general' questioning towards the end of the interviews, 
concerning for example current issues of the day, experiences with friends or 
relations or, less commonly, the students' reflection on their own character and 
personality. There seemed to be the most powerful manifestations of critical
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thinking as a life-approach or way of being while these latter reflections were 
observed. By powerful is meant, in combination, an impression of conviction, 
even passion, together with a student's readiness to be critical of the external 
world and society. Critical thinking in this conception appears separate from the 
requirements of academic work and tends to be characterised as an approach 
to life and the world in general, perhaps as a personality trait. It is clearly 
beyond the scope of this research to look into aspects of psychological and 
familial influences on cognitive development but some students did explicitly 
refer to what they saw as such factors in the development of this trait.
5b. Personality.
(Interviewer) ... is it more a kind of would you agree with this phrase 
a habit of mind?
I think it is, yes. I think I've got it in my personal life ... I definitely 
recognise it in myself but I'm not sure about other people as such ... 
I think it's there ... I've been conscious of it since I started at 
secondary school sometimes I find things in my mind a bit too 
much...
(E, p6 127)
I don't think it's something that you can teach really, I think it's 
something that em, people acquire, you are either a critically 
minded person or you're n o t... some people, I think it's something 
you develop through life and obviously em, things that you do and 
essay writing and various things like that, you just develop it, I think 
you've either got it or you haven't.
(J, p12 117)
I think to a certain extent people are generally more critical than 
others in everyday life and their approach I mean my ex-girlfriend 
could go through the day without worrying or thinking about 
anything to a great extent but I'm constantly evaluating the pros and 
cons of situations and things like that...
Whether it's linked to intelligence or just how you've been brought 
up as a child, the toys you had as a child. Whether you've been
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given toys that required you to be, to problem-solve ... I think 
people are just generally more inquisitive, some people are happy 
to sit back and take things as they are. Some people want to see 
what else is out there.
(O, p9 116)
This quotation is as some length as it appears to encompass the key elements 
in what the students representing this category were generally expressing (as 
also seen in the extracts above) -  scepticism as to the degree to which critical 
thinking can be formally 'taught1, seeing it as an aspect of personality, seeing it 
as linked to some extent with early childhood and family experiences, and 
suggesting a slight sense of 'difference' or otherness.
(Interviewer) whether you'd go so far as call it scepticism. Have you 
always been like that?
Yes. Mum always says that I'm always the, always been like that.
(N, p9 131)
... I can be ... quite logical in the way I'm thinking and if someone 
doesn't have that then I think yeh ... usually if I've got opinions on 
things I'm not the first one to go out shouting about it but just to I 
might listen to other people and what they've got to say as well ... 
My mum definitely, she definitely looks at things like that yes and 
analyses sort of people's way of thinking and picks up on things 
what are probably wrong to her yes.
(D. p6 131)
I think I just need to sort of-listening to what is being said and think 
about -  that's my nature that's the way I am.
(A, p5 19)
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(Interviewer) ...do you feel that you're a bit of a kind of or perceived 
as being a bit of a maverick o r ... you don't see things the same as 
everybody else?
Yes, I'd say so ... [gives examples] ... because I've not suddenly 
become sceptical, it's just something I've always thought I don't 
know if it's the way I was brought up... I don't take things at face 
value ...
(K, p5 132)
5c. The academic and the personal.
The beginnings of an interesting relationship between 'academic' critical 
thinking and 'way of being' critical thinking were also being sketched.
... I think you can be critical, it actually, you can be critical quite 
easily I think sort of like, I feel it's sort of eh, a trait or whereas 
critical analysis in an academic sense is a totally different skill ... I 
feel that because I'm critical it doesn't lend itself to make critical 
analysis easy.
(K, p10 I29)
Yes [criticality] more of a life thing because I think I'm better at it in 
life than I would be academically. I don't know whether it could work 
both ways!
(D, P7 110)
Yes I'd say I'm not a critical thinker because of my course, I'm 
generally quite critical.
(K, p6 112)
I couldn't see why they'd taken it [a conspiracy theory relating to the 
events of 9/11] so strongly on board from just seeing one 
programme.
(Interviewer)... So you were questioning not only their belief if  you 
like but their evidence for their belief?...
Yes because like in general I kind of like don't jump to conclusions I 
kind of just sit back and see what I've weighed up a bit.
(F, p6 115)
Em, I don't really tend to watch the news or buy a newspaper but 
when I do what it throws up I tend to criticise it and get right
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involved in i t ... it's not a rounded argument all right so somebody's 
done this so the newspaper thinks that but what about the other 
side of the story -  and that's frustrating ... if there's something else 
that I can think of I think well you know what if somebody just takes 
it as read and you end up in a seminar where people can't see the 
two sides of an argument or like have a debate that is how it is and 
that's the end of it.
(E, P6 118)
Here can be seen a degree of meshing of the academic and way of being but 
as opposed, perhaps, to the more generally-suggested separation between the 
two:
(Interviewer) ... would your definition of critical thinking stretch that 
far; a kind of engagement with the world in general?
Probably not, like I said before I'd probably just associate it with 
academically. I've never really thought about it, as you know as 
thinking about society in that way. I never really have until today.
(B, p11 I20)
Initial Conclusions
There were some problems connected with categorisation, in that students' 
views of what constituted critical thinking did tend to (for example) overlap, or 
be not very fully thought-out, or be difficult to tease out, in some cases. 
Nevertheless the categories here described convey an adequate, and to some 
extent nested representation of their perceptions. The extent to which there is a 
clear hierarchy certainly in relation to the third and fourth categories, rather 
depends on an imposition of a certain structure on a set of interleaved notions 
relating to aspects of argument, evidence, 'two-sidedness' and the other
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features referred to in these categories. In other words, 'a sense of argument' 
(the third category) itself includes some of the aspects of critical thinking 
subsequently given more emphasis and development within the fourth category 
(a general sense of analysis). It is difficult clearly to separate these two 
categories in particular, and another approach would be to see the sense of 
argument as a 'sub-type' of a more general sense of analysis. Having said that, 
it is apparent that several students did closely identify a sense of argument as a 
fairly clearly-defined, well-entrenched aspect of critical thinking and analysis, so 
it can legitimately be used to constitute a separate, visible category in this 
construction of outcome space.
It would appear that students have a strong sense that they need to 'do' critical 
thinking and analysis to get good marks, and have a sense of the mechanics of 
demonstrating it, in terms of, for example, comparing and contrasting of ideas, 
backing points up with evidence, and going into greater depth. What appears 
less certain, in their perceptions, is whether it can be (more) formally taught 
(see further, in Chapters 7 and 8), whether it relates to anything beyond A- 
Level and Degree study, and what its purpose might be. I was particularly 
struck by a strong sense that critical analysis was something they 'had to do', 
akin more perhaps to demonstrating factual knowledge or fulfilling a set of 
criteria for success. It seemed divorced, in general (although not always, as the 
fifth category illustrates) from any notion that it might be as it were an 
interesting, or important, or 'healthy' activity or approach in itself. It is suggested
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that perhaps this is connected with what has been variously described as the 
demise of the idea of liberal education, the idea that:
[LJiberal education is not preparation for any specific job, but a 
preparation for a critical, aware and responsible appreciation of 
what is happening in the world both at work and outside.
(Fox and Bell, 1999 Ch.1 
p.5)
as opposed to, perhaps, the “consumer-led demand for vocationalism in the 
undergraduate degree” (Cownie, 1999 Ch.9 p.242) which might also lead to a 
more instrumental and less widely-engaged set of student attitudes.
This, then, may have implications not merely for the curriculum but for 
increasingly prevalent notions of citizenship and social engagement. As was 
recently considered in “Times Higher Education” (THE) it can be argued that 
the humanities can contribute here, through their emphasis on critical thinking:
"Tm helping my pupils to think harder, to be more reflective, more 
cynical, harder to fool -  a good citizen, in some ways...”
(Chris Beard, quoted in 
'Soul Searching1, Matthew 
ReiszTHE, 14 February 
2008 p35)
This, together with some other implications of the students' perceptions, will be 
explored further in Chapters 7 and 8.
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Chapter 6 
The Problem of the Categories of Description in Phenomenography
One of the most problematic issues within the data analysis in this research 
was that of the construction of categories, or outcome space, following the 
interviews. It is the intention here to offer some exploration and explanation of 
this issue, both in relation to the key literature and to my personal 
understanding, interpretation and working-out of the problem. Such reflections 
link with discussion elsewhere (Chapter 5 on data analysis, Chapter 4 on 
phenomenography and Chapter 3 on methods, for example) but the focus here 
is on my relationship with the methodology selected, the question of 
subjectivity, and the dilemmas involved in constructing the outcome space. 
Some element of reflection appears necessary at this stage.
Underlying this issue is a more fundamental and, to some extent, personal set 
of questions. Determining categories, that is, the outcome space within this 
project necessitates some personal assertion and subjective interpretation. For 
most of my academic life (although not the more recent stages) any intimation 
of the subjective, the intrusion of the “I” into academic work has been seen as 
anathema. It feels almost alien now to be asserting and determining a 
categorisation in the absence of 'external evidence', relying largely instead on a 
subjective awareness of my positioning and the context of the students and the 
material produced to come up with a reasoned appreciation of the views
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expressed. The contextualisation provided by my knowledge and experience of 
students from day-to-day over many years helps to provide a mediating, or 
regulating background to a sensitive interpretation of their statements. So my 
stance is not one of 'pure' subjectivity but represents instead a type of 
'intersubjectivity' as discussed for example by Kvale and referred to in Chapter 
3.
From the perspective of methodology, such approaches offer a reasonably 
satisfactory approach to the traditional questions of validity and significance of 
research. Nevertheless the more personal underlying issues remain, and I note 
there is a growing body of literature (eg Graves and Varma, 1997; Salmon, 
1992) which attempts not only to map the 'mechanics' of the research journey 
but also the gender issues and the emotional, social and psychological 
challenges and changes brought about by the process. As has been 
suggested:
The student may be more worried about it not being good enough, 
and feel that the risks are not worth taking. On the other hand, the 
consequences of not taking the risk might be even more damaging 
in the end to a sense of personal identity.
(Light and Cox, 2001, Ch.8 
p.139)
Briefly then, those are some of the inherent personal and reflected-on elements 
within the determination of outcome space. I will now turn to the definition and 
arguments contained in the literature, before saying more about how I dealt 
with the problem, in the light of the literature.
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Phenomenographic Outcome Space
The terminology and methods associated with phenomenography are 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 4 and the intention here is more to develop 
some of the particular debates relating to outcome space. Nevertheless a brief 
resume may be useful at this stage.
The term 'outcome space' derives from the earlier work in phenomenography, 
particularly that of Ference Marton. As stated elsewhere, what the 
phenomenographic approach concentrates on is firstly the 'second-order' 
perspective (i.e. how the subject experiences or perceives a phenomenon) and 
secondly, what variation may be evident in such perceptions, within a particular 
grouping. It is this second concern which gives rise to the use of the term 
'outcome space'. The kinds of perceptions, or conceptions, resulting from a 
particular phenomenographic enquiry, are normally ordered or ranked into say, 
five categories which can reveal relative limitations or success in the 
understanding of a particular concept -  hence the particular popularity of 
phenomenography in research relating to education. These categories 
illustrating variation are what are said to constitute the 'outcome space':
This outcome space, the map of the structural relations of the 
variation in the way a group (of students) experience a particular 
phenomenon ... illustrates the power of the phenomenographic 
approach ...
In summary, phenomenography takes a relational (or non-dualist), 
second-order perspective, aims to describe the key aspects of the
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variation of the experience of a phenomenon rather than the 
richness of individual experiences, and produces a limited number 
of internally related, hierarchical categories of description of the 
variation...
(Trigwell and Richardson, 
in Rust, 2003, Ch.3 p.39) 
(emphasis added)
I will return to the question of 'hierarchy' below, although this is also related to 
the notion of variation to which I will now turn.
In theory and in practice, the identification of the types of variation in students' 
conceptions could be very useful in the development of different, and more 
targeted pedagogic approaches. If it is recognised that several students share 
a particular misconception (as was the case, for example in one of the earliest 
studies on the 'mole' concept in chemistry: (Lybeck et al 1988) then a changed 
focus within the explanation and explication of the subject, (putting the 
students' perception at the centre, rather than the concept itself) could lead to 
enhanced understanding and learning. It is the differing types of 
(mis)understanding which can help to move the teacher towards greater 
insights into the 'gap' between the explanation, and the understanding of 
students. (On a purely anecdotal note, I would have welcomed a 
phenomenographic enquiry into the teaching of algebra which of all branches of 
mathematics was always, as a pupil, the most conceptually mysterious to me. It 
is only as an adult that I have begun to grasp what algebra is 'for' and what it 
can do).
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From Marton's original work we glean another key notion underpinning 
phenomenography; that the categories within the outcome space do not 
(emphatically) represent the positions or views of individuals. As has been 
mentioned above, particularly at the beginning of Chapter 5, the concern is with 
the variation of conception within a particular grouping. This emphasis raises 
an issue regarding the relationship (developed further below) between the 
students' 'lifeworld' and the process of categorisation - from what might be 
termed a 'strict' phenomenographic perspective the individual student's 
conception is irrelevant, and yet it could be argued that conceptions, or 
meanings within a category are inevitably drawn from and embedded within the 
individuals' 'lifeworld'. However, the insistence on group, not individual 
conceptions, can be useful for illuminating different conceptions of a 
phenomenon existing either at the same time or consecutively, within a student 
grouping, which a methodology reliant on individual response would not 
necessarily pick up. Nevertheless the abstraction, or separation of categories of 
outcome space from students' personal lifeworlds might mean that the 
researcher's interpretation or extrapolation of categories becomes even more 
potentially subjective, in the absence of any rich picture being given of the 
individuals from which the categories are drawn.
The work of interpreting the students' statements and assigning them to 
categories is a lengthy and iterative process, and the issues relating to 
discourse and interpretation discussed elsewhere (Chapter 3) clearly come into
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play here. 'Immersion' in the transcripts; constant re-reading and cross- 
referencing leads to an emergence of key, repeated themes which can then be, 
at least roughly, categorised. It is this process which starts to yield the insights 
and manifestations of the students' subjective understandings and perceptions 
of the topic under investigation and to reveal a sense of 'group' 
conceptualisation -  as quoted above this is one of phenomenography's 
'strengths'. A meticulous and sensitive examination of the transcripts is clearly 
necessary for the assignment of categories, together with a reflective 
awareness of the relations between them, necessary for the development of a 
hierarchy (see below) and at least for an intelligent and useful appraisal of the 
overall 'direction' of the students' perceptions.
The Problem of Hierarchy
As quoted by Trigwell and Richardson (in Rust, 2003, Ch.3 p.39) Marton clearly 
referred, in his early work, to the idea of the formation of 'hierarchies' in the 
construction of the outcome space within a phenomenographic enquiry. The 
notion that, say, five categories of description should ideally 'ascend' so that 
each conception builds on and subsumes the previous ones (with the 'final' 
conception representing the most complete understanding) is one which is 
found in many accounts of phenomenographic research, such as Ashwin 
(2005) and Marton, Dall'Alba and Beaty (1993).
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From a methodological point of view this does raise some interesting and 
significant questions, however. As with the law of negligence, it could be said 
that “the categories are never closed”. The problem of a seemingly arbitrary, or 
premature, closing-off of constructed categories may be due to mundane 
reasons such as the time available, but also raises the question (touched on in 
Chapter 3) of the researcher, or interpreter's subjective choices:
Firstly, what basis is there for the assertion that there are a limited 
number of qualitatively different ways of experiencing a 
phenomenon? Since the categories of description are the 
production of the researcher, it would appear that it is the choice of 
the researcher to limit the number of categories of description. 
Presumably, given time and energy, one might extend the 
categories.
(Lucas and Ashworth,
1997, p.20)
It could be argued that a successful, or worthwhile piece of phenomenographic 
research will demonstrate a 'completeness' of conception within each category, 
which will be evidenced through quotation, and that this notion of completeness 
is more significant than the number of categories which emerge (note taken 
from Ashwin, 2004). The responsibility for categorisation does clearly lie with 
the researcher and it will not necessarily be demonstrable that another 
researcher would come to the same conclusions (Ashwin, 2004). The 
researcher should be clear about their experience of the research and be able 
to relate the evidence from the transcripts to their selected categories, showing 
a sense of positioning, preconception and contextual background to the 
research.
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The problem of categorisation goes deeper and relates, as suggested above, to 
the question of interpretation, and of underlying criteria and the basis on which 
choices and differentiation is made. To a lawyer this raises a very specific 
question as it relates to the problematic operation of case law/precedent:
...similarities between the facts are advanced as reasons for 
recommending or justifying the same results...
In case law it is not uncommon for precedents to be cited by 
opposing sides in the form of competing analogies: ... In such 
cases the result turns on the relative importance or weight to be 
attributed to particular elements of similarity or difference...
(Twining and Miers, 1991, 
Ch.7 p.261)
However, the legal example serves to illustrate the wider problem. In other 
words, the identification or ascription of qualities of “similarity” or “difference” 
involves the relativity principle -  at what level of generality is the comparison 
being made?
...generality and particularity are matters of degree and some of the 
most difficult choices in interpretation relate to choosing an 
appropriate level of generality.
(Twining and Miers, 1991, 
Ch.3 p.145)
However, one of the major problems within phenomenographic reporting 
remains the question of hierarchy. Again, this problem can be framed in 
different ways and it raises different sub-questions. One relates to the 
underpinning terms of reference and objective of a particular study; to put it 
simply, what are the criteria being used to determine the categories and to what 
extent do they fit with each other to give rise to a set of ordered and
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conceptually-related hierarchical concepts? Can a hierarchy always be justified, 
for example where the object of enquiry is bound, potentially, to give rise to a 
fairly loose and disparate set of perceptions (perhaps as with perceptions of 
critical thinking). As I noted in Chapter 5, the delineation of outcome space was 
difficult as, for example, the categories of student response did not always fall 
neatly and clearly into definite 'conceptions' and there was some overlap 
between types of perception. Perhaps the ease (or not) of formulating 
hierarchical categories is related to the type of research question being asked.
To sum up:
In our view, it is not clear, as phenomenography assumes, that a 
hierarchically-ordered system of mutually-interrelated conceptions 
of a given key concept is attainable -  and (if attainable) that it 
necessarily represents the meanings of the conceptions of students 
within their distinct lifeworlds...
For instance, it must be considered possible that the phenomenon 
under investigation has no place in a given individual's lifeworld, or 
that it takes a very different form.
(Lucas and Ashworth,
1997, p.21)
It should be recognised, then, that there is a danger of distorting the student 
views to make them 'fit' categories, or to organise them “in terms of the way in 
which student conceptions deviate from the 'ideal' authorised conception” 
(Lucas and Ashworth, 1997, p.23). This now takes us on to the issue of value- 
judgements and hierarchy.
In imposing an inclusive hierarchical structure (setting a conceptual framework
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for one to emerge) in which some categories appear more 'complete' than 
others, the question inevitably arises as to whether this represents a set of 
value judgements being made by the researcher (note take from Ashwin, 
2004).
The idea of “deviating from the 'ideal'” mentioned above will be a significant 
factor in the ordering and categorisation process, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly. Put simply, it might appear that this vitiates 
the phenomenographic objective of demonstrating second-order experience, as 
the students' experience is now being refracted through a more or less 
authoritative value structure (the hierarchical outcome space) which deems 
some conceptions as less complete (deficient, inferior) than others. The 
presumption of a hierarchy in this sense appears to contradict the essential 
purposes, function and power of phenomenographic enquiry -  which is to 
collate and express, as far as possible, 'the world as the learner experienced it' 
(Trigwell and Richardson, in Rust, 2003, Ch.3 p.38) in respect of a particular 
topic. It may be that the construction of an inclusive hierarchy is best or better 
for the development of a responsive pedagogy for the problem under 
consideration. But from the point of view of 'purely' learning about second-order 
experience it might seem that the hierarchical approach obstructs and 
obfuscates the interpretation of data.
If phenomenography is about finding out about students' perceptions, these
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perceptions then, as it were, need to speak for themselves. There is no further 
need to 'assess' them in terms of relative deficiency. The process could 
become regressive or circular -  the topic selected for investigation (mole 
concept; critical thinking) will have been selected, almost certainly, because 
teachers have encountered problems in students' understanding of that topic; 
the research reveals 'deficient' categories, (according to the researcher's view 
and/or the authoritative literature on the subject), and the hierarchical structure 
will reflect this. In this process there is a danger that the intended focus on the 
students' second-order perceptions is lost sight of to some extent.
The problem has largely been expressed in terms of the relationship between 
the students' 'lifeworld' and the 'authorised conception' (see for example Lucas 
and Ashworth, 1997, pp.23-26) but I would add to this the problem of 
researcher subjectivity, which is also touched on in Chapter 3). In my research, 
the final conception (critical thinking as a way of being) does at least partly 
reflect my personal belief. The point is, though, that the setting of a hierarchical 
structure would seem in some senses to detract from an emphasis being 
placed on the object of the research -  ie the students' lived experience.
Having said that, the point made above in relation to pedagogic response 
needs further examination. It is important to stress that in phenomenography it 
is not just the categories themselves which merit attention, but the relations 
between them or the variation:
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The categories of description corresponding to those differing 
understandings and the logical relations that can be established 
between them constitute the main results of a phenomenographic 
study.
(Prosser and Trigwell,
1999, Ch.3 p.57)
This is what in particular may give rise to useful knowledge for a constructive 
response from the teacher/researcher:
Another source of verification of the appropriateness of a set of 
categories is the internal logic of the categories themselves ... 
There may be an internal structure to a category system in the 
sense that what separates conceptions of a phenomenon is what is 
assumed to be in need of being explained...
A further aspect of the internal structure of categories that depict 
different conceptions of a phenomenon is that learning can be 
described as the change from one conception within this structure 
to a different one.
(Saljo, in Ramsden, 1988, 
Ch.2 p.46)
It is the variation, and types of understanding represented by relational and 
hierarchical categories, which can be most informative and enlightening to the 
researcher and hold the most vivid potential for the development of changing 
practice.
Outcome Space and Critical Thinking
The construction of outcome space in my research on perceptions of critical 
thinking did raise certain problems. The hierarchical structure I did in the event
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impose appears satisfactory from several angles. There did emerge a sense of 
ordering of conceptions in that within the group there was significant variation 
between more limited (less complete), less fully-articulated and less wide 
perspectives, and more fully-realised and deep approaches, which I have 
represented in the five categories discussed in Chapter 5. In that sense it was 
not particularly problematic to discover and express a hierarchical structure 
within the students' reporting, (pace comments above and in Chapter 4) in 
relation to personal and external 'authoritative' views - in this case on what 
might constitute critical thinking. The fifth category does convey a sense of a 
rich and wide-ranging understanding of both the minima 'required' and the 
potentialities and deeper life-relevance of criticality in its many aspects. The 
apprehensions expressed throughout the categories take us far beyond
...[the assumption] that any students entering higher education 
ought to understand what is meant by words such as 'argue', 
'critical analysis', 'be explicit'...
(McKenna, in Rust, 2003,
Ch.5 p.80)
The hierarchical structuring became more problematic in two particular areas. 
Firstly, as briefly noted above, it was sometimes difficult to separate apparently 
'overlapping' categories and perspectives, particularly as between three and 
four (a sense of argument, and a general sense of analysis). It sometimes felt I 
was straining, artificially, to assign statements and views which in (some of) the 
students' minds seemed to be closely interrelated, into separate categories, 
(although this was not always the case). This could be described as a problem
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of differentiation, perhaps particularly acute in investigating such a diffuse topic 
as critical thinking (as opposed to, say, understanding of a specific formula in 
physics or an empirically-demonstrable phenomenon).
Secondly, it could not be absolutely asserted that within this hierarchy the 
higher level conceptions do supersede and include the lower level. The most 
straightforward example is that the 'negativity' associated with the first 
conception is largely subsequently dismissed. A sense of argument (the third 
category) may still have some underlying association with negative comment 
but at least by the fourth category such perspective has disappeared. In this 
respect the ideal inclusive hierarchy could be said to be lacking in my analysis. 
Nevertheless the variation and relationship between the categories remains as 
clear and significant in helping to demonstrate the learner's view of what is 
without doubt a complex and contested concept.
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Chapter 7 
Students Learning Law - critically?
While the explicit aim of this research was to discover and reveal some aspects 
of Law students' perceptions of critical thinking, in the process of interviewing 
the students some interesting insights were offered into perceptions of learning 
Law itself. In several instances where these insights have been closely 
enmeshed with those on critical thinking, these have been discussed above, in 
Chapter 5, as constituting the phenomenographic analysis which is the focus of 
this dissertation. Some comments have been less easy to disaggregate in this 
way, however, while still offering some reflections on student perceptions which 
may be significant for the teaching of law. It is the intention below to summarise 
these key features as an interesting and useful adjunct to the main research 
findings on critical thinking.
To do this serves further the purpose of embedding the students' view on 
critical thinking and related aspects within the context of specifically legal 
education and may also help to point towards the conclusions outlined in the 
final chapter in relation both to curriculum and delivery.
The key features identified have been grouped around the following three 
themes; students' personal (emotional?) reactions to learning law, using case- 
law, and Mooting.
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Personal reactions to learning law
Em, I find it's [Law] more of a personal subject for me, I find that it 
affects me in what I think like the debates about law and the 
Internet I think ooh maybe you'll have to be careful! Whereas in 
English I've read books -  criticism -  and that was the end of that it 
didn't affect me, it didn't get into my heart, my mind yeah.
(E, p4 114)
... there are a lot of different perspectives and there's like a big 
contrast between the legal and the moral -  I think sometimes the 
legal isn't very moral!
(H, p3 I29)
[Interviewer] ... do you find almost you have to unlearn some 
preconceptions about things?
- Yes I think so mm because as I say when you're learning 
something that you've never done before you've always got to think 
of that because your way of doing things could not be the right way 
to do it so you have to take things away to add more things ...
(D, P6 115)
You assume straight away though 'cos it's Law you've got to 
criticise and argue both sides ...
(K, P3 13)
Here are four direct examples of students' subjective experience of learning 
Law in the context of preconceptions and other academic experiences. 
Preconceptions deriving from cultural sources (as were discussed briefly in 
Interview D) may be particularly interesting to follow up -  in other words, the 
extent to which some students may need to 'unlearn' aspects of Law that they 
have previously gleaned and internalised for example from the mass media and 
entertainment.
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The very personal engagement with Law identified in E above, and the 
recognition of a disjunction between Law and morality in H are both issues 
which are also played out elsewhere, particularly in relation to discussion of 
future legal careers. Other students noted, for example, the potentially 
distressing scenarios they were likely to encounter and the need to be involved 
both critically and dispassionately.
To some extent such comments reflect the concern evinced in some quarters to 
introduce more emphasis on legal Ethics earlier into the academic curriculum 
(see, for example, o'Dair, 2001).
Case-Law
... like Contract it's getting used to the cases that you can use for 
your different types of areas and not just using them for the sake of 
using them.
(D, p5 I33)
I'm a bit confused as to how many cases I should try and remember 
... particularly with Contract Law so many of them and I'm not sure 
which ones I should try and remember the names and which ones I 
should just forget, because if I'm sat there all night trying to 
remember to the names of the cases and it comes to an exam I've 
got loads of cases but I've got no opinion to go with it or I've got no 
understanding of the topic but I can quote fifty-two cases on it -  it's 
finding a balance.
(M, p4 115)
Yes ... I mean again with the case law somebody says in a case law 
you know critically analyse it and I'd probably look at it and think 
okay where did they go wrong, you know where did they -  didn't do 
this bit very w e ll... in the judgement
(B, p6 I29)
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You need to sort of be able to sort of think outside right, sort of 
outside the box and not be sort of possibly afraid to bring in stuff 
from er which sort of like you originally think is irrelevant say a case 
for Contract-Law in say I don't know different bits ... bringing stuff in 
from other parts of Law to use in other bits ...
(G, p4 120)
Several students focussed on case-law method, particularly in the context of 
Contract Law, as part of their discussion on how Law was 'different'. Using and 
remembering cases appeared in the students' perceptions to be a particularly 
important aspect of the experience of learning Law, and as these quotations 
indicate, managing case-law is perceived as both a technical issue (D and M) 
and as being related to the more critical analytical approach (B and G).
M perhaps especially seems to provide an astute reflection on the mechanics 
and pitfalls of learning this kind of Law, and M's observations raise interesting 
pedagogic questions for anyone teaching Common-Law, case-based subjects. 
This question has arisen in my own teaching experience -  put simply, whether 
to teach fewer cases and try to indicate and inculcate principles, or (as one of 
my colleagues with whom I was sharing lectures preferred), to teach large 
numbers of cases in the anticipation that students will then know a huge body 
of relevant case-law and be able to derive principles and sense from that body.
Quotation B is interesting in that it clearly indicates a perception of a judgement 
being 'wrong' as well as not being done very well. The former could be 
interpreted as indicating what probably many lecturers intuit, that several
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students come in to learning law (possibly particularly having done it at 'A' 
Level) with a rather definite sense of a 'right and wrong answer' to be 
discovered in response to legal questions (again as mentioned above, perhaps 
partly due to cultural preconceptions).
The quotation from G led on to some discussion about the practice of Law 
being a 'creative' process and also a more perhaps sophisticated recognition of 
the nature of Law:
...in  Law both sides could be the right answer ... use your ideas 
and your opinions to find your own sort of answer so you need to 
sort of critically er analyse and think about what you do by reading 
books and cases and have your own opinion.
(G, p5 16)
Mooting
When I did the mooting that helped because I had to think critically 
about the question, I worked my way through it and then try and 
apply what I knew to the cases ... I think it [mooting] helps when I'm 
doing my coursework because I can apply what I've learnt and try 
to put it in -  thinking through it more than just writing it down.
(L, p6 122)
...I thought you know you're arguing the wrong points here and I 
was just like you know just thought but where is your logical 
thinking ... they [other students] put their argument forward put a 
case which had nothing to do with it and then they just like 
contradict themselves at the end ...
(N, p7 117)
I actually quite I thought that was quite good I quite enjoyed 
mooting yes I think because I actually read up on how to do it 
because like I've never done Law before I didn't really know what it 
was, I looked up on it and I really sort of got into it and how to
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speak correctly and use the correct terms ... I think having your 
case or your arguments put forward and doing it so it's fluent and 
people can understand it as well as arguing against someone else, 
taking different aspects I suppose to make sure others can 
understand it and you yourself can understand it so you can put it 
forward w e ll...
(D, p9 11)
... we just did one moot and then we have like feedback from the 
tutor and a third year student and they also gave feedback which 
was very useful but none of it was negative ... I mean I was so 
worried and it was like it is a quite scary situation ... I think it's really 
good 'though, you know that you have to do that especially in the 
first year.
(N,p7 131)
Several students mentioned mooting activities and all in an extremely positive 
light. What these quotations appear to indicate is a truly reflective aspect of 
student learning which mooting can help to address and develop. As student L 
notes, the activity brings in critical thinking, personal initiative and application -  
but with an emphasis on thinking it through rather than just writing it down, to 
paraphrase slightly. This suggests a recognition of a more active style of 
learning, as is also suggested by quotation D above. Having to make sure 
others can understand it makes sure that there is personal understanding by 
the student concerned so that the argument can be put forward compellingly 
and lucidly. Such sentiments from the students appear to endorse the positive 
pedagogic attributes of mooting.
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The benefits and practices of experiential learning feature often 
unwittingly in UK Law schools ... Mooting, for example, conforms to 
many of the characteristics of experiential methodology ... Its 
effectiveness as an educational tool is often overlooked as it is 
valued for its mimicry of a rite of practice.
(Burridge in Burridge et al,
2002 Ch.2 p30)
The acknowledgement that mooting can be 'scary' (second quotation from N) 
and the noting of the importance of positive feedback -  both from tutors and 
from and to peers, (“I felt really bad ... I didn't like to say you know -  your 
arguments are crap” N, p8 I 2) perhaps also serve as salutary reminders of the 
student experience. But it does appear that there is a recognition of the benefits 
mooting can bring, the students' comments on this appearing overall more 
clearly reflective and articulated than on almost any other topic which emerged 
during discussion. Mooting most commonly emerged in response, directly or 
indirectly, to questions which prompted students to talk about what 'fired them 
up', effectively, so that (at least for some) it would seem that self-esteem as 
well as legal education were being enhanced through this activity.
It is against this background, then, that the conclusions relating to critical 
thinking in first year Law students will be considered.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
In my introduction I referred, at least in outline, to some of the reasons why 
critical thinking is important in relation to higher education, and the study of 
Law. I made reference, for example, to the QAA Law Benchmark statements, to 
the new tests for critical thinking, and to notions of liberal education, together 
with local examples of the need to demonstrate critical analysis for real 
academic success. In this concluding chapter I aim to revisit and develop some 
of these, consider the findings described in Chapter 5 in relation to some of the 
existing literature, and suggest some practical ways forward in terms of 
curricular and pedagogic development.
While noting the existing tensions and debates about the likely, and/or 
desirable directions and content of legal education, it would appear that the 
concept of “the liberal Law School” (Bradney, 2003) is surviving and even 
thriving. Much recent literature identifies the continuing importance and 
desirability of such an approach to law teaching. Liberal education is of course 
a term and concept fraught with difficulties -  Bradney, for example, notes, it 
can be undermined from perspectives of associations with elitism (Newman's 
“education that is suitable for 'gentlemen'” (Bradney, 2003, Ch.2 p.48), and 
from post-modernist perspectives:
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...post-modernism, in denying the possibility of a foundational 
significance being properly attached to any series of arguments, 
exposes, it seems, basic theoretical shortcomings in the idea of 
liberal education.
(Bradney, 2003 Ch.2 p.45)
The Enlightenment 'project' itself has been critiqued by, amongst others, some 
of the Frankfurt school of Critical Social Theory and some poststructuralists, 
and the ideals of liberal education which in some sense flow from that 
Enlightenment thinking are certainly not unproblematic, particularly in the 
modern political context. Within legal education itself, it can be argued that 
liberal education is being challenged by various pedagogic and political 
agendas -  skills, vocationalism, influence of the professions, consumer/student 
demand, political and funding pressures and so on - see for example Twining 
(1994); Birks (1996); Bradney (2003); Cownie (1999) and Toddington (in Birks, 
(1996).
Without actually arguing that the world of legal education is a site of internecine 
struggle - see for example Leighton (2001), Savage and Watt in Birks (1996), it 
would be missing the point to suggest that there is an easy consensus about 
what constitutes the purpose and content of Law as a discipline within higher 
education.
Arguably it has been the 'skills agenda' in particular which has driven recent 
pedagogic developments in legal education and contributed to interesting 
creative tensions, but other more recent educational developments have also
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contributed to such tensions. As Sherr has put it:
Apart from Fiona Cownie's almost lone voice in this country, it has 
been the skills school largely which has promoted the educational 
discipline as a teaching approach. Academics and teachers 
interested in educating legal skills and promoting good lawyering 
behaviours ... have also promoted more of a competence based 
approach to teaching and assessment, looking at learning 
outcomes, objectively measurable systems of assessment, learning 
objectives, and all the other concepts and argot of the new 
educational theory.
(Sherr, 1998, p44)
This, and further statements, seem best to mirror the findings as to students' 
perceptions of critical thinking as set out in Chapter 5. While not coming strictly 
within the body of critical literature as reviewed in Chapter Two, there are 
several comments within this article which appear to reflect most closely one of 
the more frequently-encountered perspectives of the students; as expressed 
above in Chapter 5 that they are following "a set of criteria for success".
However, as has been suggested:
The majority of contemporary British university Law Schools and 
the majority of academics within those Law Schools hold 
themselves out as providing a liberal education.
(Bradney, 2003, Ch.2 
P-31)
and there are perhaps enough indications both within legal educational 
literature and the external world to suggest that a liberal legal education, tout 
court, with its concomitant givens of critical approaches and critical thinking, 
can, as has been suggested above, survive and thrive. Further evidence for
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this might be found for example in Twining's advocacy of the development of 
postgraduate courses in law, the increasing emphasis on scholarly research 
(as compared to say fifty years ago) - “legal scholarship is now a large-scale, 
burgeoning enterprise” (Twining, 1994, Ch.6 p.123), and the continuing 
phenomenon that law firms :
...were often justified in preferring non-law graduates to law 
graduates, for some undergraduate legal education as currently 
practised can seriously damage one's intellectual health.
(Twining, 1994, Ch.7 
p. 164)
That may seem paradoxical for a number of reasons but what seems to be the 
case is that at the very least the wider critical perspectives offered by other 
subject disciplines appeal even to the legal profession itself.
Very much in outline, then, here are some of the reasons why what is being 
termed a critical, liberal legal education can be seen as a vivifying and relevant 
approach. Of course, there is a need to note that the “skills v. liberal legal 
education” characterisation is often an over-simplistic one, as has been pointed
The problems raised by the idea of legal education and the 
development of legal skills are as intellectually rich as any in the 
fields of philosophy and the various social sciences.
(Toddington, in Birks,
1996, Ch.6 p.76)
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How then can this be linked with the issue of critical thinking as demonstrated 
by students, or, more pertinently, their views of critical thinking in terms of 
curriculum development? For whether one takes the liberal education view as 
suggested above, or the Law Benchmarking statement, or the Dearing or Leitch 
Reports as referred to in the introduction, or other indicators of 'graduateness' it 
appears that there is a need and a desire to develop critical thinking, whatever 
that may mean in these contexts, in our students, and we therefore need to 
consider both what the term connotes and how this relates to students' 
conception and experience, in order to develop better-adapted pedagogy. For, 
as has been suggested:
The context of learning should, according to him [Marton], be 
described in terms of what is in the students' minds rather than 
what is in the textbook.
(Hedegaard and 
Hakkarainen in Ashworth 
etal, 1986, Ch.6 p.131)
This research, then, could provide the beginnings of a more developed 
awareness of what students bring to bear on the notions of critical thinking to 
which they will be exposed through academic study.
The writings of Sherr (1998) and others in this respect appear more closely 
related to my findings on student perceptions than the critical thinking literature 
perse, with its emphases for example on problem solving and formal logic.
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Sherr appears both to identify, and caution against, the “skills and 
competencies and learning outcomes approach”... [which] “is useful, but only 
so useful” (1998, p.45). The view of critical thinking identified as instrumental in 
my findings could be said to conform to what he terms:
...reductive lists of skills. There is only a certain amount of 
information or analysis which can be reduced to an outcomes or 
competencies basis and be measured as such.
(1998, p.45)
Whether or not one accepts his argument, it is clear that from one set of 
student perspectives, critical thinking is seen as another “skill” or “competency” 
which needs to be demonstrated for success.
Other academics who have discussed competence-based, and vocational 
learning within the context of legal education include Webb, (1999), and 
Johnstone, (1999) for example. The former cites Lyotard's concept of 
'performativity' (deriving from Political Writings, 1993), relating this to increasing 
flexibility and vocationalism in education, as well as to competence-based 
learning. Again, the significance of this here is how this analysis relates to the 
students' perspectives on critical thinking, while again noting that such writing 
appears not to form part of the substantive body of literature on critical thinking 
as such:
This approach [occupational competencies] has been dominated by 
the so-called 'standards methodology' of the NCVQ, whereby 
measurement of learning is defined in terms of criterion-referenced 
performance outcomes which are derived from the functional
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analysis of occupations ... It is emerging in a not wholly dissimilar 
form in higher education through attempts to define generic skills 
and attributes indicative of 'graduateness' ... It is quite difficult to 
generalise the position of the law schools in this debate. 
Skills-based learning is undoubtedly fashionable, though so far it 
has mostly eschewed the narrow emphasis on competence-based 
learning ... identified in other domains...
(Webb, in Cownie, 1999, 
Ch.9 p.241) (NCVQ : 
National Council for 
Vocational Qualifications)
These sources, then, offer some illumination of and relationship with some of 
the data findings set out above. The ideas expressed by the students as to 
critical thinking reflect, to some extent, what Webb calls (albeit referring to 
skills), “yet another discrete knowledge area to bolt-on to the curriculum” (op. 
cit p.242).
The extent to which the data relates to the 'fundamental' critical thinking 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 is perhaps more problematic. To some extent 
the perceptions mapped within categories Two, Three and Four in Chapter 5 
reflect the approach taken by Ennis (“aspects” and “abilities” - see above, 
Chapter 2).
In terms of speaking of the use of 'evidence' (Category Four) there is some 
meshing with the ideas of Dewey, as referred to in Chapter 2, although 
'evidence' is another word which could assume very different significance in 
different contexts. Nevertheless the references by the students to approaches 
such as use of evidence, comparison, looking at sides of arguments and
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analysis suggests if not a familiarity then at least an awareness of these sorts 
of basic tenets of critical thinking which Dewey, for example, touches on.
The term logic, in connection with critical thinking and as emphasised by Ennis 
for example, would seem to pose more problems in the context of student 
perceptions. Where students do refer to logic their comments are generally 
uncertain or doubtful:
I don't understand the term logic. People do things logically that 
other people don't it's just who they are ... I mean logic I think 
differs between different people, it's the same as morals -  people's 
moral views change.
(O, p6, 13...)
The formal logic referred to in Chapter 2 then would not appear to have much 
relevance or significance in terms of these students' experience.
As described in Chapter 5, the fifth category of student perception (critical 
thinking as a way of being) bears some relationship with the views expressed 
by Brookfield and Barnett, but only to a limited extent. While some students 
referred to, for example, being sceptical about some aspects of society there 
was no evidence of a thoroughgoing “calling into question [of] assumptions” 
(Brookfield, 1987, part 1 p.1) as quoted above in Chapter 2. With these insights 
in mind, it now remains to outline some possible pedagogic developments 
within the legal curriculum.
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Curriculum Development and Critical Thinking
The aim here is not to attempt to describe and comment on the large and 
growing body of literature on how to improve legal education (see for example 
Stuckey 2007). Rather the aim is to outline some possibilities for curriculum 
development both in terms of delivery and content in relation to critical thinking. 
It is not the intention here to give the minutiae of implementation but rather to 
suggest some practical possibilities which can be linked to the findings on 
students' perceptions. The first, and most obvious, is to create a set of 
seminars or workshops where the skills of critical thinking and analysis are 
specifically addressed. While this inevitably appears 'bolt-on' and is dubious in 
that it may set up the idea of critical thinking as a separate entity, unrelated to 
anything else in particular, from the student perspective it may appear as a 
useful, constructive and meaningful activity (some interviewees did comment 
positively on such an idea). Critical analysis would thereby appear in a sense 
privileged and prioritised, being given an explicit and articulated place in the 
Law diet.
This would to some extent address the student perception that critical thinking 
is important but that it is not necessarily explained, demonstrated or integrated 
explicitly into their learning. Where expressed student reaction was favourable 
to the idea, and it is something which is being tried elsewhere on Law courses, 
for example at the University of Central Lancashire.
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...it would be good if you know seminars one week how to critically 
analyse because do you know I've got a friend who goes to another 
Uni and they have a specific seminar tutor who actually teaches 
them how to do these kind of things and how to critically analyse 
and critical thinking ... they do like it because it sets out kind of what 
is expected of you as a student...
(B, p7 18...)
The problem with the apparent 'bolted-on' nature of such classes can be dealt 
with by paying careful attention to the contexts in which the critical thinking 
skills are developed. It would probably be the case, as one student suggested, 
that critical thinking is best 'taught' within the context and ongoing development 
of legal knowledge, so, for example, one class could approach the critical 
dimensions within Constitutional law, another within Contract, so avoiding too 
much ill-defined generality and skills-for-skills-sake, which students may find 
more off-putting. Critical thinking and ways of approaching it would therefore be 
grounded in the everyday subject-matter with which the students are having to 
become familiar and therefore cognitively, pedagogically and psychologically 
there is less likely to be any perceived (or real) disjunction between the 
information, or matter, as it were, and the bringing to bear of critical analysis. 
For this was an issue potentially identified by some of the students -  put 
simply, the 'how can you criticise it until you know it' conundrum, referred to in 
Chapter 5. And while this should not necessarily be such a problem:
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It is a short step from insisting on a sharp distinction between 
description and prescription to maintaining that one should describe 
before one ventures to criticise. It is only a slightly larger step to 
move on to say that legal scholars, and especially law students, 
should only be concerned with description.
(Twining, 1994, Ch.7 
p.155)
nevertheless if it appears so in students' eyes then a better way forward may 
be explicitly to link the growing ability to be critical with the growing of 
confidence within a body of knowledge.
This kind of activity, then, either as a series of discrete seminars, or with at 
least one explicit 'critical thinking' seminar built into each module (at least on 
the first year) should have the effect, then, of raising the profile of this approach 
to academic work; giving students an appreciation of why critical approaches 
might be important, and, to some extent, some frameworks and ideas as to 
how critical thinking in specific contexts can start to be developed.
Another approach, (and none of these are necessarily mutually exclusive) 
would be for lecturers to build critical approaches much more explicitly and 
consciously into lectures. Many will already be adopting this approach but a 
shift in emphasis, together with an explained and justified critical framework for 
the lecture (or whatever method of teaching delivery is being adopted) will help 
to normalise and inculcate such academic critical approaches. Lectures would 
become critical analysis in action rather than mere conveyances of information. 
This of course begs some questions as to the nature of law as compared to
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other disciplines, the purpose of lectures in an arguably over-stretched, heavy 
curriculum and the issue of student satisfaction, to name but three. However, 
the benign and developing influence of the 'research-informed teaching' 
movement could be harnessed here, together with other pedagogic 
developments such as enquiry-based learning and, possibly, autonomous 
learning developments. Associated activities might include the implementation 
of the meta-learning approaches already employed elsewhere; not just 
introduction to learning styles inventories but a familiarisation or at least an 
overview of what, in Glanville Williams' (2006) term, “learning the law" actually 
means (pace Chapters 5 and 7).
Another suggestion for developing critical thinking within the law curriculum 
derives from Bradney (2003, Ch.4). In that chapter he describes:
...the way in which a liberal education can change the direction of 
that which is done in the curriculum whilst at the same time 
continuing a tradition of law being a technical training.
(P-91)
He does this with reference to the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 
562, a Tort Case with which law students rapidly become familiar and which is 
in several senses a landmark case. Without rehearsing Bradney's approach in 
full, what he sets out is an approach which would combine the technical 
mastery the student needs to acquire together with “questions of values” (p.97) 
“the start of an education in sensibility” (p.92).
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In referring to this approach there is a necessary elision between the idea (I) of 
a liberal education and the attempt to instil features of critical thinking in Law 
students. However the key point from a pedagogic perspective is Bradney's 
assertion:
What matters is what the student is expected to see in the passage.
(p.92) (emphasis added)
The onus here is on the reflective, critical teacher as much as on the student to 
become aware of the several cultural and other connotations of certain 
passages in this or other cases, of aspects of law in order to give rise to a 
critical understanding of “the structures and values that permeate and underpin 
law” (p.86). Bradney really stresses this point:
Land law can serve as well as legal history, commercial law as well 
as critical legal studies, as a basis for a liberal education in the Law 
school. What matters is not the subject studied but the attitudes of 
those who are teaching and studying the subject ... It is thus not 
what is studied but the manner in which something is studied that 
matters
(pp 86-87).
The continuing tradition (in some quarters) then, of what can be characterised 
as the black letter, or doctrinal approach to law teaching is thus absolutely 
challenged. It is beyond the scope of this research to ascertain the extent to 
which such modes are still present or even dominant within at least the 
academic stage of legal education. A fair assumption would probably be that 
there is a mixed picture in Britain.
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A not unrelated idea to that of illuminating students' understanding of law texts 
both in terms of technical understanding and broader appreciation, would be to 
introduce the notion of 'keywords', probably at each level of study. Such 
keywords could be selected after consultation with staff, (and possibly, 
students), but would need to reflect the kinds of concepts with which students 
struggle yet which are crucial in underpinning certain subjects within the legal 
curriculum. Examples could include 'policy' and 'public policy' (Tort and 
Administrative Law); 'commerce' (Contract Law); 'accountability' (Constitutional 
and Administrative Law); 'justice' (all law subjects) and 'legitimacy' (English 
Legal System, Constitutional and Administrative Law). These are only initial 
suggestions. What matters is that students would be introduced to these 
concepts at an early stage (although as suggested above, probably tailored to 
the appropriate levels of study) in a form which relates both to some of the 
particular areas of study but which also explicitly creates and directs a critical 
stream of thinking -  encouraging students again to see both how such 
concepts directly relate to the technical legal curriculum but also how they can 
lead into more critical, discursive and academic aspects. It is not that these are 
necessarily ignored currently but such curriculum development would 
emphasise and articulate these issues more transparently and explicitly. As 
with critical thinking perse it may be that, as students indicated, they perceive 
that there is an assumption that they will pick these ideas up, as if by osmosis. 
In concentrating largely on the teaching of 'technical' law cases, statutes and 
principles, it may be that these broader concepts become obscured and
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obscure in the students' perception. Reading judgements, say, in 
Administrative Law ought to give students a sense of such concepts, and in so 
doing they are, almost inevitably, engaging in critical thinking. However a more 
explicit and perhaps more example-driven approach to teaching approaches to 
case-reading may help to focus students engagement with cases (the data 
described in Chapter 5 certainly indicates students' liking of 'examples'), so 
promoting both technical mastery and critical reflection.
Another, perhaps less formal suggestion for the development of critical thinking 
derives from ideas discussed in a workshop session at the Higher Education 
Academy Conference, 2004 (Quinton and Smallbone, 2004). This is the idea of 
'lunchtime' reading class, where students participate in the critical reading of 
journal articles, and are introduced to and familiarised with frameworks for 
reading and assessing such articles, and, it is anticipated, develop greater 
awareness of the connections between such reading and deep learning. This, 
or similar activity could for example be generated through the idea and practical 
development of learning hubs in higher education, and the extent to which 
these ideas could be practically incorporated into the legal curriculum may form 
a useful source of discussion.
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Concluding Remarks
What I have aimed to achieve in this research is some illumination of what First 
year Law students expect of and how they perceive the notion of critical 
thinking and analysis, which constitute an important aspect of performance in 
higher education. I have shown that there is some relationship between 
students' perceptions and the notions of critical thinking set out in key literature 
but that overall it is not something which students can easily define, shape or 
recognise as an integral aspect of academic (or indeed, external) life. There is 
a tendency to see it as part of a set of skills they need to deploy to do well.
There are several possible ways in which this initial research could be taken 
further. Two perhaps most significant would be to work on perceptions of 
learning law itself. There is some existing literature on this but it seems not a 
large amount, and frequently relating to experience in other countries. The 
other potential work would concentrate more on cognitive processes associated 
with critical reading in law, building on Saljo's work and applying it within a 
specific subject discipline.
This final quotation appears to sum up the thinking behind this piece of doctoral 
research :
...there clearly is a need for complementing main-stream research 
with approaches that regard the educational field and the world of 
teachers and students as yet to be discovered and conceptualized
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... For instance, when a physicist or biologist realises that it took 
mankind several hundred years to move from one 
conceptualization of the world to another, he or she is in a much 
better position to understand the learning difficulties of his/her
students who may only have a few hours to bridge the same gap.
Reflection on such issues leads to change ...
(Saljo, in Ashworth et al,
1986, Ch.5 pp.121,127) 
(emphasis added).
Finally, some further reflections on positionality would appear valuable and 
necessary. Reflection at this stage particularly in relation to the rationale for the 
research in the legal context, the findings, and implications for practice, should 
mean that some pervading themes can be brought together and that their 
relationship with professional practice may be made more explicit.
In Chapter 1 I talked about some of the reasons why critical thinking is key, in 
relation for example to assessment in higher education, within the ethos of 
higher education generally and in the context of legal education. It is clear that 
such higher-order cognitive skills are valued and seen as being a core aspect 
of 'graduateness'. To a considerable extent my findings suggest that students 
have largely absorbed this message (although they may still be uncertain as to
how to deploy and demonstrate critical thinking and analysis). What was
perhaps disappointing in my findings was the degree to which students, 
implicitly or explicitly seemed to regard such critical activity somewhat 
instrumentally, rather than seeing it as an interesting or satisfying or important 
'way of being' in its own right. Of course, as I mentioned earlier (Chapter 1) this 
view reflects my own (acknowledged) position, as someone who would have
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espoused the views incorporated in the fifth category (critical thinking as a Way 
of Being) in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, the question may be raised as to why the 
students' perceptions were thus constituted. Clearly several reasons could 
broadly be advanced: an educational history of 'teaching to the test' in recent 
times, perhaps; media and cultural influences and trends; the often-heard 
claims of a decline in political awareness or interest in young people, and 
shifting trends in vocational and intellectual motivation, to give some possible 
examples. A question arises though, for those involved in legal education, of 
what could be done within the curriculum better to inspire and initiate a more 
inherently critical approach to academic study, professional practice and adult 
life as a member of civil society? There has been some discussion more 
recently in legal education as to the extent to which values or values-based 
learning should be developed in Law schools (see for example the work in 
progress on the affective domain in legal education -  (Bates, Bradney, Claydon 
et al, 2009).
Such an approach may help to engender desirable attributes in future legal and 
professional personnel, such as empathy, emotional intelligence, reflectivity 
and greater awareness of the social context in which legal decision-making and 
policy development take place. It may also help to enthuse and revivify 
students who may otherwise be in danger of regarding the legal educational 
diet as consisting of, if not sawdust (pace Franz Kafka) then as not being 
particularly nutritious -  if not actually damaging:
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Much of the current legal literature suggests that legal education 
harms students in a combination of ways ... The literature also 
suggests that the content and curriculum of legal education is 
problematic. It is driven by our current understanding about 'legal 
knowledge' which is an epistemology of objectivism ... There is also 
some concern about the absence of legal reasoning, ethics and 
judgment in the Law school curriculum.
(Fitzgerald, 2008, pp62-63)
Earlier, in Chapter 2, I touched on the development of reflectivity and 
commented on its relationship with critical thinking. It could be argued that 
reflection, and its building-in to the legal curriculum, is key. It may be that the 
act of reflection is something which (like critical thinking) all too often comes 
across as another 'box to be ticked' within the progress of a person's education, 
but when incorporated from the beginning, as an integral and foundational 
aspect of legal education, it can help to 'humanise' and make real and vital (and 
critical) the 'orthodox' legal curriculum (see on this, for example, Hinett 1995).
The claims made for the benefits of a values-based legal curriculum, or the
incorporation of reflective practice are also to be found within some other
initiatives within the sphere of legal education, such as the Law and literature
movement, or clinical legal education.
Studies in Law and literature to date have rested on two related 
claims: first the instrumental view that literature can help to produce 
better lawyers by teaching lawyers how to read, speak and write 
more effectively; and secondly the humanistic belief that literature 
can make lawyers better persons by giving lawyers a sense of the 
complex nature of the human condition as depicted in 'great' books. 
Literature, it is said, can broaden and enhance the students' 'ethical 
consciousness' by exposing them to and reminding them of the 
value judgements implicit in their work, widen the dimensions of a
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problem, de-mystify law's claims, encourage self and social 
criticism, give an impetus for change and reform, in short, 'liberate'!
(Aristodemou, 2000, Ch.1 p.5)
Of course, as Aristodemou goes on to discuss, such claims are problematic.
Clinical legal education, while seeming to be rooted in a more practitioner -
based or vocational ethos, also has advocates for its value as a 'humanising' or
re-vitalising influence on Law students:
Sometimes it seems that curiosity is drummed out of our 
undergraduates rather than cherished ... The signs of curiosity in a 
young child, who is programmed to learn as part of his or her 
genetic inheritance, are the constant repetition of the question 
words: Why? What? When? How? Where? Who?
Which of these questions do we emphasise in legal education? Law 
is about the way society regulates itself. Society is made up of 
people. What effect does a particular decision have on real people?
In other words, who does this Law affect? Ignoring the 'Who?' is a 
long-standing tradition during the Law degree. People are reduced 
to caricatures, often given ridiculous names and unreal 
circumstances, and the effect of legal doctrine on their lives is of no 
interest.
(Brayne etal, 1998, Ch.2 pp27-29)
These, then, might represent some possible responses to the question raised 
above, as to how legal educators could be 'remotivating' or inspiring students to 
develop a new 'take' on critical thinking within a (broadened) legal curriculum.
There is, however, a potential tension here which should be pointed out. A Law 
Department's ability successfully to incorporate what may appear as unfamiliar, 
or unorthodox, approaches to legal education, may be compromised for 
example by the (perceived) requirements of the profession, and by incoming
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students' expectations of and amenability to what they may perceive as 
irrelevant or peculiar curriculum content or teaching methods (especially given 
the contemporary 'Student as Consumer' model).
Having noted that, some other implications for curriculum development stem 
from some changes within the legal profession itself. Some of these are 
developed further below, but essentially these drivers for change derive from, 
initially at least, the 'Clementi' Report (2004) and the Training Framework 
Review, initiated in 2001. Some further interesting insights are offered, 
particularly in relation to the latter, by Webb and Fancourt (2004) and Leighton 
and Owen (2005).
It is intended that the above comments, then, provide a further degree of 
reflection on the rationale for the research and development of findings within 
an overall legal educational context. I shall now turn to look more specifically 
(initially at least) at the implications for practice locally.
In terms of my own practice, at lecturer level, there are several ways in which 
this research could be used to inform pedagogic and curricular development. 
Currently, I am working (with a small team of colleagues) on a CETL/CPLA 
(Centre for Excellence in Teaching and Learning / Centre for Promotion of 
Learner Autonomy) project entitled “Introduction to Academic Skills”, intended 
for incoming first-year students. One aspect of this relates to the exposure of
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students to the importance and development of critical thinking and analysis 
within higher education. It is intended that this project will be piloted in Autumn 
2009. Over the years I have been involved with other such small project 
developments, relating mainly to initiatives within learner autonomy, but always 
with the desire and aim of enhancing the critical dimension of the legal 
curriculum. I have also been responsible for the initiation, development and 
operation of a first-year module “Law and Contemporary Society” which, in 
terms of its approach assessment and general ethos aims to introduce students 
to and engage them with a range of contemporary legal issues and topics, from 
an explicitly critical perspective.
My teaching has, in recent years, been exclusively on first-year (Level 4) 
modules, and, as has been indicated above, my research and pedagogical 
interests and work have been in the area broadly termed “Teaching, Learning 
and Assessment”, working with CETL and other such small project 
development, and fulfilling the role of the Law Group Teaching, Learning and 
Assessment Co-ordinator for some years now. This role, and range of interests, 
has also led to my involvement, albeit briefly, with, for example, task groups on 
student attendance and engagement, the Special Interest Group on Critical 
Thinking and the Student Writing Group (both recent Faculty of Development 
and Society initiatives).
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Such activities, together with the work I have undertaken for this Doctorate, 
have prompted me to think more carefully and perhaps more empathetically, 
about the perspectives and perceptions of students, particularly at what is 
generally termed the 'transition' stage of entry into higher education, still most 
commonly at age eighteen/nineteen (some similar but also some considerably 
different issues attend, say, mature students entering higher education, 
whether for the first, or subsequent time). Whether looking at the perspectives 
of students from the starting-point of their problems with academic writing (my 
most recent involvement), or, as in this research, their engagement with critical 
analysis and critical thinking, or learner autonomy and independent learning, for 
example, it appears to me that I have become much more conscious of the 
differing preconceptions, concerns and motivations of students. To some extent 
this has emerged in any case through the 'routine' of teaching and assessment 
over the years, but my research and other such activities and involvements 
outlined above have sharpened and highlighted my awareness of the student 
mind or 'lifeworld'. Often, this will be in the context of the 'pathological' -  what is 
'wrong' (for example in the context of an inability to write in a sufficiently 
academic style, or grasp what critical analysis might mean) but it is important 
not to overstress this negative, or 'deficient' model of student ability and 
behaviour. Becoming more involved, if not immersed, particularly for this 
present research, has I believe given me greater understanding, or at least 
awareness, of a range of views, preconceptions and 'baggage' which students 
will carry. In some respects this has made me more confident and relaxed with
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students on a day-to-day basis -  working with students in the interviewing 
process, for example, enabled me to glimpse a set of more personal worlds 
which helped to break down some of my barriers to understanding and 
conceptualisation of their world. In terms of my practice at an individual level, 
then, this research and related activities have helped to shift my own 
perceptions and I do believe, enhanced my empathetic understanding of 
students, as well as potentially strengthening the more practical and pedagogic 
developments which may be set in train.
What is needed now is some thought to be given to the implications of this 
research at Law Programme level. There are clearly limits as to what can be 
said here, as so much of practice and continuing development at this level will 
be contingent on a very wide range of factors. What follows are some 
suggestions for, say, underpinning future discussions within Law around the 
time of re-validation of the suite of Law Degrees or validation of any new 
Awards.
We would need, I believe, to be looking at some form of curriculum model for 
integrating the various aspects of skills development, including critical thinking 
and analysis, and linking these to the Law subjects or modules being taught, 
ideally. What would be desirable, I feel, is if each module (or at least a majority, 
certainly at level 4), could be designed to incorporate key aspects of academic
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skill development in an explicit, continuing and integral manner (by this I mean 
linked to the subject matter of the module).
Practice in some other university Law Schools could be usefully surveyed; 
there is evidence that several institutions are increasingly developing such 
approaches -  either for example through the 'values-based' theme mentioned 
above (Bates, Bradney, Claydon etal, 2009), or through a more explicit basis in 
critical thinking and analysis (Doherty, 2009), or by providing 'humanities'-type 
options within the legal curriculum (Pawlowski and Greer, 2009).
Whichever curricular approach or theme is adopted, however, what might be 
most important is the raising of students' awareness of the expectations and 
principles inherent in learning in the context of higher education. One colleague 
recently referred to the idea of developing in students a 'meta-language', in 
other words a heightened or more conscious and explicit set of terms and 
concepts which they could then bring to, for example, critical thinking, 
academic writing and reflective activities (to a great extent these could be said 
to be inseparable). Such more personalised and student-focussed approaches 
may prove to be more mutually rewarding than a set of 'skills' classes perse.
In terms of the wider legal policy context, then certain more recent initiatives 
need to be borne in mind. The Clementi Report (2004) and Training Framework 
Review as mentioned above, marked a clear shift within the legal profession
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and attendant training policy. The current work-based learning pilot programme 
being run by the SRA (Solicitors' Regulation Authority), sets outcomes in the 
context of business awareness but, most significantly for immediate purposes, 
also stresses the need for trainees to have self-awareness and develop skills of 
reflection and self-evaluation - critical thinking in a professional context.
More recently the Legal Services Act (2007) seems set to bring about further 
changes in the ways legal services are provided and overseen. The Act is not 
yet in force (this is expected in approximately 2011), but its proposals are clear, 
and follow a lengthy period of consultation with, for example, the legal 
professions and consumer organisations. From one legal education / training 
policy perspective probably the most significant measure is the potential for 
Alternative Business Structures, where lawyers and non-lawyers will be able to 
be combined in one business. In the interim, before full implementation of these 
new structures, up to 25% non-lawyer partners will be allowed in a legal service 
firm. What is envisaged, then, is an increasing number of inter-professional or 
multi-disciplinary practices developing, between, for example, solicitors, 
barristers, accountants and other related service providers.
Given such impending 'shake-ups' in professional practice, it may be that the 
Law Degree curriculum could and should be being adapted to reflect such 
changes. A 'critical' curriculum, or at least one which enables Law students to 
become more enlightened, aware and outward-looking (seeing Law as one part
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of a much wider, if interconnected set of professional, as well as socio-cultural 
systems) would, it might seem, enhance student employability as well as the 
more diffuse desirable personal attributes more traditionally claimed by 
advocates of 'liberal' education (see for example Chapter 2 and above). The 
challenge is to begin to develop more distinct, more reflexive and more critical 
(giving this its widest sense) curricula within legal education -  in other words, 
re-framing legal education to reflect what is in some respects a much-changing 
profession, as well as to satisfy the intellectual and cognitive developments 
explicitly required by higher education.
Finally, in order further to bring themes together and to suggest a contribution 
to professional practice in the light of the implications of the findings of this 
research, what is needed is some reflection on the categories or description 
themselves (Chapter 5) and the ways in which these inter-relate with the key 
features I have identified in Chapter 7.
It may initially be worth pointing out that I was not aware of having any 
particular preconceptions about the findings, apart from being conscious of my 
own views on critical thinking, as outlined in the 'positionality' section in Chapter 
1. I arrived at the categories of description through several re-readings of the 
data -  themes emerged with differing levels of generality, which I noted, 
checked and then used to construct the categories. There was no formalised 
coding of units or language, for example (it seems to me that that process may
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put the coder in the position where s/he displaces or ignores context -  
discussed a little above in Chapters 3 and 4). The findings, both in terms of 
categories of description, and the other key features which emerged from the 
interviews (referred to in Chapter 7) emerged as relatively common themes or 
concerns from the students' talk. It seemed to me that it was important to 
capture the key features (which I identified as relating particularly to personal 
reactions to learning Law, using Case-Law, and Mooting) as although they did 
not 'fit1 neatly into the five categories of description, nevertheless these 
comments constituted important and rich data relating to perceptions of the 
(critical) learning of Law.
On reflection, what is most apparent is the degree of awareness and reflection 
being demonstrated by these students in making the comments relating to, for 
example, their 'relationship' with studying Law, or the beneficial effects of » 
Mooting. Aspects of critical thinking and reflection are both expressed here. It is 
clear that when given the opportunity, space and time some students at least 
will become actively involved with this reflexive or critical consideration of the 
legal and educational context in which they find themselves.
It could also be pointed out, however, that I did have some difficulty in the initial 
'recruitment' of student interviewees for this project. I went about it by talking, 
firstly to my personal tutor group and then to the first year in general. I also 
gave out a briefing document giving basic information as to what their
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involvement would entail, contact details in case of queries and information as 
to anonymity, 'consent' and the ability for students to withdraw at any point if 
they wished.
The observations and perceptions demonstrated in these three 'key feature' 
areas cannot be simply disentangled from my main research concern which 
has been critical thinking in the widest sense. In commenting on, for example, a 
personal view of Law as a discipline, a student is almost by definition 
demonstrating a form of critical thinking, whether consciously or unconsciously. 
Perhaps (and relating back a little to Chapters 5 and 6) this difficulty in creating 
categories of description from such rich and multifarious data represents an 
issue within the phenomenographic approach, where the emphasis is generally 
placed on the construction of five or six identifiable and cogent categories.
To sum up, then, this work and these findings can point towards potential 
change or shifts in emphasis within the legal education curriculum; to a 
recognition of the student 'lifeworld' with attendant implications for the practice 
of teaching; and to a fundamental re-evaluation of the relationship between 
academics' and students' views of critical thinking - its purposes, rationale and 
value.
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Appendix A 
Interview Prompt Questions
1. (Going back to A Level/AS level if not further) Has a teacher ever talked
to you about being 'critical' or critical thinking' ?
If we were to do that here, what would you think they meant/were talking 
about ?
2 (Show Assignment Feedback sheet - highlight critical thought/analysis
sections) When you read those sections, what do they suggest/mean to 
you ?
How would you try to respond, in your own work ?
3. What might critical thinking mean to you in relation to studying Law, 
particularly?
4. Are you able to describe a situation where you or someone else were 
being completely illogical in their thinking ?
5. Have you ever been aware that you had been 'taken in' by an argument 
you subsequently realised was really weak ?
6. Can you think of and describe a situation were you were really thinking 
hard, 'firing on all cylinders', being critical and confident ?
1
MUSE OF EVIDENCE 
AND SOURCES
LEGAL CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS
UNDERSTANDING 
OF TOPIC
SUBJECT
RELEVANCE
INSIGHT AND 
ORIGINALITY
LOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT
Critical and wide
ranging use of relevant i— i
cases and materials |___ |
Demonstrates understanding 
of awareness and appropriate 
theory. Consistent use of 
critical analysis well 
integrated into the text j— |
Very well informed and 
demonstrates deep 
understanding j j
All material relevant to the 
subject
□
Clear evidence of insight, 
imagination and innovative 
thought |— |
Develops a logical argument 
and marshalls ideas clearjv__
t l
Appropriate use of evidence 
from a variety of sourcesj——j
Evidence of critical analysis 
□
Well informed and 
demonstrates sound 
understanding j j
Most material relevant to the 
subject
□
Clear evidence of insight and 
imagination
□
Generally logical and most 
ideas clearly marshalled
□
Key sources and reference 
material covered j— j
Some evidence of critical 
thought
□
Sound grasp of basic ideas 
and issues
□
Relevant material used but 
not sufficiently developed
□
Some evidence of insight and 
imagination
□
Could be better organised. 
Sequencing of some 
materials inappropriate | |
Available evidence not well 
used or lacking evidence j— j
Overly descriptive content. 
Little evidence of critical 
thought
□
Shows only a rudimentary 
understanding of the issue
□
Some material irrelevant/ 
underdeveloped/repetitive
□
Little or no evidence of insight 
and imagination
□
Large portions of assignment 
out of sequence. Poor 
development of theme | |
No evidence. Reliant on 
rhetoric and bias |— j
No analysis at all
□
Shows no understanding of 
the issues
□
Essay contains too much 
irrelevant, repetitive and 
tangential material j j
No evidence of insight and 
imagination
□
No development of a theme 
or attempt at one. Does not 
develop a theme | [
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TAPE B
Interviewer: So in a sense I just want to ask you a few general questions. 
First of all going back to what you were just saying about being at school.
Student: Yes
Interviewer: Mmm particularly perhaps when you were doing your A Levels - 
A Levels and AS Levels but perhaps before that as well. Em did any of the 
teachers ever talk to you about being critical or the need to be critical in your 
thinking?
Student: Mmm Yeah, teachers did yeah, it was mostly when I did my English, 
I mean I did A Level English it was mostly in that. It was more the subjects that 
involved more English rather than, because I did do Biology and Physics but 
then
Interviewer: I was going to say was English combined or English Lit or?
Student: I did English Lang and Lit, I did Law and I did Biology and Physics 
and General Studies.
Interviewer: Gosh, all for A level? Well done.
Student: Yeah
Interviewer: Can you tell me a bit more particularly about critical thinking in 
the kind of English you did
Student: Yeah and in the Law
Interviewer: Can you recall what, you know what kind of, when teachers went 
on about critical thinking, what were they sort of, what message were you 
getting, what were they saying .what were you learning ?
Student: When they said critical thinking I heard analyse in depth and
basically scrutinise it in everyway you know, what is it, what’s good or bad 
about it you know how are things are portrayed and stuff like that.
Interviewer: Yes, yes, did they give you any kind of help or advice or skills as 
to how to go about this kind of thing?
Student: No I just got lots of work sheets, follow the work sheets that's all I 
really got
Interviewer: Mmm so you don’t feel that they kind of taught it.
1
TAPE B
Student: No by the time I got to A Level I didn't think that it was taught, but I 
thought it was just do this, basically do it on your own you know books, mainly 
learning from books, it was all down to books.
Interviewer: And in that sense I suppose what kind of, what books of practical 
criticism?
Student: Yes it was mainly A Level books I had to go out and buy specific A 
Level books like you know how to do revision; you know they were kind of 
revision guides the Letts.
Interviewer: Yes - so you kind of absorb it?
Student: Yes they didn't spend a lot of time teaching it as a skill
Interviewer: And do you think, I mean this is perhaps a bit more difficult 
question, do you think, do you think you could have done with a bit more 
explicit guidance on that kind of work ?
Student: Yes, I could have definitely; definitely once you get on the right you 
know, once you know what track you’re on, where you want you know. I mean 
they did like, initially this is very early AS you know kind of term one they did 
examples like here’s the text how would critically analyse it, we did that but 
towards the end it was what was like you know you should know how to do it by 
now.
Interviewer: You all get on with it. So a sort of learning curve?
Student: Yes.
Interviewer: And did, was that say you’d say that was mainly to do with 
English and Law?
Student: Mmm
Interview: In a sense I’m pre-empting one of my own questions here but it can 
come in now. That's how it came into English - can you sort of say a bit more 
about how perhaps it came into Law?
Student: Law it was. It was very brief. They weren’t pressurising you. It was 
more descriptive Law but there were like aspects that you know to look at a 
statute and how does it fit into this scenario, critically analysing you know - how 
do you do that?
Interviewer: And again in a sense the same question how were you expected 
to sort of acquire this critical faculty?
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Student: To be honest when I did my A Level Law we did it through video links 
and we got one lesson a week and the rest was down to you.
Interviewer: Really! (laughter)
Student: So I had to do it all. But it was all right in the end.
Interviewer: Can I ask how you did? Just out of interest.
Student: I got an ‘A’ in my Law, it was my strongest the others I didn't do so 
well in. I got a ‘D’ in English and I got ‘E’ in General Studies, ‘U’ in Physics.
Interviewer: There was a lot going on there.
Student: I mean I found Law was my strongest subject. I went for it.
Interviewer: Yes. Right mmm I may come back to that a little bit in a minute. 
Ok well moving on to your experience here so far I mean it's still relatively early 
days but I mean when tutors here em talk about in a sense we can bring in this 
now (shows feedback sheet) you’re really already a bit familiar with it but when 
they talk about things like critical analysis. In a sense what I’m asking you is in 
your life here what do these things suggest to you, what do you think we are 
sort of looking for? As I say there’s no right answer, it’s not a catch.
Student: Mmm I thought at first I still haven’t got my head round the whole 
critical analysis, I still haven’t yet, but since I’ve been here I have taken it on 
board a bit more because I’ve heard it a lot more since I’ve been here make 
sure you’re critically analysing so I've taken it on board a bit more but when 
people say to me when people say critical, I think I have to almost pick out 
faults to see where you know, that’s the way I look at it, you know where’s it 
going wrong, not going wrong but you know look at it in a, I can’t think of the 
word in a critical way you know just criticise it you know where do you think, it’s 
hard to describe it but I know what I’m saying.
Interviewer: Mmm so for example if I mean it doesn’t really matter which area 
of Law you’re talking about mmm but in the sense of if you have let’s say for 
example this kind of comment back on the essay 'some evidence of critical 
thought needs to be more analytical' how do you think you might try to respond 
and build on that in your work? What practical, what practical and academic 
steps do you think you’d need to take?
Student: I think I learned that, I’d know that you know I’ve got to stop
describing what it is and I’ve got to start explaining, I think that’s what I’d start 
doing rather than just say what’s it’s like.
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Interviewer: Mmm right and what other words you know I think you know if 
you’re contrasting describing with other words what other words might come 
into it-1 know this is all out of the blue, off the top of your head I'm conscious of 
that
Student: Mmm
Interviewer: I mean for example I don’t want to put words into your mouth but 
for example would you think comparing or some kind of?
Student: Yeah
Interviewer: Or some comparative kind of thing. So you’ve got a topic and 
you’re told you’ve got to be critical about it. OK you’ve got to perhaps describe 
it a bit but then explain it you’ve got to.
Student: Yeah I’d just maybe compare it to you know how does it fit in to the 
whole you know just fit it into everything - the big thing
Interviewer: The big picture yeah right. That I can see. And I think going back 
to what you were saying am I right in interpreting what you’re saying but it’s the 
idea of looking at the kind of mmm what's almost a bit sort of wrong with 
something.
Student: Mmm
Interviewer: I mean I can only think of a constitutional law example. What’s 
good and what’s perhaps bad.
Student: Yeah, how does it work very well, how doesn't it.
Interviewer: Yes there’s a sense of what are the strengths and weaknesses 
Student: Yes rather more than
Interviewer: Right I mean I think having said there’s no right and wrong
answer I mean clearly that is you know partly from our point of view I think the 
kind of thing that we are increasingly looking for the kind of awareness in that 
sense as you say of context, of these are strength and weaknesses rather than 
just saying well it's a piece of legislation like this
Student: Yes strength and weakness - critical analysis where now I mainly 
think of the weaknesses more than the strengths.
Interviewer: Interesting now is that because to you
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Student: I think it’s the word critical that does it to me 
Interviewer: Yes that’s what I was going to say
Student: some of us think critical. I don’t know why I think it’s because of the 
word.
Interviewer: That’s something I think that’s interesting because I think people 
hear, this is quite you know often the case you hear the word critical as if it is 
automatically a negative connotation - like a critical person-like my sister's a 
critical person.
Student: Yes, yes
Interviewer: I mean in a sense would it be what might be from a student’s
point of view then possibly a more helpful term?
Student: If you’re looking at both strengths and weaknesses.
Interviewer: Yes to convey what we’re looking at.
Student: I’d probably say analyse it rather than critical because you know I’d 
focus more on the weaknesses being critical than just analysing it I think right, 
well, the strengths I can’t think of the word now but I mean probably just 
analyse itself.
Interviewer: And of the two in that sense analyse conveys a similar kind of 
meaning but without the negativity?
Student: Yes.
Interviewer: But the two you’d expect the two to mean apart from that roughly 
the same
Student: Yes mm
Interviewer: Because I think we tend to use don’t we these words kind of fairly 
interchangeably in dialogue.
Student: I mean the way I’ve always seen it especially from A Level is if you’re 
not critically analysing it you’re describing it. And like I’ve learnt now that you’re 
not supposed to describe any more.
Interviewer: That’s right yes. Or only to a minimum. I mean it’s a good, off 
the point a little a bit I suppose but in a sense that I think it’s often a good 
question that students ask there's no simple answer because you’ve got to
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show in a way you’ve got to show the examiner enough description to show 
you know what you’re talking about.
Student: To show what you’re talking about yes.
Interviewer: That’s right but then especially in a short essay you need to cut to 
the chase. Mmm moving on a little bit then and in a sense harking back to A 
Levels but more about now mmm can you just develop a little bit what you were 
saying about what critical thinking might mean especially in relation to studying 
Law. If you want to pause, you know, pause for thought you know that’s fine. 
Silence is data! But you know what, just to put it under way having started here 
and doing Law as a degree specifically might, what might critical thinking mean 
in relation to Law as opposed to what you were saying for instance about you 
know, analysing characters or whatever.
Student: Yes, I think in Law, is that what you’re asking me to do. I’d probably 
possibly ask like going back to constitutional questions I said that like critically 
analysing the judiciary then I’d probably start looking at all the weakness in 
there, why you know in all three branches of Law you know the weaknesses of 
that in relation to the Law. Or if I had a statute I’d start by saying well you know 
this statute is all very nice and everything however, it doesn’t cover this part of 
you know the Law it's trying to ... or look at the negative things
Interviewer: So I mean what I suppose the obvious thing would be
discrimination legislation oh well you know the work that's been done on it’s 
better than nothing but there are all sorts of big gaps still to go, that kind of 
thing, ok. Mmm what about, anything else you can think of that’s critical, 
specifically in relation to law as a separate discipline in terms perhaps of 
specifically legal skills that you're learning. I think the legislation is a good 
example, anything else that you can think of perhaps how you can apply 
criticality or critical thinking specifically to studying Law. You know thinking of 
the things you do on the Law Degree case law for example
Student: Yes I mean again with the case law somebody says in a case law 
you know critically analyse it and I’d probably look at it and think ok where did 
they go wrong, you know where did they -didn't do this bit very well
Interviewer: In the reasoning?
Student: Yes you know - in the judgement
Interviewer: So you can criticise the judges. So you see that as part of a kind 
of case law and method that’s it’s part of you actually looking at the reasoning 
what are the strengths and weaknesses, in a sense that’s part of it.
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Student: Yes but I tend to look at the weaknesses more than strengths you 
know because like I said the word critical just brings the whole negative 
thinking into it.
Interviewer: Again almost what’s wrong with it, what's lacking in the reasoning 
or perhaps what social effect of a decision might be or that kind of thing.
Student: That’s maybe because no-one’s really ever sat down and said well 
this is what it is and this is what you have to do so you just end up going on 
using your own initiative thinking -it says that so it must mean this
Interviewer: I mean again that kind of begs the question, we do a tiny bit of it 
here but I mean do you think from your perception as a first year law student, 
do you think a lot more in a sense formal teaching about analysis or critical 
thinking whatever you want to call it would be helpful or do you see it primarily 
as something that in a sense if you've got half a brain you just kind of pick it up- 
I mean that’s a big question for us.
Student: I think when, I mean now I’m starting to get a lot of assignments to 
do and stuff and I think nearer the time when you’re about to do your 
assignments and you need to know these kind of things it would be really 
useful rather than me asking what's this about it would be good if you know 
seminars one week how to critically analyse because do you know I’ve got a 
friend who goes to another Uni and they have a specific seminar tutor who 
actually teaches them how to do these kind of things and how to critically 
analyse and critical thinking and they have exams and stuff.
Interviewer: Really,
Student: Yes and he was telling me that he’s recently had an exam on it and 
they actually get taught how to do these specific things that actually come up in 
their exams, it’s a skill that they have to meet.
Interviewer: Do you know off the top of your head is it the kind of critical 
thinking, it is kind of actually kind of almost like logical problem solving 
type,(yes) because again part of my brief in this PhD generally to look at that 
because it can mean a lot of different things but in a sense of like almost like 
formal logic and the application of that to cases that kind of thing.
Student: Yes
Interviewer: Mmm so they do that, do they do in a sense the kind of critical 
thinking in terms of analysis in essays as well or is it very much too kind of 
formalistic kind of, or just the logical problem solving or do they do a lot of other 
work as well?
7
TAPE B
Student: They do a lot of other work as well. They’ll spend like every week in 
the seminar and talk about other critically analysing and about problem solving 
and you know then applying it to the topics the subjects that you are doing.
Interviewer: So it could be what a contract problem one week
Student: Yes and then the following week you could have a constitutional 
problem
Interviewer: So it’s very integrated.
Student: Mmm
Interviewer: Is your impression that the students like that?
Student: They do and they do like it because it sets out kind of what is 
expected of you as a student rather than you kind of looking at a sheet and 
you've got to do this. What you find is you don't know you’ve got an idea of 
what they want but to what extent.
Interviewer: It's a bit abstract at the start. I think that’s good, I think that’s a fair 
comment, I mean I think that people get, well they get kind of familiar with this I 
mean I think it does kind of get embedded into people’s consciousness as they 
go along but I think that’s interesting.
Student: Yes.
Interviewer: Because we’ve talked here about doing a bit more about that I 
think you know there are two schools of thought. I’d like to teach them. Mmm 
ok now the next two questions are a bit more kind of challenging in a sense. If 
you really can’t think of anything it really, really doesn’t matter. Can you think 
of a situation where either yourself or a friend, either you or a friend would be 
you realise, would be being completely illogical in your thinking? This is a 
difficult one especially if you can’t think of a situation but think of a situation 
where you suddenly thought oh yeah, oh god I’ve been talking rubbish or that a 
friend or something, or it doesn’t necessarily need to be a friend, it could be you 
know a relative or somebody on the tele or a politician or any media figure. 
When you thought, hang on, that doesn’t add up, (yeah) that kind of thing. If 
you can’t it doesn’t matter, that’s quite a tricky one.
Student: Oh I can’t.
Interviewer: Like a politician or something or some 
Student: Someone that’s been talking
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Interviewer: Yes, yes
Student: That they don’t make sense?
Interviewer: Yes 
Student: Mmm, Tony Blair!
Interviewer: Think of an example. Which one? (laughter). No seriously think 
where there are something you can think of and you think oh
Student: I think actually with my assignment if I start them then I think I don't 
know what I'm talking about.
Interviewer: It doesn’t matter you can be political as you like. I mean it's 
interesting you say Tony Blair because its obvious something triggered off, 
some kind of gut reaction mmm If you can think of something. In a sense the 
converse is my other sort of question, have you ever been aware that you’ve 
been, do you know what I mean by being taken in er sort of duped by way of an 
argument that you’ve subsequently realised is very weak?
Student: Yes
Interviewer: Can you think of an example! If you’re prepared to talk?
Student: I can’t remember the argument but I can remember I think it was 
when the Elections were going on I was very much into Michael Howard, yes 
he was totally talking sense then he went onto viewers question time and then 
people asking him questions and he was just like, he was totally not answering 
the question and going on, and I’m just thinking ok so maybe you’re not as 
strong as you come out to be, you just kind of walking your way through it.
Interviewer: What did you think, bluffing ?
Student: Oh no, no, no, it’s not like that and
Interviewer: And then when somebody actually pinned him down, questioned 
him. Can you remember what topic it was just as a general question?
Student: I can’t remember it was ages ago. But I can remember thinking ok, I 
got some the wrong idea about that. Because Tony Blair came on afterwards, 
he did a really good job, he did a really good job and he answered and you 
know he was very strong about what he said, you know.
Interviewer: When you saw that you thought?
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Student: I’m in the wrong one.
Interviewer: Ok. In a sense my last formal question, can you think of a 
situation, I mean it could be here, it could be in I don’t know some other aspect 
of life you know didn't you say you worked in the House of Lords?
Student: My uncle stood as an MP
Interviewer: Right I remember you saying something about some, some
political background but I was thinking
Student: Yes, he’s been running as MP for a while, he’s been in the elections 
for a while.
Interviewer: But I was thinking about whether again this could cover a variety 
of possibilities either academic work here or in your school or some other 
capacity. Can you think of a situation when you feel that you were really 
demonstrating critical thinking you know that feeling you get of kind of firing on 
all intellectual cylinders.
Student: Actually me and my uncle, he’s a grown man he’s done loads of 
different things he’s doing law now; he’s finding it interesting. We were playing, 
at Christmas we were playing you be the judge, a game and me and my uncle 
were on one team, we thought we were like brilliant and actually we were like 
when they read out a case and you have to decide who’s guilty and who’s not 
guilty. And when we were looking at the case we were like proper, that’s when 
I found I was like, hang on a minute you’ve got to take this bit into account and 
really critically really analyse it, you have to, to kind of get the answer. Then I 
would say!
Interviewer: What you’re kind of looking at evidence?
Student: Yes, you’ve got to look at you know what happened, you know, what 
the person did and whatever and what the jury found them
Interviewer: You didn’t see Judge John Deed on Friday. It's such rubbish! In 
the jury room you know he kept saying we must look at the evidence. Yes, and 
that gave you that feeling that you were really sort of being logical and being 
logical and being methodical, all those things.
Student: Mmm but when you think if you don’t you’re not going to do very well.
Interviewer: Mmm is there anything else that strikes you either about in a 
sense to rounding things off a bit I mean is there anything else you want to say 
about what comes into your mind about what critical thinking means in a sense 
perhaps for example moving away from the narrow academic you know,
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framework as it were. Is there anything else that, if I say you know like the old 
psychology thing, example, If I say this word what do you say kind of thing. If I 
say critical, what does critical thinking mean, what else might it mean to you?
Student: Well beyond academic I’ve not really thought about it before. I would 
assume that it’s all about assignments and you’ve got to write it in a particular 
way to get good marks other than that I’ve never really thought about it. But 
thinking about now I mean I suppose that if the Barrister have got a case on 
their hands I presume they will have to critically analyse it to kind of you know 
see its weaknesses.
Interviewer: Mmm, I mean that's a nice example, I mean one of my
interviewees in a sense you've touched on this for example talked about, I don’t 
know if you’ve ever experienced it you know when she reads newspapers or 
sees things on the tele she gets all in a rage you know kind of about what the 
politicians are saying. Do you see that as part of critical thinking, or is that just 
you know reacting to stupidity on the telly. I suppose what I’m trying to get at 
is, could you conceive as a kind of critical thinking of a kind of a world view a 
kind of almost the world’s mad again I don't want to put words in your mouth a 
political critique to use a French word of a society we live in. I mean do you 
think it stretches that far? I mean I’m being a bit vague but do you see what I’m 
trying to say, would you definition of critical thinking stretch that far, a kind of 
engagement with the world in general?
Student: Probably not, like I said before I’d probably just associate it with 
academically. I’ve never really thought about it, as you know as thinking about 
society in that way. I never really have until today.
Interviewer: Right maybe sociology students would! Is there anything else 
you want to say about this or what might be helpful to you as first year 
students. You talked about that course for example.
Student: Yes, I would definitely, absolutely like that course because especially 
like you know when you come here and it’s all very much you know, it’s quite 
scary and you’ve been thrown in at the deep end I have been quite like 
obviously everyone’s at university now, you’re all on your own, I have been 
quite depressed with it. Actually you’re not on your own and there’s plenty of 
help. Obviously at the start I would say though it would be really helpful, even if 
it is one seminar, I’d just go and watch you know for assignments, it would 
really help.
11
TAPE E
Interviewer: OK. Thanks for coming. First of all though, first of all what I want 
to ask you taking you back to A Levels really & AS levels I'm assuming you 
came by that route (yes) Did any of the teachers ever talk to you about critical 
thinking or about being critical or critical analysis, any of those kind of words?
Student: Yes they never stopped! (laughter) It was particularly in English 
Literature we did a critical analysis of two novels and we compared them and 
then we'd go back and did a commentary at the end, critical thinking and 
analysis, I quite enjoyed that.
Interviewer: What A Levels did you do?
Student: Eh, English Literature, English Language, they were separate (yes) 
and I did Sociology.
Interviewer: And when the teachers endlessly went on about it -you were 
expected to somehow demonstrate it Did they tell you what they meant or did 
they give you any lessons on it or did they expect you to vaguely apprehend 
what they were on about ?
Student: It wasn't like a critical thinking lesson as such it was more like em 
usually he'd read the essays and then it came back but how do you come to 
this conclusion, could you analyse better and little comments like that, to try 
and build your argument - we looked at like model answers as well to see how 
they did it to try and get the gist of it
Interviewer: So it wasn't in any sense formalised
Student: No, no.
Interviewer: So when these kind of comments came back and you were 
perhaps told that you must be more critical more analytical that kind of thing
Student: Yes.
Interviewer: What I’m trying to get at is what was your response then, what 
was your perception that you needed to do - 1 know it was a long time ago !
Student: Em, I felt that I needed to instead of just saying this is this and that is 
that I needed to pull the arguments apart and work out why I thought it was like 
that, is there anything other that makes me think like that within your argument, 
(tape indistinct)
Interviewer: And would you say it was particularly the English Lit that came 
out with that kind of thing (em) or would you say it kind of manifested itself 
generally?
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Student: It was mostly em Literature and then followed by language working 
on different pieces, pulled it apart looked at the language structure, critical 
language We used to do peer assessment just worked out a coursework mark 
for it and then it was criticised , but it was constructive it did help in that sense
Interviewer: Did you find that helpful?
Student: Em it was hard at first when someone just jumps in and says it's not 
good (laughter) you have to try not take it to heart I thought it did help a bit with 
the perception of what I was writing.
Interviewer: It's something we're talking about perhaps introducing here I'm 
wondering in a sense if students would be able to take criticism off other 
students-like-what do they know?
Student: Yes I suppose that I'm a bit more respectful to this point of view. I'm 
not bothered -if it's not very good I'll say so
Interviewer: OK. Anything more that strikes you about the A level
experience? Did anyone talk to you about you know in terms of critical 
thinking? Am I hearing you right? It was certainly in English at least you got it 
quite heavily
Student: I think it was a lot to do with my choice of A levels you wouldn't get it 
so much in some - 1 chose very writing - based subjects for A Levels generally 
like writing in different subjects
Interviewer: OK. I'm biased - did English! I think it's true - in terms of moving 
on to University life here you’ve had a quick look at this assessment feedback 
sheet with reference to critical thought In a sense there’s two parts to this 
question, I mean first of all when you read the guidelines assessment criteria I 
mean what do they mean to you, you know, to put the question in another way 
how do you try and respond to that
Student: Em
Interviewer: Another side to that question- is it different here - is there 
anything in a sense that you know that so far that you think is different What I 
mean to be getting at is what these words mean to you
Student: That was like the first time I’ve seen it em
Interviewer: In a sense that when you look at, if you look at the legal critical 
analysis for example that box there
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Student: I think it’s because like because it’s difficult, coming to this subject 
you don’t know anything and it’s coming, definitely coming, (laughter) 
somewhere in my brain it's registering - I found I did A Levels in the second 
year especially in literature and I read the book and you had your views on it 
but I don’t know I find it a little bit different here because I don’t quite know what 
I’m doing here yet. If I knew, if it was already in my mind I'd be able to criticise it 
- I'd be able to write my report - but I just need more knowledge before I can 
start doing that
Interviewer: Right that’s interesting because there's a big debate in education 
whether you can in a sense do that - criticise - others will argue that it's a 
process it's a kind of analysis you can start with relatively little knowledge
Student: I’m finding that in Cyberlaw especially about we're getting the topic of 
defamation getting an assessed seminar next week I’m able to criticise that 
because it relates to so many things especially cyberlaw it's all around and it 
does affect me so I feel I can deal with especially well because I can criticise it 
because it does relate to me but in Constitutional law I didn't have a clue when 
I came here what a constitution was (laughter...now you know !) and I didn’t 
think I could like criticise it I feel a little bit I didn't really know enough a little bit 
for want of a better word inferior to argue about it but you know I'll give it my 
best shot
Interviewer: Yes well. What about I mean thinking along those lines does that 
occur to you I don't want to put words in your mouth does that ... in a sense 
critical analysis although always seems to be related to subject matter - would 
you say in a sense does it relate to yourself as well not just to the discipline out 
there but to yourself
Student: Yes I think em, it throws up the kind of issues that you have in your 
own mind and there's all sorts of controversies, legal moral debates and it 
makes me question what I think in my own mind when I hear these arguments
Interviewer: And would you call that critical thinking?
Student: Em, probably more of a debate but when you're criticising things - 
obviously you've got to appreciate what other people have said about it
Interviewer: Part of the idea of again seeing things in the round ?
Student: Mmm
Interviewer : Moving on a little bit from that is there anything specifically that 
critical thinking might relate to Law you know Is there anything that strikes you 
coming to Law fresh ? just developing that a little bit it's early days anything 
that's odd or peculiar ...as opposed to say...
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Student: Em em I find it’s quite different and I think it’s back to what I said
earlier about not having enough knowledge I think after I’ve got my knowledge 
I’ll be confident to criticise it. Em but in another sense law's all around us it’s 
not just in its box with the lid on. I will go and think about things and start to 
begin to criticise in my mind it’s beginning ,when a lecturer says something it'll 
throw up in my mind what do I think about that but em, I never really expected 
to have a lot of you know analytical skills first off. (yes)
Interviewer: So again that is as you say relates to this notion of like 'feeling 
your way' before you start sounding off - not that you would! But in a sense is 
there anything else perhaps with one eye on lawyering as a job you know is 
there anything else as opposed to Law you know your own perceptions but in a 
sense is there anything in law and legal scholarship so far that you think are 
different ?
Student: Em, I find it’s more of a personal subject for me, I find that it affects 
me in what I think like the debates about law and the Internet I think ooh 
maybe you’ll have to be careful! Whereas in English I’ve read books - criticism 
- and that was the end of that it didn’t affect me, it didn’t get into my heart, my 
mind yeah
Interviewer: Almost in a sense divorced from real life, (yes) - law - just be 
careful how you tread!
Student: Yes because a book you can close it and put it away on the shelf 
whereas Law (laughter tape indistinct)
Interviewer: Now this is perhaps a bit more difficult em, again there's different 
ways of thinking about critical thinking Can you perhaps first of all talk about a 
situation em, where either you or someone else was being kind of pretty 
illogical, you realised a flaw in their argument you know but can you see what 
I’m getting at can you think of anything, that's difficult coming to this cold but in 
a sense can you think of any situation where that kind of thing emerges and it 
could be you it could be a friend or a relative or someone on TV- a politician, a 
talking head as they call them
Student: Em, in one sense like discussing academically flawed you know in 
law teamwork sometimes I find it a little bit hard because somebody wants to 
do it that way. In Law & Contemporary Society last week we did about learning 
styles, talked about reflection I'm a Reflector I like to think, plan as well I don’t 
want to be in there panicking I want to get back out ! - I find that illogical, 
completely illogical, can’t be doing that whereas some people do
Interviewer: Can you say a bit more why? Can you say why you actually say 
that's illogical? Activists?
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Student: Em, em. In my mind I’ve got my own way of doing things the way I 
think I start work I plan my time I’ve got my own research and structure the way 
I do things to me it seems illogical to just not have a structure, to not have a 
plan and to not prepare ...
Interviewer: And that’s kind of illogical in the sense .-. illogical in the sense that 
you expect you know if you plan and reflect in advance you improve you're 
likely to have a better outcome - that kind of logic - process
Student: Yes logic, process and structure like in exams, prepare for seminars 
and the best coursework - 1 had a plan and with my A Levels and stuff (you do 
get enthusiasm ) - people who jump in I - I'd just panic I think we’re not going 
to do it, we’re going to fail, this is going to happen and oh my god. It’s like I 
never did Drama then we were you know forced to in year eight and then we'd 
got to choose it, I hated it. It was stand there in a group and then I don’t know 
oh ten minutes make something up we could - first couple of minutes and then 
how we gonna do it, how we gonna you know open it how we gonna close it. 
Yeh that kind of thing (laughter)
Interviewer: I get the impression from that you like a clear line of planned 
activity, structure, process, purpose, clear relationships.(tape indistinct). Em, 
can I just ask you in a sense the opposite this is perhaps even more difficult but 
in a sense can you think of a situation where you or a friend were taken in by 
an argument-you know what I mean -duped-fallen for an argument you 
subsequently realised was weak.
Student: I found that like this year when it came to voting I found I was (tape 
indistinct) oh brilliant that's fine I was trying to work out what was going on I 
thought that was one party that I might actually vote for.
Interviewer: Yes anything else?
Student: Em
Interviewer: You know do you get involved with violent political arguments 
Student: No I'm not interested in politics
Interviewer: Ok, can you think of a situation as well when in a sense the 
opposite was true I mean you talked in a sense about being the reflector in the 
group sort of situation but can you think of a situation perhaps where you did 
the opposite where you’ve been demonstrating a high level or a reasonably 
high level of critical thinking, critical analysis you know in terms of could be 
something academic or it could be sort of more general where you've brought 
your critical powers as it were to bear on a situation to good effect
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Student: Where I've actually used critical powers 
Interviewer: Yes.
Student: Em, I don't really tend to watch the news or buy a newspaper but 
when I do what it throws up I tend to criticise it and get right involved in it. I live 
with my boyfriend we have a newspaper every night - Where he tends to be 
like a very you know openly opinioned person I want to just sit and be quiet but 
newspapers drive me mad
Interviewer: And is that because in a sense that links back to what I was 
arguing just now is that because you disagree with the content, the dodgy 
sloppy thinking the one-sidedness that kind of thing
Student: Yes, it’s not a rounded argument all right so somebody's done this so 
the newspaper thinks that but what about the other side of the story- and that’s 
frustrating.
Interviewer: Am I right in thinking then that’s again something to do with the 
idea of sides the idea of wanting to see the whole picture
Student: Yes the whole picture if there’s something else that I can think of. I 
think well you know what if somebody just takes it as read and you end up in a 
seminar where people can't see the two sides of an argument or like have a 
debate that is how it is and that’s the end of it. There’s no way in, that’s how it 
is and no one else has got the balance it winds me up I’m that kind of person 
you know - will challenge that
Interviewer: Is, I mean is it just two things really I mean there is the broad 
question I want to ask you is there anything else that occurs to you thinking 
about that I wanted to ask you I don’t want to push you put words in your mouth 
is that something, I’m getting an impression from you that it’s something not 
just about academic work not just about what this assessment sheet's about Is 
it more a kind of would you agree with this phrase a habit of mind
Student: I think it is yes I think yes I think I’ve got it in my personal life, your 
social life sometimes it’s not even worth arguing the toss you know I try and 
suggest it but they won’t have it but it’s always there, I find it’s always there in 
my mind as well as my life with Law it won't go back in the box I could do that 
more with Literature (as you were saying) it was just like lesson's over I 
(laughter)
Interviewer: Do you think that just pushing that little bit harder what we call 
habit of mind or cast of mind is that something that you see, that you recognise 
it in other people
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Student: I definitely recognise it in myself but I’m not sure about other people 
as such
Interviewer: Not like they've got a big spot on their face!
Student: No it’s not like a badge of your critical thinking. Em, in my own mind 
you know I could have put it forward then and people probably might not know 
what's going off in my mind if I’m having an argument but maybe it’s going on in 
their mind and they’re not telling me
Interviewer: And do you think you are kind of you know think you were kind of 
born with it?
Student: I think it’s there (and your parents kind of foster it?)
Interviewer: Coming out
Student: (tape indistinct) I just come out with it
Interviewer: Do you think it’s linked to the reading that thing of being an avid 
reader?
Student: Probably I think I do kind of I've been conscious of it since I started at 
secondary school sometimes I find things in my mind a bit too much - won't get 
out - it's a bit too much
Interviewer: In a sense do you think it would be desirable would the world be 
a better place if people demonstrated more critical faculties are you saying it 
would make the world a better place?
Student: I think sometimes people do things that they don’t really think about
the consequences and that - 1 read about protests against 4 by 4s - first thing I 
thought - who owns these 4 by 4s? People with money? Professionals? 
Doctors? What about their patients? I get right wound up about that.
Interviewer: All right then that was great. Thank you very much.
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